UPC commentary
The Rules of Procedure of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) define how cases are conducted before the Court. From case initiation and evidence gathering to hearings, judgments, and appeals, these rules form the procedural backbone of UPC litigation.
- As of 1 January 2026 -
1. The Court shall conduct proceedings in accordance with the Agreement, the Statute and these Rules. In the event of a conflict between the provisions of the Agreement and/or the Statute on the one hand and of the Rules on the other hand, the provisions of the Agreement and/or the Statute shall prevail.
2. The Rules shall be applied and interpreted in accordance with Articles 41(3), 42 and 52(1) of the Agreement on the basis of the principles of proportionality, flexibility, fairness and equity.
3. Proportionality shall be ensured by giving due consideration to the nature and complexity of each action and its importance.
4. Flexibility shall be ensured by applying all procedural rules in a flexible and balanced manner with the required level of discretion for the judges to organise the proceedings in the most efficient and cost effective manner.
5. Fairness and equity shall be ensured by having regard to the legitimate interests of all parties.
6. In accordance with these principles, the Court shall apply and interpret the Rules in a way which shall ensure decisions of the highest quality.
7. In accordance with these principles, proceedings shall be conducted in a way which will normally allow the final oral hearing on the issues of infringement and validity at first instance to take place within one year whilst recognising that complex actions may require more time and procedural steps and simple actions less time and fewer procedural steps. Decisions on costs and/or damages may take place at the same time or as soon as practicable thereafter. Case management shall be organised in accordance with these objectives. Parties shall cooperate with the Court and set out their full case as early as possible in the proceedings.
8. The Court shall endeavour to ensure consistent application and interpretation of these Rules by all first instance divisions and the Court of Appeal. Due consideration shall also be given to this objective in any decision concerning leave to appeal against procedural orders.
1. The Court shall conduct proceedings in accordance with the Agreement, the Statute and these Rules, which include the Preamble to these Rules and the principles set out therein. In the event of a conflict between the provisions of the Agreement and/or the Statute on the one hand and of the Rules on the other hand, the provisions of the Agreement and/or the Statute shall prevail.
2. Where these Rules provide for the Court to perform any act other than an act exclusively reserved for a panel of the Court, the President of the Court of First Instance or the President of the Court of Appeal, that act may be performed by:
(a) the presiding judge or the judge-rapporteur of the panel to which the action has been assigned;
(b) a single legally qualified judge where the action has been assigned to a single judge;
(c) the standing judge designated pursuant to Rule 345.5.
3. References to persons in these Rules may apply to legal persons as well as natural persons. Words importing the masculine gender shall include the feminine and vice versa. Unless the contrary intention appears, words in the singular include the plural and vice versa.
Relation with Agreement: Article 8(7)
Relation with Statute: Article 19(3) and (4)
Where these Rules refer to the Registry or Registrar and provide to perform any act that reference shall include – where applicable – the Deputy-Registrar and the relevant sub-registry and that act may be performed by the Registrar, the Deputy-Registrar or by a member of staff of the Registry or sub-registry of the relevant division.
Relation with Agreement: Article 44
The Court of Appeal clarified in its Decision UPC_CoA_61/2026 issued on 22.05.2026 (SharkNinja v. Group SEB the signature requirements as follows:
Electronic signature means a signature on the document itself
The immediate issue arose because SEB filed observations on SharkNinja’s confidentiality request within the deadline, but the filed documents themselves did not contain an electronic signature. SEB argued that the CMS login and submission process, including secure dual authentication and the “sign submission” functionality, should suffice.
The Court rejected that argument.
It held that Rule 4.1 RoP requires the procedural document itself to be signed. The CMS authentication process may verify the identity of the user submitting the document, but that does not establish that the actual content of the procedural document is necessarily attributable to the authorised representative in the legally required sense. In the Court’s words, legal certainty requires the authenticity of the procedural document itself to be guaranteed and the risk excluded that the filing is not in fact the work of the person authorised to submit it.
1. The proprietor of a European patent (including a European patent that has expired) or the applicant for a published application for a European patent (hereinafter in this Rule 5 an “application”) who wishes to opt out that patent or application from the exclusive competence of the Court in accordance with Article 83(3) of the Agreement shall lodge an Application (hereinafter in this Rule 5 an “Application to opt out”) with the Registry.
(a) Where the patent or application is owned by two or more proprietors or applicants, all proprietors or applicants shall lodge the Application to opt out. Where the person lodging an Application to opt out is not recorded as the proprietor or applicant in the registers referred to in Rule 8.5(a) and (b), respectively, the person shall lodge a declaration pursuant to paragraph 3(e).
(b) The Application to opt out shall be made in respect of all of the states for which the European patent has been granted or which have been designated in the application.
2. An Application to opt out or an Application to withdraw an opt-out pursuant to paragraph 7 (hereinafter in this Rule 5 an “Application to withdraw”) shall extend to any supplementary protection certificate based on the European patent.
(a) Where any such supplementary protection certificate has been granted at the date of lodging the Application to opt out or the Application to withdraw, the holder of the supplementary protection certificate shall, if different from the proprietor of the patent, lodge the Application to opt out or the Application to withdraw together with the proprietor.
(b) Where any such supplementary protection certificate is granted subsequent to lodging the Application to opt out, the opt-out shall take effect automatically on grant of said supplementary protection certificate.
(c) Paragraphs 6 and 8 shall apply mutatis mutandis. For the purposes of paragraphs 6 and 8, reference to actions (i) in respect of a European patent shall apply to all supplementary protection certificates based on that European patent, and (ii) in respect of a supplementary protection certificate shall apply to the European patent on which such supplementary protection certificate is based and (iii) in respect of a supplementary protection certificate shall apply to all other supplementary protection certificates based on the same European patent.
(d) For the avoidance of doubt, it is not possible to opt out supplementary protection certificates, whether granted by the authorities of a Contracting Member State or otherwise, based on a European patent with unitary effect.
3. The Application to opt out shall contain:
(a) the name of each proprietor or applicant for the European patent or application and of the holder of any supplementary protection certificate based on the European patent in question, and all relevant postal and, where applicable, electronic addresses;
(b) the name and postal address and electronic address of (i) the representative appointed by the applicant or the proprietor in accordance with Article 48 of the Agreement or (ii) any other person lodging the Application to opt out on behalf of the proprietor or theapplicant and the mandate for lodging the Application to opt out;
(c) details of the patent and/or application including the EP publication number;
(d) details of any supplementary protection certificate granted based on the patent concerned, including the number; and
(e) for the purposes of paragraph 1(a), a declaration by or on behalf of each proprietor or applicantpursuant to Rule 8.5 that he is entitled to be registered in the national patent register.
4. Rule 8 shall not apply to Applications to opt out and to Applications to withdraw made pursuant tothis Rule 5.
5. The Registrar shall as soon as practicable enter the Application to opt out in the register. Subject to paragraph 6, the opt-out which meets the requirements laid down in this Rule shall be regarded as effective from the date of entry in the register. If the requirements recorded in the register are missing or incorrect, a correction may be lodged with the Registry. The date of entry of the correction shall be noted in the register. The opt-out shall be effective from the date of correction.
6. In the event that an action has been commenced before the Court in respect of a patent and/or an application contained in an Application to opt out prior to the date of entry of the Application to opt out in the register or prior to the date of correction pursuant to paragraph 5, the Application to opt out shall be ineffective in respect of the patent and/or application in question, irrespective of whether the action is pending or has been concluded.
7. A proprietor of a patent or an application the subject of an opt-out pursuant to this Rule may lodge an Application to withdraw in respect of the patent or application, but not in respect of different states for which the European patent has been granted or which have been designated in the application. The Application to withdraw shall contain the particulars in accordance with paragraph 3. The Registrar shall as soon as practicable enter the Application to withdraw in the register and the withdrawal shall be regarded as effective from the date of entry in the register. Paragraphs 1(a) and 5 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
8. In the event that an action has been commenced before a court of a Contracting Member State in a matter over which the Court also has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 32 of the Agreement in respect of a patent or application contained in an Application to withdraw, prior to the entry of the Application to withdraw in the register or any time before the date pursuant to paragraph 5, the Application to withdraw shall be ineffective in respect of the patent or application in question, irrespective of whether the action is pending or has been concluded.
9. Where an application for a European patent subject to an opt-out pursuant to this Rule proceeds to grant as a European patent with unitary effect the opt-out shall be deemed to have been withdrawn and the Registrar shall as soon as practicable enter the withdrawal in the register.
10. A patent or application the subject of an Application to withdraw which has been entered on the register may not thereafter be the subject of a further Application to opt out.
11. The Registrar shall as soon as practicable notify the European Patent Office and the national patent office of any Contracting Member States concerned of the entries in the register pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 7.
12. Applications accepted by the Registry before the entry into force of the Agreement shall be treated as entered on the register on the date of entry into force of the Agreement.
Relation with Agreement: Article 83(3) and (4)
1. The Registry shall as soon as practicable serve, in accordance with Part 5, Chapter 2:
(a) orders and decisions of the Court on the parties;
(b) written pleadings and other documents of a party on the other party.
Where applicable, the Registry shall inform the parties of the opportunity to reply or to take any other appropriate step in the proceedings and of any time period for so doing.
2. The Registry shall also as soon as practicable supply to the parties copies of documents referred to in these Rules and lodged with pleadings and written evidence.
3. Where the postal or electronic address for service provided by a party pursuant to these Rules has changed that party shall give notice to the Registry and to every other party as soon as such change has taken place.
1. A party shall be represented in accordance with Article 48 of the Agreement unless otherwise provided by these Rules [Rules 5, 88.4 and 378.5].
2. For the purpose of all proceedings in relation to a patent, where these Rules provide that a party performs any act or that any act be performed upon a party that act shall be performed by or upon the representative for the time being of the party.
3. Except where these Rules provide otherwise, a party shall not communicate with the Court without informing the other party. Where such communication is in writing, the communication should be copied to the other party unless these Rules provide that the Court will supply a copy to the other party.
4. For the purposes of proceedings under these Rules in relation to the proprietor of a European patent with unitary effect, the person shown in the Register for unitary patent protection [Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012, Article 2(e)] as the proprietor shall be treated as such. If during proceedings before the Court a new proprietor is recorded in the Register for unitary patent protection, the former registered proprietor may apply to the Court pursuant to Rule 305.1(c) for the substitution of the new proprietor.
5. Subject to paragraph 6, for the purposes of proceedings under these Rules:
(a) in relation to the proprietor of a European patent, the person entitled to be registered as proprietor under the law of each Contracting Member State in which such European patent has been validated shall be treated as the proprietor whether or not such person is in fact recorded in the register of patents maintained in such Contracting Member State (hereinafter “national patent register”); and
(b) in relation to the applicant for a European patent, the person entitled to be registered as applicant whether or not such person is in fact recorded as such in the European Patent Register kept by the European Patent Office.
(c) For the purposes of paragraph 5, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person shown in each national patent register and the European Patent Register kept by the European Patent Office is the person entitled to be registered as proprietor or applicant as the case may be.
6. For the purposes of proceedings pursuant to Rules 42 and 61 in relation to a European patent, the person shown in the national patent register [Rule 8.5(a)] as the proprietor shall be treated as such for each Contracting Member State or, as far as no such person is registered in a national patent register, the last person shown recorded as proprietor in the European Patent Register kept by the European Patent Office.
Relation with Agreement: Article 48
In the Decision UPC_CFI_100/2024 and UPC_CFI_411/2024 (Ona Patents/Ekahau vs. Google) issued on 15.01.2026 the LD Düsseldorf confirmed that the Rules of Procedure show that in constellations where a claimant wants to obtain a decision to remove the effects of a granted patent (be it the validity of the patent or the declaration that a specific act does not constitute an infringement) the law prioritizes the registration over the entitlement. Ratio legis is the legal certainty for the claimant. It does not have the burden to “search” the entitled proprietor.
For assessing the proprietorship in the context of a counterclaim for revocation, the Rules of Procedure contain specific provisions. Rule 8.6 RoP stipulates that for the purpose of proceedings pursuant to Rules 42 and 61 in relation to a European patent, the person shown in the national patent register shall be treated as such for each Contracting Member State. Rule 42.1 RoP states that any action for the revocation of a patent shall be directed against the proprietor of the patent. The wording of the provision (“any action for the revocation”) also includes a counterclaim for revocation. This understanding is supported by Rule 25.1 RoP, stating that the counterclaim shall be included in the statement of Defence against the proprietor of the patent for revocation of said patent in accordance with Rule 42 RoP. Rule 8.6 RoP takes precedence over Rule 8.5 RoP as Rule 8.5 stipulates “subject to paragraph 6”.
The Rules of Procedure show that in constellations where a claimant wants to obtain a decision to remove the effects of a granted patent (be it the validity of the patent or the declaration that a specific act does not constitute an infringement) the law prioritizes the registration over the entitlement. Ratio legis is the legal certainty for the claimant. It does not have the burden to “search” the entitled proprietor. It is for the registered proprietor and the entitled proprietor to apply to the Court for the substitution of the registered proprietor in a situation of non-identity (Rule 42.2, 61.2 RoP). In a revocation situation, the claimant's legal protection needs are not affected by whether the registered proprietor is entitled to hold the patent, as long as the requested decision results in the patent being revoked.
The situation may be different in a case of a counterclaim of revocation in which the entitlement of the registered person is effectively rebutted in the corresponding infringement action and the question of the entitlement is decisive for the infringement action. The reason lies here in the procedural dependency of the counterclaim. A defendant asserting invalidity is obliged to include a counterclaim against the proprietor of the patent pursuant to Rule 25.1 RoP. If the presumption of the claimant´s entitlement to be registered is effectively rebutted and the entitlement must be investigated in detail for the outcome of the infringement decision, the result of this investigation will be taken into account in the counterclaim as well. The requirements of an effective rebuttal have not yet been defined in detail by the Court, which is also not necessary in a case of non-infringement, because then the entitlement is not decisive for the infringement action. And in such cases, the entitlement is also not relevant to the counterclaim as Rule 8.6 RoP prevails.
In the case UPC_CFI_100/2024 and UPC_CFI_411/2024 at hand the following situation was decided:
At the time of filing the Counterclaim, the German and French registers show the Counterdefendant 2) as proprietor. In that moment, it was reasonable for the Defendant to direct the counterclaim to both, the Claimant and Counterdefendant 2), to comply with Rules 25.1 and 42 RoP. During the proceedings, the Claimant became the registered proprietor. The parties disputed the entitlement in the infringement action and in the counterclaim. In the case at hand, the Court found no infringement. As laid out above, the question of entitlement is thus not relevant for the Counterclaim. According to Rule 8.6 RoP the Claimant was the proprietor of the patent in suit and the Counterdefendant 2) was not/no longer the patent owner. Both the Claimant and the Counterdefendant 2) agreed on this, as the Counterdefendant 2) had requested to order that it ceases to be a party in the counterclaim proceedings.
1. The Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, of its own motion or on a reasoned request by a party, make a procedural order such as to order a party to take any step, answer any question or provide any clarification or evidence, within time periods to be specified.
2. The Court may disregard any step, fact, evidence or argument which a party has not taken orsubmitted in accordance with a time limit set by the Court or these Rules.
3. Subject to paragraph 4, on a reasoned request by a party, the Court may:
(a) extend, even retrospectively, a time period referred to in these Rules or imposed by the Court; and
(b) shorten any such time period.
4. The Court shall not extend the time periods referred to in Rules 198.1, 213.1 and 224.1.
UPC_CFI_457/2023 (Dolby v HP, order of 19 January 2024 – Düsseldorf Local Division) demonstrates the Court’s cautious use of the discretionary power in Rule 9.3(a) to extend deadlines. The judge rapporteur stressed that the UPC’s accelerated timetable is the rule; extensions are confined to justified exceptional cases. The extension granted here rested on three elements: (i) fifteen defendants, most abroad, had not yet been served; (ii) defence counsel offered to accept service for all defendants and waived re-service, streamlining procedure; and (iii) the claimant consented. Harmonising the new deadlines (15 February 2024 for oppositions; 3 May 2024 for statements of defence) ensured a single timetable for all parties and avoided staggered pleadings. The order confirms that cooperative procedural steps and clear logistical barriers – not counsel workload alone – can qualify as exceptional circumstances under Rule 9.3.
UPC_CFI_363/2023 (Seoul Viosys v expert e Commerce & expert klein, Order of 20 January 2024 – Düsseldorf Local Division) further illustrates the UPC’s strict approach to extensions under Rule 9.3(a). The judge rapporteur rejected the defendants’ request to add two weeks to the deadlines for defence and counterclaim because no exceptional circumstance was shown. A generic statement that the CMS had been inaccessible “for an extended period” was inadequate: the writ and exhibits had been served on paper, so the parties possessed all material needed to prepare pleadings, and there was no evidence that uploading to the CMS would be impossible by the deadline. The order echoes UPC_CFI_475/2023 (19 January 2024) that Rule 9.3 departures must remain rare and fact specific, aligned with the UPCA’s goal of swift proceedings.
Practice point. Parties seeking more time must provide concrete, verifiable obstacles (e.g., large-scale foreign service, parallel settlement discussions, or documented technical failures) and explain why those obstacles cannot be mitigated. Mere workload issues or vague IT complaints will not suffice.
This has been confirmed by the LD Mannheim in its Procedural Order UPC_CFI_162/2024 issued on 04.08.2025 (Hurom v. NUC Electronics) where it is stated:
Further, the Court of Appeal granted in its Order UPC_COA:pending issued on 24.09.2025 (Industriebeteiligungs- und Beratungs GmbH et al v. Washtower) a time extension of three days upon a request for a two weeks extension in view of the fact that the two lead attorneys of the Appellants had to attend oral proceedings before the EPO one day before and at the day by when the Statement of grounds of appeal were to be lodged. The grounds for the granted three days' time extension were as follows:
The Court of Appeal stated in its Decision UPC_CoA_61/2026 issued on 22.05.2026(SharkNinja v. Group SEB that R. 9.3 (a) RoP expressly allows the retroactive extension of a time period. This means that an extension order can be issued after the time period has expired and also that the Court may grant a time extension even if the applicant lodged the request for extension after the time period has expired.
The Court relied on existing Court of Appeal practice, including Ocado v X, but the practical significance of the present order lies in the specific application of that principle to a filing defect scenario.
Importantly, the Court considered the error excusable because no prior Court of Appeal decision or order had clarified whether CMS submission alone satisfied Rule 4.1 RoP. Referring to the principles of fairness and equity in the Preamble to the Rules of Procedure, the Court granted a one-day retroactive extension, thereby validating the corrected signed filing lodged the following day.
R. 9 RoP applies to pending proceedings. R. 9.3 RoP may therefore be applied where the procedural document for which an extension is sought does not initiate new proceedings. Observations on a confidentiality request under R. 262A RoP do not initiate new proceedings and may accordingly be subject to an extension under R. 9.3 RoP (Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_61/2026, order of 22 May 2026 – SharkNinja v Groupe SEB; referring to Hanshow v VusionGroup, Angelalign v Align Technology and Optopol v Topcon).
UPC_CFI_412/2023 (ITCiCo Spain v BMW, Central Division Paris, order of 9 February 2024) explores the limits of the Court’s discretion to enlarge deadlines. Relying on Rule 9(3) and the proportionality and fairness principles in the Preamble, the judge rapporteur refused to prolong the two month window for the Statement of Defence. The Court stressed that an extension is warranted only where compliance is objectively impossible or exceedingly difficult for reasons outside the party’s control. Here, service of the writ by post on 25 November 2023 gave the defendant enough information to prepare a defence even without the exhibits; CMS access issues and counsel illness were (i) unsupported by evidence and (ii) raised only on the final day of the deadline. Such last minute requests, especially when the impediment arose earlier, conflict with the duty of procedural fairness. The order therefore reinforces that parties must act diligently, gather proof of genuine obstacles and seek relief promptly – otherwise the accelerated UPC timetable prevails.
Ad Request to disregard (unsolicitated) submissions in consideration of R. 9.2 RoP and R. 36 RoP
With Procedural Order UPC_CFI_521/2024 issued on 27.08.2025 by the LD Mannheim (Decathlon v. OWIM/LIDL/Kaufland) the Court disregarded unsolicited summaries of the parties’ arguments on the validity/invalidity of the patent-in-suit outside the regular pleading regime for the RoP.
The above order is based on R. 9.2 RoP and R. 36 RoP.
1. Pursuant to R. 9.2 RoP, the Court may disregard any step, fact, evidence or argument which a party has not taken or submitted in accordance with a time limit set by the Court or the Rules of Procedures. According to R. 36 RoP, any written submission in addition to the written pleadings provided for in the RoP requires permission by the court. It follows that the court may, at its discretion, disregard not only unsolicited written submissions in addition to the regular written pleadings provided for in the RoP, but also the content of regular written pleadings that goes beyond the admissible content provided for in the RoP.
According to R. 32.3 RoP, the content of the Defendants’ rejoinder to the application to amend the patent (AA= entitled “Reply to the Statement of Rejoinder to the Counterclaim for Revocation and Reply to the Statement of Reply to the Application to Amend the Patent”) and relating to the validity of the patent-in-suit as granted, shall be limited to matters raised in the aforementioned reply AA. Contrary to the Defendants, this restriction applies not only to new arguments or facts but to any submission that goes beyond the matters raised in the said reply AA. It is therefore irrelevant whether the part that goes beyond the content permitted under R. 32.3 RoP merely contains a summary of the parties’ arguments on the validity/invalidity of the patent as granted. Otherwise, the claimant of a counterclaim for revocation who files the last written submission in the written procedure in the event of an AA would have an inappropriate advantage over the patent owner for whom no further regular written submission is provided for in the written procedure in which a summary of the parties’ arguments could be included. Furthermore, it is up to the judge-rapporteur to ask the parties for a summary if the court wishes to obtain one (cf. R. 101.1 RoP in conjunction with R. 103.1 (d), R. 104 (e) RoP).
2. Applying these principles, the excess part of the Defendants’ rejoinder AA is disregarded.
According to Defendants’ own statements, the excess part of their rejoinder AA only contains a mere summary of the parties’ arguments regarding the validity/invalidity of the patent-in-suit as granted. Even if this were true, there is no need to allow such an alleged summary. Taking all circumstances of the individual case and the interests of the parties into account, this part of the rejoinder AA is therefore rejected. The court has an interest in not allowing unsolicited alleged summaries of the parties’ arguments on the validity/invalidity of the patent-in-suit outside the regular pleading regime provided for in the RoP.
Proceedings before the Court of First Instance shall consist of the following stages:
(a) a written procedure;
(b) an interim procedure, which may include an interim conference with the parties;
(c) an oral procedure which, subject to Rules 116.1 and 117, shall include an oral hearing of the parties unless the Court dispenses with the oral hearing with the agreement of the parties;
(d) a procedure for the award of damages, which may include a procedure to lay open books;
(e) a procedure for cost decisions.
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
1. The written procedure shall consist of:
(a) the lodging of a Statement of claim (by the claimant) [Rule 13];
(b) the lodging of a Statement of defence (by the defendant) [Rules 23 and 24]; and, optionally
(c) the lodging of a Reply to the Statement of defence (by the claimant) [Rule 29(b)]; and
(d) the lodging of a Rejoinder to the Reply (by the defendant) [Rule 29(c)].
2. The Statement of defence may include a Counterclaim for revocation [Rule 25.1].
3. If a Counterclaim for revocation is lodged:
(a) the claimant and any proprietor who becomes a party pursuant to Rule 25.2 (hereinafter in this Rule 12 and Rules 29 to 32, “the proprietor”) shall lodge a Defence to the Counterclaim for revocation [Rule 29(a)], which may include an Application to amend the patent by the proprietor [Rule 30];
(b) the defendant may lodge a Reply to the Defence to the Counterclaim [Rule 29(d)]; and
(c) the claimant and the proprietor may lodge a Rejoinder to the Reply to the Defence to the Counterclaim [Rule 29(e)].
4. If an Application to amend the patent is lodged by the proprietor, the defendant shall lodge a Defence to the Application to amend the patent in the Reply to the Defence to the Counterclaim, the proprietor may lodge a Reply to the Defence to the Application to amend and the defendant may lodge a Rejoinder to such Reply [Rule 32].
5. The judge-rapporteur may allow the exchange of further written pleadings, within time periods to be specified [Rule 36].
1. The claimant shall lodge a Statement of claim with the division chosen by him [Article 33 of the Agreement] which shall contain:
(a) the name of the claimant, and, where the claimant is a corporate entity, the location of its registered office, and of the claimant’s representative;
(b) the name of the party against whom the Statement is made (the defendant), and, where the defendant is a corporate entity, the location of its registered office;
(c) postal and electronic addresses for service on the claimant and the names of the persons authorised to accept service;
(d) postal and, where available, electronic addresses for service on the defendant and the names of the persons authorised to accept service, if known;
(e) where the claimant is not the proprietor or not the only proprietor of the patent concerned, postal and where available, electronic addresses for service on the proprietor and the names and addresses of the persons authorised to accept service, if known;
(f) where the claimant is not the proprietor of the patent concerned, or not the only proprietor, evidence to show the claimant is entitled to commence proceedings [Article 47(2) and (3) of the Agreement];
(g) details of the patent concerned, including the number;
(h) where applicable, information about any prior or pending proceedings relating to the patent concerned before the Court including any action for revocation or a declaration of non-infringement pending before the central division and the date of any such action, the European Patent Office or any other court or authority;
(i) an indication of the division which shall hear the action [Article 33(1) to (6) of the Agreement] with an explanation of why that division has competence; where the parties have agreed in accordance with Article 33(7) of the Agreement, the indication of the division which shall hear the action shall be accompanied by evidence of the defendant’s agreement;
(j) where applicable, an indication that the action shall be heard by a single judge [Article 8(7) of the Agreement], accompanied by evidence of the defendant’s agreement;
(k) the nature of the claim, the order or the remedy sought by the claimant;
(l) an indication of the facts relied on, in particular: (i) one or more instances of alleged infringements or threatened infringements specifying the date
and place of each; (ii) the identification of the patent claims alleged to be infringed;
(m) the evidence relied on [Rule 170.1], where available, and an indication of any further evidence which will be offered in support;
(n) the reasons why the facts relied on constitute an infringement of the patent claims, including arguments of law and where appropriate an explanation of the proposed claim interpretation;
(o) an indication of any order the claimant will seek during the interim procedure [Rule 104(e)];
(p) where the claimant assesses that the value of the infringement action exceeds EUR500.000, an indication of the value; and
(q) a list of the documents, including any witness statements, referred to in the Statement of claim, together with any request that all or part of any such document need not be translated and/or any request pursuant to Rule 262.2 or Rule 262A.
2. The claimant shall at the same time supply a copy of each of the documents referred to in the Statement of claim.
3. The judge-rapporteur shall decide on any request made pursuant to paragraph 1(q) as soon as practicable after his designation pursuant to Rule 18.
In the decision UPC_CFI_248/2024 of the LD Munich issued on 22.08.2025 (Brita v. Aquashields et al) the following has to be considered when drafting the Statement of Claim:
According to Article 43 of the UPCA, the parties determine the subject matter of the proceedings. In the case of an infringement action, the subject matter of the dispute is determined by the plaintiff by means of the claims set out in the statement of claim and the facts presented in support of those claims (Rule 13(1)(g), (k), (l) and (n) of the RoP). The (actual) facts of the case presented by the claimant, together with the claim, specify the desired legal consequences. Accordingly, the facts from which the defendant's actions are to be inferred, which are or are to be qualified as an infringement of the patent in dispute, are relevant for determining the subject matter of a patent infringement action (Rule 13(1)(l) RoP).
These facts typically include, first and foremost, the actual design of a specific product or process referred to as the contested embodiment with regard to the features of the asserted patent. These facts typically include first and foremost the actual design of a specific product or process referred to as the contested embodiment with regard to the features of the asserted patent claim.
Even if the mention of a product name, order number, model name or similar may contribute to the identification of an infringing embodiment, which is why it is generally advisable to reproduce these in a statement of claim, the designation, name or number alone does not determine the infringing embodiment. As explained above, what is decisive is the actual design of the contested product in relation to the features of the patent in dispute. It is therefore necessary to present the facts in this respect. A different actual design of a product that is relevant in view of the features of the patent in dispute therefore leads to different embodiments. This is the case even if the different designs are manufactured, offered and/or distributed under the same designation.
1. Without prejudice to Articles 49(3) to (6) of the Agreement and subject to paragraph 2 and Rules 271.7, 321 to 323, proceedings shall be conducted:
(a) in the official language or one of the official languages designated as language(s) of proceedings pursuant to Article 49(1) of the Agreement; or
(b) in a language designated as language of proceedings by a Contracting Member State pursuant to Article 49(2) of the Agreement.
2. Where a Contracting Member State hosts a local division or participates in a regional division for which several languages have been designated pursuant to Article 49(1) and/or Article 49(2) of the Agreement:
(a) subject to paragraphs 2(b) and (c), the claimant may choose as the language of proceedings any of the language(s) designated pursuant to Article 49(1) and/or Article 49(2) of the Agreement;
(b) in proceedings before a local or regional division in a Contracting Member State against a defendant who has his domicile or principal place of business in that Contracting Member State where the action could not be brought pursuant to Article 33(1)(a) of the Agreement before any other local or regional division, proceedings shall be conducted in the official language of the Contracting Member State (paragraph 1(a)). Where a designation by a Contracting Member State having several official regional languages so indicates, proceedings shall be conducted in the official language of the region in which the defendant has his domicile or principal place of business. Where there are two or more such defendants whose domicile or principle place of business has different regional languages, the claimant may choose the language from the regional languages in question. Where a designation by a Contracting Member State having several official languages so indicates, proceedings shall be conducted in the official language of the defendant. Where there are two or more such defendants with different official languages, the claimant may choose the language from the official languages in question.
(c) Where a designation of a language under Article 49(2) of the Agreement for a regional division or for one or more local division(s) hosted in a Member State so indicates, the judge-rapporteur may order in the interest of the panel to provide that judges may use in the oral proceedings the language according to paragraph 1(a) and/or to provide that the Court may make any order and deliver any decision in the language according to paragraph 1(a) together with a certified translation for the purpose of Rule 118.8 into the language according to paragraph 1(b).
3. The Registrar shall maintain a list of languages communicated by Contracting Member States pursuant to Article 49(1) and Article 49(2) of the Agreement as well as designations by Contracting Member States made pursuant to paragraph 2(b) and (c). The list shall be made publically available online.
4. The Registrar shall return any pleading lodged in a language other than the language of proceedings.
1. The Registry shall as soon as practicable check whether the patent concerned is the subject of an optout pursuant to Article 83(3) of the Agreement and Rule 5. In the event of an opt-out the Registry shall as soon as practicable inform the claimant who may withdraw or amend the Statement of claim as appropriate.
2. The Registry shall, as soon as practicable after the lodging of the Statement of claim, examine whether the requirements of Rules 13.1 (a) to (j), .2, 14 and 15.1 have been complied with.
3. If the claimant has not complied with the requirements referred to in paragraph 2, the Registry shall as soon as practicable invite the claimant to:
(a) correct the deficiencies within 14 days of service of such notification; and
(b) where applicable, pay the fee for the infringement action within said 14 days.
4. The Registry shall at the same time inform the claimant that if the claimant fails to correct the deficiencies or pay the fee within the time stated, a decision by default may be given, in accordance with Rule 355.
5. If the claimant fails to correct the deficiencies or pay the fee, the Registry shall inform a judge of the division who may reject the action as inadmissible by a decision by default. The judge may give the claimant an opportunity to be heard beforehand.
1. If the requirements referred to in Rule 16.2 or 16.3 have been complied with, the Registry shall as soon as practicable:
(a) record the date of receipt of the Statement of claim and attribute an action number to the file;
(b) record the file in the register; and
(c) inform the claimant of the action number of the file and the date of receipt.
2. The action shall be assigned to a panel of a division according to Rule 345.3. Where requested by the parties the action shall be assigned to a single judge in accordance with Rule 345.6.
3. The following shall determine the distribution of actions between the seat of the central division and its sections.
(a) Where an action involves a single patent having a single classification, the Registry shall allocate the action to the seat or the section of the central division appropriate to the classification of the patent according to Annex II of the Agreement. The Registry shall assign the action to a panel in accordance with Rule 345.3.
(b) Where an action involves more than one patent and a majority of the patents have a single classification appropriate to the seat or a single section of the central division according to Annex II of the Agreement, the Registry shall allocate the action to the seat or that section of the central division. The Registry shall assign the action to a panel in accordance with Rule 345.3.
(c) Where neither paragraph (a) nor (b) applies, especially where (i) the action involves a single patent having more than one classification or (ii) where the action involves more than one patent and no majority of the patents have a single classification corresponding to the seat or to one of the sections of the central division, the Registry shall assign the action in accordance with Rule 345.3 to the panel at the seat or the section appropriate to the first classification of either the single patent or, where the action involves more than one patent, the patent first listed in the Statement of claim, according to Annex II of the Agreement. If the presiding judge of the respective panel considers that the reference of the action is appropriate, he shall accept it. If he considers otherwise, he shall instruct the Registry to refer the action in accordance with Rule 345.3 to the presiding judge of a panel of either the seat or the other section of the central division he considers appropriate, who shall likewise consider whether the re-allocation of the action is appropriate. If that presiding judge considers otherwise, he shall inform the President of the Court of First Instance, who shall allocate the action to the seat or the section of the central division he considers appropriate. The Registry shall assign the action to a panel in accordance with Rule 345.3.
4. The action shall be regarded as having commenced before the Court as from the date of receipt attributed to the Statement of claim.
Relation with Agreement: Article 7(2), Article 10
The presiding judge of the panel to which the action has been assigned [Rule 17.2] shall designate one legally qualified judge of the panel as judge-rapporteur. The presiding judge may designate himself as judge-rapporteur. The Registry shall as soon as practicable notify the claimant and defendant of the identity of the judge-rapporteur.
1. Within one month of service of the Statement of claim, the defendant may lodge a Preliminary objection concerning:
(a) the jurisdiction and competence of the Court, including any objection that an opt-out pursuant to Rule 5 applies to the patent that is the subject of the proceedings;
(b) the competence of the division indicated by the claimant [Rule 13.1(i)];
(c) the language of the Statement of claim [Rule 14].
2. A Preliminary objection shall contain:
(a) particulars in accordance with Rule 24(a) to (c);
(b) the decision or order sought by the defendant;
(c) the grounds upon which the Preliminary objection is based; and
(d) where appropriate the facts and evidence relied on.
3. The Preliminary objection shall be drawn up in the language pursuant to Rule 14.
4. If the action has been commenced before a regional division the defendant may by a Preliminary objection request a transfer of the action to the central division pursuant to Article 33(2) of the Agreement. The Preliminary objection shall in such a case contain all facts and evidence supporting the existence of the same infringement in the territories of three or more regional divisions.
5. The Registry shall as soon as practicable invite the claimant to comment on the Preliminary objection. Where applicable, the claimant may of his own motion correct any deficiency [paragraph 1(b) or (c)], within 14 days of service of notification of the Preliminary objection. Alternatively the claimant may submit written comments within the same period. The judge-rapporteur shall be informed of any correction made or written comments submitted by the claimant. If the deficiency referred to in paragraph 1(b) is corrected and the claimant has indicated another division, which is competent, the judge-rapporteur shall refer the action to the division indicated by the claimant.
6. The period for lodging the Statement of defence [Rule 23] shall not be affected by the lodging of a Preliminary objection, unless the judge-rapporteur decides otherwise.
7. The defendant’s failure to lodge a Preliminary objection within the time period referred to in paragraph 1 shall be treated as a submission to the jurisdiction and competence of the Court and the competence of the division chosen by the claimant.
In UPC_CFI_163/2024 – Decision of 23 May 2025, the Paris Local Division clarified the distinction between jurisdiction (Articles 31–33 UPCA) and the territorial scope of decisions (Art. 34 UPCA). It held that objections based on Art. 34 UPCA are not preliminary objections under Rule 19 RoP and are therefore admissible even if raised later in the proceedings.
On the merits, the Court confirmed that the UPC has jurisdiction over such claims in line with the CJEU’s decision in BSH v. Electrolux and previous UPC rulings (e.g. UPC_CFI_355/2023, UPC_CFI_702/2024, UPC_CFI_792/2024).
Ad) Objected international jurisdiction and objected competence of a Local Division
Pursuant to the Procedural Order UPC_CFI_575/2025 issued on 12.02.2026 (Honeywell vs. Sovex, Solvest, Hemtech) the LD Mannheim came in a case with six Defendants located in the Netherlands and one Defendant located in Bosnia-Herzogovina to the conclusion in relation to the international jurisdiction according to Art. 31 UPCA, that the Court has also the international jurisdiction based on Art. 31 UPCA in conjunction with Art. 71b(1) and (2) and Art. 7(2) of the Brussels I recast Regulation with regard to the Defendant located in Bosnia-Herzigovina. The Court established (international) jurisdiction and competence based on the facts brought forward. That Claimant did not explicitly mention the second paragraph of Art. 71b Brussels I recast Regulation in the Statement of Claim does not mean that the Court cannot apply this. According to Art. 28 Brussels I recast regulation, the court has to decide on its jurisdiction under Regulation ex officio (ECJ Decision 28 October 2004 – C 148/03 Nürnberger Allgemeine Versicherungs AG/Portbridge Transport International BV). It follows from the facts and 4 statements brought forward in the briefs that the seventh Defendant is not domiciled in the EU and that for international jurisdiction, Art. 31 UPCA and Art. 7(2), 71a and 71b Brussels I recast regulation were at issue. It was furthermore clear that the seventh Defendant was aware of paragraph (2) of Art. 71b and has had the opportunity to comment on its applicability.
The Defendants have given their view on jurisdiction and competence in their extensive Preliminary objection document. Other than the Defendants seem to assert, R. 20(1) RoP does not require that a defendant has to be given another opportunity to be heard. Moreover, the Defendants were able to present their arguments in their application for review.
As stated in former order of 22 October 2025, in the Statement of Claim, the Claimant has sufficiently substantiated that Defendant located in Bosnia-Herzogovina allegedly infringes the patent in a Contracting Member State where the patent is valid. Such an allegation can be done either by stating infringing acts of Defendants jointly and individually. Both has been done by the Claimant. Whether the Defendant located in Bosnia-Herzogovina is in fact involved in infringing activities is to be decided in the case on the merits (CoA 3 September 2024, UPC_CoA_188/2024, Aylo v Dish, para 18).
The Defendants also objected the competence of the LD Mannheim (Art. 33 UPCA). In this respect the Court stated:
As ruled by the Court of Appeal, competence of the divisions of the Court of First Instance, regulated in Art. 33 UPCA, is a UPC internal matter. Internal competence is not governed by the Brussels I Recast Regulation. For the purpose of establishing the competence of a local division, there is no hierarchy between competence based on the place where the actual or threatened infringement has occurred or may occur in Art. 33(1)(a) UPCA, and competence based on the residence or principal place of business of the defendant in Art. 33(1)(b) UPCA. There is no need to look for connecting factors in the territory of the local division seized in relation to each defendant to establish competence. To determine competence under Art. 33(1)(a) UPCA, the existence of infringing activities, for example an offer or the possibility to obtain the allegedly infringing devices through a website accessible in the Contracting Member State hosting the local division, needs to be established. The establishment of whether a first instance division is competent should not be based on a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence in relation to disputed facts that are relevant both to the question of competence and to the existence of the claim, since such an assessment would improperly anticipate the outcome. Rather, the Court will take a cursory look at the parties' allegations and evidence as provided, if any (CoA 28 November 2025, UPC_CoA_317/2025, UPC CoA376/2025, Barco – Yealink, headnotes 3-5). 16. As stated in a former order of 22 October 2025, in the Statement of Claim, the Claimant has sufficiently asserted that infringement has occurred or may occur in - inter alia - Germany. For example, it has stated that the website where the allegedly infringing products are offered is directed at the whole of Europe, so also Germany and that in a brochure in which the products are offered clients from across Europe and in particular Germany are named. Whether or not the alleged acts amount to an actual or threatened infringement in Germany by (each of) the Defendants, is to be decided in the case on the merits (CoA 3 September 2024, UPC_CoA_188/2024, Aylo v Dish, para 18).
Where facts relevant to a Preliminary objection concerning competence are also relevant to the merits of the infringement action, the Court should not conduct a comprehensive assessment of the evidence at the stage of R. 19 RoP. Such an assessment could improperly anticipate the decision on the merits. The Court must instead conduct a summary examination of the parties' allegations and the evidence submitted in support (UPC_CoA_4/2026 and UPC_CoA_13/2026, Court of Appeal, Valeo v Bosch, order of 22 June 2026; confirming the approach in Barco v Yealink).
Rule 19.7 / jurisdiction – failure to contest jurisdiction
Where a defendant neither files a Preliminary objection under R. 19 RoP nor challenges the jurisdiction of the Court in the Defence, the jurisdiction of the Court is deemed to be accepted pursuant to R. 19.7 RoP (LD Düsseldorf, UPC_CFI_811/2024, decision of 22 June 2026 – Evac v. Shanghai VacDrain et al., referring to UPC_CoA_409/2025 – NUC v Hurom).
The Court of Appeal decided with Order UPC_CoA_757/2025 of 31.10.205 (Vivo v.Sun Patent /Apple) concerning a Rule R.9.3 RoP request for stay of proceedings/term extension as follows:
The defendant shall lodge a Statement of defence within three months of service of the Statement of claim.
The Statement of defence shall contain:
(a) the names of the defendant and of the defendant’s representative;
(b) postal and electronic addresses for service on the defendant and the names and addresses of the persons authorised to accept service;
(c) the action number of the file;
(d) an indication whether the defendant has lodged a Preliminary objection [Rule 19];
(e) an indication of the facts relied on, including any challenge to the facts relied on by the claimant;
(f) the evidence relied on [Rule 170.1], where available, and an indication of any further evidence which will be offered in support;
(g) the reasons why the action shall fail, arguments of law and any argument arising from the provisions of Article 28 of the Agreement and where appropriate any challenge to the claimant’s proposed claim interpretation;
(h) an indication of any order the defendant will seek in respect of the infringement action during the interim procedure [Rule 104(e)];
(i) a statement whether the defendant disputes the claimant’s assessment of the value of the infringement action and the grounds for such dispute; and
(j) a list of the documents, including any witness statements, referred to in the Statement of defence together with any request that all or part of any such document need not be translated and/or any request pursuant to Rule 262.2 or Rule 262A. Rule 13.2 and .3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
1. If the Statement of defence includes an assertion that the patent alleged to be infringed is invalid the Statement of defence shall include a Counterclaim against the proprietor of the patent for revocation of said patent in accordance with Rule 42. The Counterclaim for revocation shall contain:
(a) an indication of the extent to which revocation of the patent is requested;
(b) one or more grounds for revocation, which shall as far as possible be supported by arguments of law, and where appropriate an explanation of the defendant’s proposed claim construction;
(c) an indication of the facts relied on;
(d) the evidence relied on, where available, and an indication of any further evidence which will be offered in support;
(e) an indication of any order the defendant will seek during the interim procedure [Rule 104(e)];
(f) a statement of his position, if any, on the options provided for in Article 33(3) of the Agreement and Rule 37.4;
(g) a list of the documents, including any witness statements, referred to in the Counterclaim for revocation together with any request that all or part of any such documents need not be translated and/or any request pursuant to Rule 262.2 or Rule 262A. Rule 13.2 and .3 shall apply mutatis mutandis; and
(h) insofar as the proprietor of the patent is not claimant in the infringement proceedings, the information required by Rule 13.1(b) and (d) in respect of said proprietor.
2. Where the claimant is not the proprietor or not the only proprietor of the patent concerned, the Registry shall as soon as practicable serve a copy of the Counterclaim for revocation on the relevant proprietor in accordance with Rule 13.1(e) and shall supply a copy of each document referred to in paragraph 1(h). Rule 271 shall apply mutatis mutandis. The proprietor in question shall become a party to the revocation proceedings and shall be treated as defendant in all subsequent proceedings. The proprietor shall provide details pursuant to Rule 13.1(e) if not already provided by the claimant.
In UPC_CFI_359/2023 (Fujifilm Corporation vs. Kodak GmbH et al., decision of 2 April 2025). it was stated that in accordance with R. 24(g) RoP, R.25(1)(b) and (c) RoP, if a Defendant refers to public prior use he has to submit all and sufficient facts in his Statement of Defence. New facts submitted in the Defendant’s rejoinder and reply to the counterclaim have to be disregarded. The analysis of the facts referred to by the Defendant is to be limited to the facts which had been presented in the Statement of Defence and the Counterclaim for Revocation. It is in those briefs that the defendant has to submit reasons why the action shall fail, R. 24(g) RoP and the grounds for revocation have to be presented comprehensively, R. 25(1)(b) and (c) RoP whereas the following briefs have to limit themselves to a response to matters raised in the Reply, R. 29(c) and (d) RoP. If the defendant were allowed to submit abundant new facts in its rejoinder and reply to the counterclaim alone, this would call for additional briefs by the claimant so as to be able to respond to such fresh arguments and allegations leading to a new round of briefs not foreseen in the front-loaded procedure enshrined in the RoP. In case a defendant needs more time to clarify facts it will have to submit a request to extend the time limits for the respective brief. Otherwise submitting fresh facts and arguments in the rejoinder alone would amount to a welcome opportunity to hold back points and avoid the claimant having an opportunity to respond in the written procedure.
The defendant shall pay the fee for the Counterclaim for revocation in accordance with Part 6. Rule 15.2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
1. The Registry shall, as soon as practicable after the lodging of the Statement of defence:
(a) examine whether the requirements of Rule 24(a) to (d) have been complied with; and
(b) if the Statement of defence includes a Counterclaim for revocation, examine whether the requirements of Rule 25.1(g) and (h), and the obligation to pay the fee pursuant to Rule 26 has been complied with.
2. If the Registry considers that the Statement of defence or the Counterclaim for revocation does not comply with any of the requirements referred to in paragraph 1, it shall as soon as practicable invite the defendant to:
(a) correct the deficiencies noted, within 14 days of service of such notification; and
(b) where applicable, pay the fee for the Counterclaim for revocation, within said 14 days.
3. The Registry shall at the same time inform the defendant that if the defendant fails to correct the deficiencies or pay the fee within the time stated, a decision by default may be given, in accordance with Rule 355.
4. If the defendant fails to correct the deficiencies or to pay the fee for the Counterclaim for revocation, as appropriate, within said 14 days, the Registry shall inform the judge-rapporteur who may give a decision by default. He may give the defendant an opportunity to be heard beforehand.
As soon as practicable after service of the Statement of defence, the judge-rapporteur shall, after consulting the parties, set a date and time for an interim conference (where necessary [Rule 101.1]) and set a date for the oral hearing. The judge-rapporteur may set one alternative date.
(a) Within two months of service of a Statement of defence which includes a Counterclaim for revocation, the claimant shall lodge a Defence to the Counterclaim for revocation together with any Reply to the Statement of defence and any Application to amend the patent pursuant to Rule 30, if applicable.
(b) Within two months of service of a Statement of defence which does not include a Counterclaim for revocation, the claimant may lodge a Reply to the Statement of defence.
(c) Within one month of service of a Reply to the Statement of defence which does not include a Counterclaim for revocation the defendant may lodge a Rejoinder to the Reply to the Statement of defence. The Rejoinder to the Reply to the Statement of defence shall be limited to a response to the matters raised in the Reply to the Statement of defence.
(d) Within two months of service of the Defence to Counterclaim the defendant may lodge a Reply to the Defence to the Counterclaim together with any Rejoinder to the Reply to the Statement of defence and any Defence to an Application to amend the patent pursuant to Rule 32, if applicable.
(e) Within one month of the service of the Reply to the Defence to the Counterclaim, the claimant may lodge a Rejoinder to the Reply together with any Reply to the Defence to an Application to amend the patent pursuant to Rule 32, if applicable. The Rejoinder to the Reply to the Statement of defence shall be limited to a response to the matters raised in the Reply to the Statement of defence.
(f) Where the claimant is not the proprietor of the patent, all references to the claimant in this Rule 29 regarding an Application to amend the patent shall be read as including the proprietor.
In UPC_CoA_880/2025 issued on 02.06.2026 (Kodak v. Fujifilm) the Court of Appeal stated in relation to the front loaded proceedings, that It is not contrary to R. 29(c) RoP and the front-loaded system of the RoP if a party submits additional evidence of an already stated fact or submitted argument for which other evidence had already been submitted, but which was disputed by the other party.
The Defence to the Counterclaim for revocation shall contain:
(a) an indication of the facts relied on, including any challenge to the facts relied on by the defendant;
(b) the evidence relied on [Rule 170.1], where available, and an indication of any further evidence which will be offered in support;
(c) the reasons why the Counterclaim for revocation shall fail, including arguments of law and any argument as to why any dependent claim of the patent is independently valid;
(d) an indication of any order the claimant and the proprietor will seek in respect of the revocation action at the interim conference [Rule 104(e)];
(e) the claimant’s and the proprietor’s response to the defendant’s choice of option, if any, provided for in Article 33(3) of the Agreement and Rule 37.4; and
(f) a list of the documents, including any witness statements, referred to in the Defence to the Counterclaim together with any request that all or part of any such document shall not be translated and/or any request pursuant to Rule 262.2 or Rule 262A. Rule 13.2 and .3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
1. The Defence to the Counterclaim for revocation may include an Application by the proprietor of the patent to amend the patent which shall contain:
(a) the proposed amendments of the claims of the patent concerned and/or specification, including where applicable and appropriate one or more alternative sets of claims (auxiliary requests), in the language in which the patent was granted; where the language of the proceedings [Rule 14.3] is not the language in which the patent was granted, the proprietor shall lodge a translation of the proposed amendments in the language of the proceedings, and where the patent is a European patent with unitary effect in the language of the defendant’s domicile in a Member State of the EU or of the place of the alleged infringement or threatened infringement in a Contracting Member State if so requested by the defendant;
(b) an explanation as to why the amendments satisfy the requirements of Articles 84 and 123(2), (3) EPC and why the proposed amended claims are valid and, if applicable, why they are infringed; and
(c) an indication whether the proposals are conditional or unconditional; the proposed amendments, if conditional, must be reasonable in number in the circumstances of the case.
2. Any subsequent request to amend the patent may only be admitted into the proceedings with the permission of the Court.
3. Where other proceedings involving the patent subject to an Application to amend the patent are pending, the claimant shall notify the Court or the authority in question that such an Application has been made and provide the information required in paragraph 1(a).
Admissibility and Intelligibility of the requested amendments:
In Microsoft v Suinno Mobile & AI Technologies Licensing – Central Division (Paris seat), 7 January 2026, UPC_CFI_433/2024, the CD Paris confirmed that the defendant in a counterclaim for revocation is entitled to amend the patent, provided the application is included in the statement of defence (or otherwise meets the filing deadline) and contains the information required by Rule 30 RoP. It distinguished between objective and discretionary requirements.
It treated the following as objective admissibility conditions: (i) compliance with the filing deadline, (ii) inclusion of at least one amendment, and (iii) formulation in the language of the patent. Failure on these points leads to inadmissibility.
By contrast, the Court viewed clarity and intelligibility of the amendments, the sufficiency of the explanation as to compliance with Art. 84 EPC and Art. 123(2) and (3) EPC, and the “reasonable in number” requirement as matters of judicial discretion. Importantly, the Court stated that where these discretionary requirements are not met, it may decline to examine inadequately formulated or explained amendments, or amendments that are excessive compared to the number deemed reasonable.
The Court’s central drafting message is that amendments must be presented so that both the Court and the counterclaimant can immediately understand what the claims would look like if maintained in amended form. The Court linked this to three procedural principles:
On that basis, the Court stated a general rule: mere deletion of claims may not require a consolidated document, but any substantive amendment generally requires submission of a full set of amended claims. Crucially, that full claim set must be filed together with the amendment application (or at least within the same Rule 30 deadline), not later in the reply/rejoinder cycle.
Applying these principles, the Court held that the application to amend was timely and, from an objective perspective, admissible. The number of auxiliary requests was also not regarded as unreasonable given the complexity of the case. The problem was the formulation.
Auxiliary Request I was accompanied by a corresponding reformulated set of claims and was therefore properly filed. By contrast:
Accordingly, only Auxiliary Request I was examined on the merits.
In GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals SA v. Moderna et al, UPC_CFI_616/2025, order of 18 February 2026, The Hague Local Division showed visible scepticism towards 40 conditional auxiliary requests filed with a Rule 30.1 amendment. Introducing at least 18 new features, this number raised concerns in light of the “speedy proceedings” principle.
However, the Court did not impose a numerical ceiling, nor did it strike requests en bloc. Instead, it opted for structured case management: GSK must file a comprehensive table mapping each auxiliary request to the specific invalidity attack addressed. Any further combinations require leave under Rule 30.2 RoP.
Hence, excessive auxiliary requests may be considered unreasonable. But at an early stage, the Court prefers transparency and discipline over immediate procedural sanctions. Tabular clarity becomes the price for procedural generosity.
R. 30.1 – Applicability of R. 80 EPC
In UPC_CFI_355/2023 (Fujifilm Corporation v. Kodak GmbH et al., decision of 28 January 2025) it was stated that R. 80 EPC (by way of conjunction with Art. 24(1)c) UPCA; R. 80 EPC: “[…] the description, claims and drawings may be amended, provided that the amendments are occasioned by a ground for opposition […]”) is not applicable to claim amendments filed before the UPC, because R. 80 EPC is a regulation limited to opposition proceedings before the EPO. The Rules of Procedure of the UPC are lex specialis in this regard and contain a complete regulation on the prerequisites for admissibility of an application to amend the patent. Accordingly, there is also no regulation gap that must be closed by transferring the regulations of R. 80 EPC to revocation proceedings before the UPC.
In this regard, it may become necessary and appropriate to amend a dependent claim as well to maintain the conciseness of the claims in view of proposed amendments to an independent claim of a patent in reply to an invalidity attack. Conciseness is one of the criteria to be met by amended claims under Art. 84 EPC (which must be fulfilled by the amendments according to R. 30.1 RoP). I.e., amendments to dependent claims are occasioned by the admissibility requirements of R. 30.1 RoP, if maintaining a dependent claim in its granted form would lead to a clarity issue.
Also, not applicable is the case law of the EPO’s Boards of Appeal, by which amendments are inadmissible that do not constitute a reaction to an invalidity attack. According to said case law, the addition of a new dependent claim during opposition proceedings is generally forbidden under R. 80 EPC, if such an additional dependent claim does not limit the related independent claim and therefore is unsuitable to overcome a ground for opposition (cf. Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, version of June 2024, IV.C.5.1.2.c.i).
With regard to the above statements from decision UPC_CFI_355/2023, it should be noted that this is the only (and only first-instance) decision on R. 80 EPC to date. Even though this decision takes a very clear view on the non-applicability of R. 80 EPC, a different view by another division or the Court of Appeal cannot be ruled out.
R. 30.1 (b)
In UPC_CFI_359/2023 (Fujifilm Corporation vs. Kodak GmbH et al., decision of 2 April 2025), it was stated that as far as a claimant wishes to defend dependent claims separately, such defence is inadmissible because the claimant did not file a proper application to amend the patent pursuant to R. 30 RoP in this regard. Further, the claimant or patent proprietor, respectively, has to demonstrate and prove the patentability of the new independent claim in case the said new independent claim is a combination of the originally granted claim 1 and one or more of the dependent claims, because during the procedure up to grant, the patentability of the subject-matter of dependent claims is not necessarily assessed independently from that of the relevant independent claim because dependent claims are supposed to concern particular embodiments of the invention only as laid down by its essential features in the relevant independent claim (cf. R. 43.3 of the Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the grant of European Patents). Concerning added matter, the wording of a claim can be corrected in a way that it corresponds to the description even in a case where the wording of the incorrect claim as such is unambiguous.
Admissibility of subsequent request to amend the patent acc. to R.30.2 RoP:
In the decision of 25 November 2025, Meril et al. v. Edwards Lifesciences et al., the Court of Appel stated in Headnote 2.:
Under R. 49.2 RoP, the Defence to revocation may include an application to amend the patent. Pursuant to R. 50.2 in conjunction with R. 30.2 RoP, a subsequent request to amend the patent may only be admitted into the proceedings with the permission of the Court. When deciding on a subsequent request to amend the patent, the Court must take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case, including whether the party seeking the subsequent amendment is able to justify that i) the amendment in question could not have been made with reasonable diligence at an earlier stage, and ii) the amendment will not unreasonably hinder the other party in the conduct of the action. The Court of First Instance has a margin of discretion in this respect. The review by the Court of Appeal is therefore limited.
1. Within two months of service of an Application to amend the patent, the defendant shall lodge a Defence to the Application to amend the patent setting out whether he opposes the Application to amend the patent and, if so, why:
(a) the proposed amendments are not allowable; and
(b) the patent cannot be maintained as requested.
2. Where appropriate in view of the proposed amendments, the Defence to the Application to amend the patent may contain submissions in accordance with Rule 44(d) to (h) and alternative non-infringement submissions.
3. The proprietor may lodge a Reply to the Defence to the Application to amend the patent within one month of service of the Defence and the defendant may within one month of the service of the Reply lodge a Rejoinder to the Reply. The Rejoinder shall be limited to the matters raised in the Reply.
Following the exchange of written pleadings in accordance with Rule 12.1 and, where applicable, in accordance with Rule 12.2 to .4, the judge-rapporteur shall:
(a) inform the parties of the date on which he intends to close the written procedure, without prejudice to Rule 36; and
(b) where an interim conference is necessary [Rules 28 and 101.1], confirm the date and the time set for the interim conference [Rules 28] or inform the parties that an interim conference will not be held.
Without prejudice to the powers of the judge-rapporteur pursuant to Rule 110.1, on a reasoned request by a party lodged before the date on which the judge-rapporteur intends to close the written procedure [Rule 35(a)], the judge-rapporteur may allow the exchange of further written pleadings, within a period to be specified. Where the exchange of further written pleadings is allowed, the written procedure shall be deemed closed upon expiry of the specified period.
In UPC_CoA_520/2024 (Scandit v. Hand Held, procedural order of 01.11.2024) the Court of Appeal stated that the court may, in accordance with R. 36 RoP, allow the exchange of further written pleadings at the reasoned request of a party, in particular if this is required by the principles of due process, such as in particular the principles of fairness, equity and efficiency and the right to be heard.
In UPC_CoA_222/2024 (Volkswagen v. Network System Technologies, order of 17.06.2024) the Court of Appeal stated that in accordance with R.239.1 RoP, Rules 101-110 RoP (on the interim procedure) apply mutatis mutandis to the appeal proceedings. In view thereof, Rules 35 and 36 RoP must be held to be applicable mutatis mutandis in the appeal proceedings as well.
In UPC_CFI_115/2024 and UPC_CFI_377/2024 (Hartmann Packaging v. Omni-Pac, procedural order of 04.03.2025) the Local Division Düsseldorf stated that the submission of the rejoinder in infringement proceedings normally exhausts the quota of written submissions. If a party nevertheless considers further written submissions to be necessary, it has the option of applying for the exchange of further written submissions to be permitted by means of a reasoned request in accordance with R. 36 RoP until the conclusion of the written proceedings. The decision on whether to allow further written submissions is at the discretion of the rapporteur. Since the preamble to the RoP specifies the objective of conducting the oral hearing as a rule within one year of the action being brought, there must be substantial reasons for allowing further written submissions (see Tilmann/Plassmann/Steininger, Einheitspatent/Einheitliches Patentgericht, R. 36 RoP, margin note 7).
Arguments introduced into the proceedings in the written procedure outside the pleadings provided for in the RoP without prior admission under R. 36 RoP shall not be taken into account in the further proceedings and in the decision-making process.
If the plaintiff wishes to comment further on the arguments put forward in the rejoinder in the infringement proceedings in the form of a further written statement, a corresponding application must be made promptly after receipt of the rejoinder. This is the only way to ensure that the proceedings are delayed by the granting of a possible further period for comment only to the extent necessary. The request, which was not submitted until two months after receipt of the rejoinder in the infringement proceedings, does not meet these requirements.
In UPC_CFI_135/2024 and UPC_CFI_477/2024 (Dolby v. Beko / Arcelik, procedural order of 14.08.2025) the Local Division Düsseldorf stated that a reasoned request must be timely filed before conclusion of the written procedure. The admission of a further pleading may be required in the exercise of the discretion granted under R. 36 RoP for reasons of fairness, approval, and efficiency, as well as the right to a fair hearing, if the rejoinder contains new arguments and the defendants are not disadvantaged by its admission and it does not cause any delay in the proceedings. The other party is adequately protected against late submissions by R. 9.2 RoP.
When a Counterclaim for revocation is referred to the central division, it shall be dealt with as follows:
(a) Rule 17.2 and .3 shall apply mutatis mutandis;
(b) Rule 18 shall apply mutatis mutandis: the presiding judge of the panel to which the Counterclaim for revocation has been assigned shall designate one legally qualified judge of the panel as judgerapporteur;
(c) The judge-rapporteur shall give any further directions necessary for the future conduct of the written procedure before the central division;
(d) Rule 28 shall apply mutatis mutandis: the judge-rapporteur shall after consulting the parties set a date and a time for the interim conference (where necessary [Rule 264 and 101]) and set a date, and one alternative date, for the oral hearing.
The judge-rapporteur shall accelerate proceedings before the central division where
(a) an Application for provisional measures has been lodged [Rule 206]; or
(b) the regional or local division has referred the Counterclaim for revocation to the central division and where the infringement action has not been stayed.
In the latter case, the judge-rapporteur of the panel of the central division shall endeavour to set a date for the oral hearing on the revocation action prior to the date of the oral hearing of the infringement action.
When an action is referred to the central division under Article 33(3)(c) of the Agreement, it shall be dealt with as follows:
(a) Rule 17.2 and .3 shall apply mutatis mutandis. The parties may request that the action be heard by a single judge;
(b) Rule 18 shall apply mutatis mutandis: the presiding judge of the panel to which the action has been assigned shall designate one judge of the panel as judge-rapporteur;
(c) dates already set under Rule 28 shall be confirmed wherever possible;
(d) Rule 39 shall apply mutatis mutandis: the judge-rapporteur may order that the parties lodge a translation in the language in which the patent was granted of any written pleadings lodged during the written procedure; where appropriate, the judge-rapporteur may specify in his order that only excerpts of parties’ written pleadings and other documents shall be translated. Otherwise the pleadings lodged during the written procedure shall stand;
(e) The judge-rapporteur shall give any further directions necessary for the future conduct of the written procedure before the central division.
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
1. The written procedure shall consist of:
(a) the lodging of a Statement for revocation (by the claimant) [Rule 44]; and
(b) the lodging of a Defence to revocation (by the defendant) [Rule 49]; and optionally
(c) the lodging of a Reply to the Defence to revocation (by the claimant) [Rule 51];
(d) the lodging of a Rejoinder to the Reply (by the defendant) [Rule 52].
2. The Defence to revocation may include:
(a) an Application to amend the patent; and
(b) a Counterclaim for infringement by the proprietor of the patent.
3. If an Application to amend the patent is lodged, the claimant shall lodge a Defence to the Application to amend the patent. The defendant may lodge a Reply to the Defence to the Application. The claimant may lodge a Rejoinder to the Reply. The Rejoinder shall be limited to a response to the matters raised in the Reply.
4. If a Counterclaim for infringement is lodged, the claimant shall lodge a Defence to the Counterclaim for infringement [Rule 56], the defendant may lodge a Reply to the Defence to the Counterclaim [Rule 56.3] and the claimant may lodge a Rejoinder to the Reply [Rule 56.4].
5. Rule 12.5 shall apply.
The claimant shall, subject to point (b), lodge a Statement for revocation at the Registry in accordance with Article 7(2) of the Agreement and Annex II thereto. The Statement for revocation shall contain:
(a) particulars in accordance with Rule 13.1(a) to (d) and (g), (h);
(b) where the parties have agreed to bring the action before a local division or a regional division in accordance with Article 33(7) of the Agreement, an indication of the division which shall hear the action, accompanied by evidence of the defendant’s agreement;
(c) where applicable, an indication that the action shall be heard by a single judge [Article 8(7) of the Agreement], accompanied by evidence of the defendant’s agreement;
(d) an indication of the extent to which revocation of the patent is requested;
(e) one or more grounds for revocation, which shall as far as possible be supported by arguments of law, and where appropriate an explanation of the claimant’s proposed claim construction;
(f) an indication of the facts relied on;
(g) the evidence relied on, where available, and an indication of any further evidence which will be offered in support;
(h) an indication of any order the claimant will seek during the interim procedure [Rule 104(e)];
and
(i) a list of the documents, including any witness statements, referred to in the Statement for revocation together with any request that all or part of any such document need not be translated and/or any request pursuant to Rule 262.2 and Rule 262A. Rule 13.2 and .3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
According to the Decision UPC_CFI_497/2024 of the CD Milan issued on 23.10.2025 (bioMérieux v. Labrador) the following has to be considered concerning the maximum number of attacks ( in the decided case the claimant filed about 50 invalidity attacks, more than 12 added matter attacks, 3 novelty attacks, 1 insufficiency attack, and 6 different starting points for 30 inventive steps attacks):
An assessment based on a maximum of different documents to challenge the novelty and to argue for non-inventiveness is indeed appropriate. The attacks not identified by the party challenging the patent as (most) promising will not be discussed on the merits because, when the party submits a number of attacks that appear to be unmanageable by the Court in accordance with the principles of proportionality (point 3 of the preamble) and speed (point 7 of the preamble), and the same party is unable to re-module some of the attacks in such a way as to allow the Court to organise its time for the efficient management of the proceedings, it must be assumed that if the (most) promising attacks, after assessment of the Court, do not affect the validity of the claim(s), the others wouldn’t have done so either.
Pursuant to R. 44(e) RoP, the party seeking revocation of a patent must state the grounds for revocation related to in Art. 138(1) EPC. Conversely, patent attacks as such cannot be interpreted as ‘grounds for revocation’ but rather constitute legal pleadings based on a combination of facts (R. 44(f)), evidence supporting those facts (R. 44(g)), and arguments of law (Rule 44(e)), which start from the claimant’s own interpretation of the patent and aim to show the existence of the conditions referred to in Art. 138 EPC.
Under R. 104 RoP, the JR is entitled to ask the parties to limit the attacks and the auxiliary request to make their assessment more manageable, or, alternatively, to list them in a logical order, to establish a schedule for the further progress of the proceedings, and to clarify the position of the parties as regards the facts in dispute. At the end of the written procedure, the claimant and defendant must, therefore, consider all arguments and documents put forward by the other party, possibly reshaping their procedural defences based on the opposing party's arguments, to ensure the interim conference swiftly progresses towards the oral hearing. A particular feature of the interim conference is therefore the selection of relevant issues, and therein all parties are required to contribute to the smooth management of the process so that the UPC's decisions are issued within a limited time frame and meet the highest quality standards.
If the number of arguments proves unmanageable or overly complex for the panel, the party that filed them must, if not reduce them, at least arrange the legal pleadings in order of importance and likelihood of success. Each legal team is therefore called upon to cooperate with the Court by limiting attacks and auxiliary requests, facilitating the Court's work in accordance with the principles of proportionality and fairness set out in the preamble. However, given the judge's impartiality, it is not the Court's role to indicate which attacks it considers to be the most promising or likely to be successful. Consequently, the Court may ask the party to arrange their legal defence in order of likelihood of success and argue that if the attacks the party considers most promising are unsuccessful, the others will be too.
Relation with Agreement: Article 49
1. The defendant shall lodge a Defence to revocation within two months of service of the Statement for revocation.
2. The Defence to revocation may include:
(a) an Application to amend the patent;
(b) a Counterclaim for infringement.
Admissibility of application to amend the patent acc. to R.49.2 RoP:
In the decision UPC_CoA_464/2024 et al of the Court of Appeal issued on 25.11.2025 it is stated in Headnote 2.:
Under R. 49.2 RoP, the Defence to revocation may include an application to amend the patent. Pursuant to R. 50.2 in conjunction with R. 30.2 RoP, a subsequent request to amend the patent may only be admitted into the proceedings with the permission of the Court. When deciding on a subsequent request to amend the patent, the Court must take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case, including whether the party seeking the subsequent amendment is able to justify that i) the amendment in question could not have been made with reasonable diligence at an earlier stage, and ii) the amendment will not unreasonably hinder the other party in the conduct of the action. The Court of First Instance has a margin of discretion in this respect. The review by the Court of Appeal is therefore limited.
Admissibility of application to amend the patent acc. to R.49.2 RoP and subsequent request to amend the patent acc. to R30.2 RoP and corresponding content of the defence to revocation acc. to R.50.2 RoP:
In the decision UPC_CoA_464/2024 et al of the Court of Appeal issued on 25.11.2025 it is stated in Headnote 2.:
Under R. 49.2 RoP, the Defence to revocation may include an application to amend the patent. Pursuant to R. 50.2 in conjunction with R. 30.2 RoP, a subsequent request to amend the patent may only be admitted into the proceedings with the permission of the Court. When deciding on a subsequent request to amend the patent, the Court must take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case, including whether the party seeking the subsequent amendment is able to justify that i) the amendment in question could not have been made with reasonable diligence at an earlier stage, and ii) the amendment will not unreasonably hinder the other party in the conduct of the action. The Court of First Instance has a margin of discretion in this respect. The review by the Court of Appeal is therefore limited.
Within two months of service of the Defence to revocation the claimant may lodge a Reply to the Defence to revocation together with any Defence to an Application to amend the patent pursuant to Rule 43.3 and 55 as well as any Defence to the Counterclaim for infringement pursuant to Rule 56.1, if applicable.
Within one month of the service of the Reply the defendant may lodge a Rejoinder to the Reply to the Defence to revocation together with any Reply to the Defence to an Application to amend the patent pursuant to Rule 43.3 and 55 as well as any Reply to the Defence to the Counterclaim for infringement pursuant to Rule 56.3, if applicable. The Rejoinder shall be limited to a response to the matters raised in the Reply.
The defendant shall pay the fixed fee and, where applicable, the value based fee for the Counterclaim for infringement in accordance with Part 6. Rule 15 and Rule 16.3 to 5 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Rule 32 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
1. A declaration that the performance of a specific act does not, or a proposed act would not, constitute an infringement of a patent may be made by the Court in proceedings between the person doing or proposing to do the act and the patent proprietor or licensee entitled to commence infringement proceedings pursuant to Article 47 of the Agreement, if the patent proprietor or such licensee has asserted that the act is an infringement, or, if no such assertion has been made by the patent proprietor or licensee, if:
(a) that person has applied in writing to the proprietor or licensee for a written acknowledgment to the effect of the declaration claimed, and has provided him with full particulars in writing of the act in question; and
(b) the proprietor or licensee has refused or failed to give any such acknowledgment within one month.
2. The action for a declaration shall be directed against the proprietor of the patent or the licensee who has asserted an infringement or refused or failed to give an acknowledgement pursuant to paragraph 1(b).
3. If the action for a declaration of non-infringement is directed against the proprietor of the patent in accordance with Rule 8.6 (“the registered proprietor”) but the registered proprietor is not a proprietor within the meaning of Rule 8.5(a) or (b) (“the Rule 8.5 proprietor”) each such registered proprietor shall as soon as possible after service of the Statement for a declaration of non-infringement apply to the Court pursuant to Rule 305.1(c) for the substitution of the registered proprietor by the Rule 8.5 proprietor.
1. The written procedure shall consist of:
(a) the lodging of a Statement for a declaration of non-infringement (by the claimant) [Rule 63];
(b) the lodging of a Defence to the Statement for a declaration of non-infringement (by the defendant) [Rules 67 and 68]; and, optionally
(c) the lodging of a Reply to the Defence to the Statement for a declaration of non-infringement [Rule 69];
(d) the lodging of a Rejoinder to the Reply [Rule 69].
2. Rule 12.5 shall apply.
The claimant shall, subject to point (b), lodge at the Registry in accordance with Article 33(4), Article 7(2) of the Agreement and Annex II thereto, a Statement for a declaration of non-infringement which shall contain:
(a) particulars in accordance with Rule 13.1(a) to (h) and particulars confirming that the requirements of Rule 61 are met;
(b) where the parties have agreed to bring the action before a local division or a regional division in accordance with Article 33(7) of the Agreement, an indication of the division which shall hear the action, accompanied by evidence of the defendant’s agreement;
(c) where applicable, an indication that the action shall be heard by a single judge [Article 8(7) of the Agreement], accompanied by evidence of the defendant’s agreement;
(d) the declaration sought by the claimant;
(e) the reasons why the performance of a specific act does not, or a proposed act would not, constitute an infringement of the patent concerned, including arguments of law and where appropriate an explanation of the claimant’s proposed claim construction;
(f) an indication of the facts relied on;
(g) the evidence relied on, where available, and an indication of any further evidence which will be offered in support;
(h) an indication of any order the claimant will seek at the interim conference [Rule 104(e)];
(i) where the claimant assesses that the value of the declaratory action exceeds EUR 500.000, an indication of the value; and
(j) a list of the documents, including any witness statements, referred to in the Statement for a declaration together with any request that all or part of any such document need not be translated and/or any request pursuant to Rule 262.2 or Rule 262A. Rule 13.2 and .3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Rule 45 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
The defendant shall lodge a Defence to the Statement for a declaration of non-infringement within two months of service of the Statement for a declaration of non-infringement.
The Defence to the Statement for a declaration of non-infringement shall contain the matters referred to in Rule 24(a) to (j). Rule 13.2 and .3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
The claimant shall pay the fixed fee and, where applicable, the value based fee for the action for a declaration of non-infringement in accordance with Part 6. Rule 15.2 and Rule 16.3 to .5 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
1. The Application for appropriate compensation [Article 32(1)(h) of the Agreement] shall contain:
(a) particulars in accordance with Rule 13.1(a) to (d);
(b) information on the filing of the statement as referred to in Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012;
(c) the licence agreement referred to in Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012.
2. Rules 132, 133, 134, 135 and 137 to 140 apply mutatis mutandis to the procedure for appropriate compensation.
Relation with Agreement: Article 32(1)(h)
1. Subject to paragraph 2, where an action is brought against a decision of the European Patent Office in carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 (hereinafter "decision of the Office"), proceedings before the Court of First Instance shall consist of:
(a) a written procedure, which shall include a possibility for interlocutory review by the European Patent Office;
(b) an interim procedure, which may include an interim conference; and
(c) an oral procedure which, at the request of the claimant or at the instance of the Court, may include an oral hearing.
2. This Rule and Rules 88 (save as expressly provided for in Rule 97.2), 89 and 91 to 96 shall not apply to an expedited action against a decision of the Office pursuant to Rule 97.
An action against a decision of the Office shall have suspensive effect.
An action against a decision of the Office may be brought on grounds of:
(a) infringement of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 or of Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 or of any rule of law relating to their application;
(b) infringement of any of the implementing rules of the European Patent Office for carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012;
(c) infringement of an essential procedural requirement;
(d) misuse of power.
1. The claimant shall lodge an Application at the Registry, in accordance with Article 7(2) of the Agreement and Annex II thereto, to annul or alter a decision of the Office in the language in which the patent was granted, within two months of service of the decision of the Office.
2. The Application to annul or alter a decision of the Office shall contain:
(a) the names of the claimant and, where applicable, of the claimant’s representative;
(b) where the claimant is not the proprietor of or applicant for the European patent with unitary effect, an explanation and evidence that he is adversely affected by the decision of the Office and entitled to start proceedings [Article 47(7) of the Agreement];
(c) postal and electronic addresses for service on the claimant and the names and addresses of the persons authorised to accept service;
(d) a reference to the contested decision of the Office;
(e) where applicable, information about any prior or pending proceedings relating to the patent concerned before the Court, the European Patent Office or any other court or authority;
(f) an indication whether the action shall be heard by a single judge;
(g) the order or the remedy sought by the claimant;
(h) one or more grounds for annulling or altering the contested decision, in accordance with Rule 87;
(i) the facts, evidence and arguments relied on; and
(j) a list of the documents, including any witness statements, referred to in the Application together with any request that all or part of any such document need not be translated and/or any request pursuant to Rule 262.2 or Rule 262A. Rule 13.2 and 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
3. The claimant shall pay the fee for the action against a decision of the Office, in accordance with Part 6. Rule 15.2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
4. Rule 8 shall not apply.
Relation with Agreement: Articles 32(1)(i), 33(9), 47(7), 48(7) and 49(6)
1. The Registry shall, as soon as practicable after an Application to annul or alter a decision of the Office has been lodged, examine whether the requirements of Articles 47(7) and 49(6) of the Agreement and Rule 88.1, .2(a) to (d) and .3 have been complied with.
2. If the Registry considers that any of the requirements referred to in paragraph 1 has not been complied with, it shall invite the claimant to:
(a) correct the deficiencies noted, within 14 days from the date of service of such notification; and
(b) where applicable, pay the fee for the action against a decision of the Office, within said 14 days.
3. The Registry shall at the same time inform the claimant that if the claimant fails to correct the deficiencies or pay the fee within the time stated, a decision by default may be given in accordance with Rule 355.
4. If the claimant fails to correct the deficiencies noted or to pay the fee for the action against a decision of the Office, the Registry shall inform the President of the Court of First Instance who may reject the action as inadmissible by a decision by default. He may give the claimant an opportunity to be heard beforehand.
If the requirements referred to in Rule 89.1 have been complied with, the Registry shall as soon as practicable:
(a) record the date of receipt of the Application to annul or alter a decision of the Office and attribute an action number to the file;
(b) record the file in the register;
(c) inform the claimant of the action number of the file and the date of receipt; and
(d) forward the Application to the European Patent Office, with an indication that the Application is admissible.
1. If the European Patent Office considers that the Application to annul or alter a decision of the Office is well founded, it shall within two months of the date of receipt of the Application:
(a) rectify the contested decision in accordance with the order or remedy sought by the claimant [Rule 88.2(g)]; and
(b) inform the Court that the decision has been rectified.
2. Where the Court is informed by the European Patent Office that the contested decision has been rectified, it shall inform the claimant that the action is closed. It may order full or partial reimbursement of the fee for the action against a decision of the Office, in accordance with Part 6.
Where the action is not closed in accordance with Rule 91.2, the action shall, as soon as practicable after the expiry of the period referred to in Rule 91.1, be assigned to a panel of the central division or to a single judge if requested by the claimant [Rule 88.2(f)] in accordance with Rule 345.3. Rule 18 shall apply.
The judge-rapporteur may, on his own initiative or on request by the President of the European Patent Office, invite the President of the European Patent Office to comment in writing on any question arising in the course of proceedings under this Section including any appeal by the claimant pursuant to Rule 220. The claimant shall be entitled to submit his observations on the President’s comments.
During the interim procedure, the judge-rapporteur shall invite the claimant to indicate whether he wishes that an oral hearing be convened. The judge-rapporteur may convene an oral hearing at his own instance.
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
1. Whether or not the judge-rapporteur decides to hold an interim conference, he may order the parties, within time periods to be specified, in particular to:
(a) provide further clarification on specific points;
(b) answer specific questions;
(c) produce evidence;
(d) lodge specific documents including each party’s summary of the orders to be sought at the interim conference.
The judge-rapporteur shall at the same time inform the party concerned that if the party fails to comply with the order within the time period specified, a decision by default may be given in accordance with Rule 355.
2. If a party fails to comply with an order of the judge-rapporteur within the time period specified, the judge-rapporteur may give a decision by default pursuant to Rule 355.
The interim conference shall enable the judge-rapporteur to:
(a) identify main issues and determine which relevant facts are in dispute;
(b) where appropriate, clarify the position of the parties as regards those issues and facts;
(c) establish a schedule for the further progress of the proceedings;
(d) explore with the parties the possibilities to settle the dispute or to make use of the facilities of the Centre;
(e) where appropriate, issue orders regarding production of further pleadings, documents, experts (including court experts), experiments, inspections, further written evidence, the matters to be the subject of oral evidence and the scope of questions to be put to the witnesses;
(f) where appropriate, but only in the presence of the parties, hold preparatory discussions with witnesses and experts with a view to properly preparing for the oral hearing;
(g) make any other decision or order as he deems necessary for the preparation of the oral hearing including, after consultation with the presiding judge, an order for a separate hearing of witnesses and experts before the panel;
(h) set a date for any separate hearing pursuant to point (g) of this Rule, confirm the date for the oral hearing and order, where appropriate, after consultation with the presiding judge and the parties that the oral hearing or a separate hearing of witnesses and experts be wholly or partly by video conference in accordance with Rule 112.3;
(i) decide the value of the action in accordance with Rule 370.6.;
(j) decide the value of the proceeding for the purpose of applying the scale of ceilings for recoverable costs (Rule 152.3);
(k) order the parties to submit, in advance of the decision at the oral hearing, a preliminary estimate of the legal costs that they will seek to recover.
Relation with Agreement: Article 52(2)
According to the Decision UPC_CFI_497/2024 of the CD Milan issued on 23.10.2025 (bioMérieux v.Labrador) the following has to be considered concerning the maximum number of attacks ( in the decided case the claimant filed about 50 invalidity attacks, more than 12 added matter attacks, 3 novelty attacks, 1 insufficiency attack, and 6 different starting points for 30 inventive steps attacks):
An assessment based on a maximum of different documents to challenge the novelty and to argue for non-inventiveness is indeed appropriate. The attacks not identified by the party challenging the patent as (most) promising will not be discussed on the merits because, when the party submits a number of attacks that appear to be unmanageable by the Court in accordance with the principles of proportionality (point 3 of the preamble) and speed (point 7 of the preamble), and the same party is unable to re-module some of the attacks in such a way as to allow the Court to organise its time for the efficient management of the proceedings, it must be assumed that if the (most) promising attacks, after assessment of the Court, do not affect the validity of the claim(s), the others wouldn’t have done so either.
Pursuant to R. 44(e) RoP, the party seeking revocation of a patent must state the grounds for revocation related to in Art. 138(1) EPC. Conversely, patent attacks as such cannot be interpreted as ‘grounds for revocation’ but rather constitute legal pleadings based on a combination of facts (R. 44(f)), evidence supporting those facts (R. 44(g)), and arguments of law (R. 44(e) RoP), which start from the claimant’s own interpretation of the patent and aim to show the existence of the conditions referred to in Art. 138 EPC.
Under R. 104 RoP, the JR is entitled to ask the parties to limit the attacks and the auxiliary request to make their assessment more manageable, or, alternatively, to list them in a logical order, to establish a schedule for the further progress of the proceedings, and to clarify the position of the parties as regards the facts in dispute. At the end of the written procedure, the claimant and defendant must, therefore, consider all arguments and documents put forward by the other party, possibly reshaping their procedural defences based on the opposing party's arguments, to ensure the interim conference swiftly progresses towards the oral hearing. A particular feature of the interim conference is therefore the selection of relevant issues and therein all parties are required to contribute to the smooth management of the process so that the UPC's decisions are issued within a limited time frame and meet the highest quality standards.
If the number of arguments proves unmanageable or overly complex for the panel, the party that filed them must, if not reduce them, at least arrange the legal pleadings in order of importance and likelihood of success. Each legal team is therefore called upon to cooperate with the Court by limiting attacks and auxiliary requests, facilitating the Court's work in accordance with the principles of proportionality and fairness set out in the preamble. However, given the judge's impartiality, it is not the Court's role to indicate which attacks it considers to be the most promising or likely to be successful. Consequently, the Court may ask the party to arrange their legal defence in order of likelihood of success and argue that if the attacks the party considers most promising are unsuccessful, the others will be too.
UPC_CFI_181/2023 (KraussMaffei v Troester, Munich LD, order of 23 January 2024) offers a clear illustration of how the Munich local division employs the interim conference tool. After a video based interim-conference on 22 January 2024, the judge rapporteur issued a concise written order under Rule 105.5 that: (i) declared the written procedure closed six weeks later (8 March 2024); (ii) confirmed a fixed oral hearing slot on 16 April 2024; (iii) set staggered reply deadlines; (iv) required both parties to file a provisional cost estimate by the closure date (Rule 104(k)); and (v) determined the value in dispute at €2 million. The order also reminded parties that the hearing recording is available for on site listening pursuant to Rule 106.
The judge-rapporteur shall summon the parties to the oral hearing which shall take place before the panel on the date(s) set under Rules 28 and/or 41(c) and 104(h). If no date(s) have been set the judgerapporteur shall set a date for the oral hearing. At least two months’ notice shall be given, unless the parties agree to a shorter time period.
1. At the latest one month before the oral hearing including any separate hearing of witnesses and experts a party may lodge a Request for simultaneous interpretation which shall contain:
(a) an indication of the language to or from which the party requests simultaneous interpretation during the oral hearing;
(b) the reasons for the Request;
(c) the field of technology concerned;
(d) any other information of relevance for the Request.
2. The judge-rapporteur shall decide whether and to what extent simultaneous interpretation is appropriate and shall instruct the Registry to make all necessary arrangements for simultaneous interpretation. In the event that the judge-rapporteur refuses to order simultaneous interpretation the parties may request arrangements to be made, so far as practically possible, for simultaneous interpretation at their cost.
3. The judge-rapporteur may decide of his own motion to order simultaneous interpretation and shall instruct the Registry and inform the parties accordingly.
4. A party wishing to engage an interpreter at its own expense shall inform the Registry at the latest two weeks before the oral hearing.
5. Costs for simultaneous interpretation are costs of the proceedings to be decided upon under Rule 150 except where a party engages an interpreter at its own expense under paragraph 4; these costs are borne solely by that party.
Relation with Agreement: Article 51(2)
In UPC_CFI_135/2024 and UPC_CFI_477/2024 (Dolby v. Beko / Arcelic, procedural order of 15.09.2025), the Local Division Düsseldorf stated that pursuant to Article 51(2) of the EPC, all chambers of the Court of First Instance shall, where appropriate, provide interpretation at the request of a party in order to assist that party during oral proceedings. This general principle is specified in R. 109.2, first sentence RoP, which states that the rapporteur shall decide, upon a timely request, whether and to what extent simultaneous interpretation is appropriate. If he considers it appropriate, he shall instruct the Registry to make all necessary arrangements. In such a case, the costs of simultaneous interpretation are part of the costs of the proceedings, Rule 150 RoP. If the rapporteur refuses to order simultaneous interpretation, a party may, at its own expense, engage a simultaneous interpreter and request that, as far as practicable, arrangements be made at its own expense for simultaneous interpretation. A party may, at its own expense, engage a simultaneous interpreter and request that, as far as practicable, arrangements be made for simultaneous interpretation at its expense (R. 109.2 sentence 2 RoP in conjunction with R. 109.4 RoP). If a party makes use of this option, the costs incurred are not procedural costs according to Rule 109.5 RoP; they are to be borne solely by the party commissioning the interpreter.
In UPC_CFI_195/2024 (Szymon Spyra v. Amycel, order of 25.06.2024) the Local Division Den Haag stated that rule 109 RoP includes a double/twofold ‘appropriateness-test’ in the sense that it is to be decided
(i) whether allowing translations during the oral hearing is appropriate and
(ii) whether it is appropriate that the costs of such interpretation shall become costs of the proceedings.
The LD Düsseldorf followed this double test in UPC_CFI_355/2023 (Fujifilm v. Kodak, order of 29.11.2024).
a) Should simultaneous interpretation be allowed?
In UPC_COA_520/2024 (Scandit v. Hand Held Products, procedural order of 11.12.2024) the Court of Appeal stated that the mere fact that internal employees of the applicant who do not speak the language of the procedure will be participating in the hearing does not justify instructing the law firm to make all the necessary arrangements for simultaneous interpretation.
In UPC_CFI_195/2024 (Szymon Spyra v. Amycel, order of 25.06.2024) the Local Division Den Haag stated that it is beyond doubt that actively conducting a hearing in a foreign language places higher demands on the parties and their counsel in terms of their language knowledge compared to merely reading written documents. In order to effectively meet the requirements of the fundamental right to be heard, it is therefore important to allow parties to use simultaneous interpreter(s) if they deem this necessary to enable them to participate fully in the oral hearing that is held in a language that they are not familiar with. Simultaneous interpretation will in general already be appropriate if the language of the proceedings is not a language that is sufficiently familiar to (one of) the parties or to their counsel. The threshold for allowing interpretation as such is therefore low for R. 109.1 RoP requests. For R. 109.4 RoP requests the threshold seems even lower. For self-paid translations the only restriction seems to be whether it is practically possible (R. 109.2 second sentence RoP).
b) Who shall bear the costs of interpretation?
In UPC_CFI_195/2024 (Szymon Spyra v. Amycel, order of 25.06.2024) the Local Division Den Haag stated that it seems reasonable to interpret R. 109.5 RoP in such a way that it does not prevent the party from submitting the costs incurred for interpretation for recovery as costs of the proceedings at a later point in the proceedings, if facts and/or circumstances are established that make it unreasonable for the party to bear these costs.
In UPC_CFI_135/2024 and UPC_CFI_477/2024 (Dolby v. Beko / Arcelic, procedural order of 15.09.2025), the Local Division Düsseldorf stated that the provision of simultaneous interpretation by the court involves a high level of organizational effort for the law firm and must therefore be reasonable.
In UPC_CFI_367/2023 (CEAD v. BEGO, procedural order of 10.05.2024), the Central Division Paris stated that when deciding on the appropriateness of simultaneous interpretation in response to a request pursuant to R. 109(1) RoP, the rapporteur must take into account Art. 1 EPGÜ, according to which an appropriate balance of interests between rights holders and other parties must be ensured, taking into account the necessary proportionality and flexibility. This principle is also relevant in the context of procedural costs. Applicants are not challenged by the language of the proceedings to a greater extent than is usually the case in a multilingual international court. The interests of the applicants are represented by legal representatives which language skills are to be considered in the decision of the rapporteur. It is in the nature of an international court that not all representatives of the parties are able to follow the legal proceedings directly during the oral hearing.
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
The presiding judge shall:
(a) have all authority to ensure a fair, orderly and efficient oral procedure; and
(b) ensure that the action is ready for decision on the merits at the end of the oral hearing.
1. The oral hearing shall be held before the panel and shall be under the control of the presiding judge.
2. The oral hearing shall consist of:
(a) the hearing of the parties’ oral submissions;
(b) the hearing of witnesses and experts under the control of the presiding judge.
3. The Court may decide to:
(a) allow a party, representative or accompanying person, to attend the oral hearing by videoconference,
(b) hear a party, witnesses or expert through electronic means, such as video conference or
(c) hold the oral hearing by videoconference if all parties agree or the Court considers it appropriate to do so due to exceptional circumstances. In all cases, the oral hearing shall be transmitted simultaneously in picture and sound to the court room.
4. The presiding judge and the judges of the panel may provide a preliminary introduction to the action and put questions to the parties, to the parties’ representatives and to any witness or expert.
5. Under the control of the presiding judge, the parties may put questions to the witness or expert. The presiding judge may prohibit any question which is not designed to adduce admissible evidence.
6. With the consent of the Court a witness may give evidence in a language other than the language of proceedings.
In exceptional cases, the Court may, after hearing the parties’ oral submissions, decide to adjourn proceedings and call for further evidence.
According to the Order UPC_CFI_414/2024 of the LD Mannheim ( Centripetal v. Keysight) issued on 05.12.2025 an oral hearing can be reopened only for exceptional cases.
The Court decided that on the instant facts, a reopening of the oral hearing and a call for further evidence was not warranted. This has to be reserved for exceptional cases (R. 114 RoP). R. 114 RoP is applicable only in situations where, during the oral hearing, a specific issue or a specific in-depth investigation is identified as necessary and cannot reasonably be completed within the existing hearing slot. In such a case, the court may postpone the hearing in order to obtain, for example, further testimony or experimental evidence which has proved necessary as a result of what emerged in the oral hearing. It is, however, not a tool to present new infringement allegations after the closure of the oral hearing as in the decided case suggested by Claimant’s arguments.
This becomes even more evident, when R. 114 RoP is put into context with R. 245 RoP. Under Rule 245(1) RoP, an application for rehearing may only be lodged by a party adversely affected by a final decision for which the time limit for appeal has expired (or by a party adversely affected by a final decision of the Court of Appeal), and must be brought before the Court of Appeal within narrow deadlines. The grounds on which such a rehearing may be requested are likewise strictly limited. Rule 245(2) RoP and Article 81 UPCA confine rehearing primarily to cases of fundamental procedural defect or to situations involving an act later held to be a criminal offence. Mere errors in the assessment of facts, evidence or law are explicitly not sufficient. The Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_405/2024, 19 June 2025, Alexion v Amgen confirmed that rehearing is not a second or small appeal, but a truly extraordinary legal remedy available only for the most serious procedural deficiencies. These requirements restrict a rehearing to rare, clearly circumscribed situations that affect the integrity of the procedure itself, not to re-litigate or “supplement” the merits. Claimant’s broad reading of R. 114 RoP would therefore also run counter to this exceptional rule.
The oral hearing and any separate hearing of witnesses shall be open to the public unless the Court decides to make a hearing, to the extent necessary, confidential in the interests of one or both parties or third parties or in the general interests of justice or public order. The hearing shall be audio recorded. The recording shall be made available to the parties or their representatives at the premises of the Court after the hearing. Rule 103 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Relation with Agreement: Article 45
Where both parties have informed the Registry that they do not wish to be represented at the oral hearing the Court shall take a decision on the merits on the basis of the pleadings and evidence submitted by the parties and the court expert, if applicable, and otherwise in accordance with Rules 118 and 350 to 354.
1. In addition to the orders and measures and without prejudice to the discretion of the Court referred to in Articles 63, 64, 67 and 80 of the Agreement the Court may, if requested, order the payment of damages or compensation according to Articles 68 and 32(1)(f) of the Agreement. The amount of the damages or the compensation may be stated in the order or determined in separate proceedings [Rules 125-144].
2. If, while there are infringement proceedings before a local or regional division, a revocation action is pending between the same parties before the central division or an opposition is pending before the European Patent Office, the local or regional division:
(a) may render its decision on the merits of the infringement claim, including its orders, under the condition subsequent pursuant to Article 56(1) of the Agreement that the patent is not held to be wholly or partially invalid by the final decision in the revocation proceedings or a final decision of the European Patent Office or under any other term or condition; or
(b) may stay the infringement proceedings pending a decision in the revocation procedure or a decision of the European Patent Office and shall stay the infringement proceedings if it is of the view that there is a high likelihood that the relevant claims of the patent will be held to be invalid on any ground by the final decision in the revocation proceedings or of the European Patent Office where such decision of the European Patent Office may be expected to be given rapidly.
3. Where, in the decision on the merits of a revocation action, the patent is found to be entirely or partially invalid, the Court shall revoke the patent entirely or partially according to Article 65 of the Agreement.
4. Where the Court has made orders in accordance with paragraph 2(a) any party may apply to the local or regional division within two months following a final decision of the central division or the Court of Appeal or the European Patent Office as the case may be on the validity of the patent for orders consequential on such final decision [Rule 354.2].
5. The Court shall decide in principle on the obligation to bear legal costs in accordance with Article 69 of the Agreement. The Court may order in advance of the decision that the parties submit a preliminary estimate of the legal costs that they will seek to recover.
6. The Court shall give the decision on the merits as soon as possible after the closure of the oral hearing. The Court shall endeavour to issue the decision on the merits in writing within six weeks of the oral hearing. The Court shall give reasons for its decision.
7. The Court may give its decision immediately after the closure of the oral hearing and provide its reasons on a subsequent date.
8. The orders of the Court referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2(a) shall be enforceable on the defendant only after the claimant has notified the Court which part of the orders he intends to enforce, a certified translation of the orders in accordance with Rule 7.2, where applicable, into the official language of a Contracting Member State in which the enforcement shall take place has been provided by the claimant and the said notice and, where applicable, a certified translation of the orders have been served on the defendant by the Registry. The Court may subject any order or measure to a security to be given by the successful party to the unsuccessful party as determined by the Court in accordance with Rule 352.
Relation with Agreement: Article 77
Stay of Court proceedings in view of a co-pending opposition proceedings before the European Patent Office (Art. 33 (10) UPCA; Rule 118 (2)(b) RoP and Rule 295 (a) RoP)
In case UPC_CFI_414/2024 issued on 05.09.2025 by the LD Mannheim (Centripetal v. Keysight), the proceedings before the UPC were well advanced with the oral hearing being scheduled for 9/10 October 2025. The Defendant applied to have the proceedings stayed in the light of a preliminary opinion rendered by the EPO in opposition proceedings against the patent-in-suit, the oral hearing being scheduled for 27 November 2025. Defendant is of the opinion that the revocation of the patent-in-suit were highly likely as according to the preliminary opinion suffered from added matter.
Despite the short time difference of only some weeks between the aforementioned oral proceedings, the Court exercised its discretion so as to reject the Defendant’s application to stay the infringement and counter revocation proceedings with the following arguments:
“The case is ripe for a full-fledged hearing on 9/10 October 2025 including the validity of the patent. The reasoned decision of the Opposition Division may only be available a considerable time thereafter. Moreover, it remains open, what the consequences of the added matter as found on a preliminary basis by the EPO will be for the patent-in-suit and even if confirmed after the hearing, the patent-in-suit may still be upheld in a restricted form, and it remains unclear what the consequences for the infringement reading of the case at hand would be. Therefore, it appears to be preferable for the UPC to continue the proceedings, as it is also in the interest of justice in general to avoid conflicting decisions. The decision of the UPC, which will be handed down approximately six weeks after the hearing in October at the latest and therefore before the hearing at the EPO, will have bearing on the case before the EPO. Furthermore, it appears preferable to decide on both aspects, infringement and validity, as planned after the hearing in October, as the case is ripe for decision.”
R. 118.2 RoP – orders subject to a condition subsequent in foreign-patent casesWhere an infringement action is based on a designation of a European patent outside the UPC territory and validity falls to be determined by a competent national court, the Court may, where appropriate and in order to avoid undue delay, issue its decision and orders subject to the condition subsequent that the patent is not held wholly or partially invalid to the extent relevant to the finding of infringement.
Such an approach may be appropriate where there is a reasonable, non-negligible possibility that the patent will be held valid by the competent national court. If the patent is upheld, the decision and its orders remain in place and, once the validity decision is final, the injunction becomes permanent. If the patent is held wholly or partially invalid to the relevant extent at first instance or on appeal, the condition is not fulfilled and the decision and orders fall away to that extent. The patentee may request consequential orders pursuant to R. 118.4 RoP within two months of the national decision (Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_312/2025, UPC_CoA_333/2025, UPC_CoA_880/2025 and UPC_CoA_882/2025, decision of 2 June 2026 – Fujifilm v Kodak).
Rule 118.5
In UPC_CFI_249/2023 (Meril GmbH v. Edwards Lifesciences Corporation, order of 19 December 2023, the Local Division Munich found that Rule 118.5 RoP (Decision on the principle of costs) shall apply mutatis mutandis to applications for provisional measures; and that a decision on the principle of costs under Rule 118.5 RoP may be followed by cost determination proceedings pursuant to Rule 151 RoP.
Rule 118.8
In UPC_CFI_2/2023 (10xGenomics v. NanoString Technologies et al), the Local Division in Munich emphasized the immediate enforceability of preliminary injunction orders without the need for additional court enforcement orders under Art. 82.4 UPCA. Rule 118.8 of the Rules of Procedure, according to its clear wording does not apply to orders under Art. 62 UPCA.
With reference to UPC_CoA_683/2024 par. 240 (Decision of the Court of Appeal on the merits re. Belkin v. Philips, issued on 03.10.2025) and with reference to UPC_CoA_845/2024 par. 40-41 (Order of the Court of Appeal Belkin v. Philips of 30 May 2025) the Court of Appeal made in its Order UPC_CoA_699/2025 issued on 14.10.2025 (Kodak v. Fujifilm) the following summarizing statements:
The system of penalties under the Rules of Procedure acc. to R. 354.3 RoP and R. 118.8 RoP is as follows.
The Court may order an interim award of damages to the successful party in the decision on the merits, subject to any conditions that the Court may order. Such award shall at least cover the expected costs of the procedure for the award of damages and compensation on the part of the successful party.
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
The determination of the amount of damages ordered for the successful party may be the subject of separate proceedings. The determination shall include the determination of the amount of compensation, if any, to be awarded as a result of the provisional protection conferred by a published European patent application [Article 32(1)(f) of the Agreement, Article 67 EPC] and compensation to be paid pursuant to Rules 118.1, 198.2, 213.2 and 354.2. The expression “damages” used in Chapter 4 shall be deemed to include such compensation and interest at the rate and for the period that the Court shall decide.
Where the successful party wishes to have the amount of damages determined, it shall no later than one year from service of the final decision on the merits (including any final decision on appeal) on both infringement and validity (or in the case of an award under Rules 118.1, 198.2, 213.2 or 354.2 from the date of the order for such award) lodge an Application for the determination of damages, which may include a request for an order to lay open books.
Relation with Agreement: Article 68
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
1. The Application for the determination of damages shall contain:
(a) particulars in accordance with Rule 13.1(a) to (d);
(b) the date of the decision on the merits and the action number of the file;
(c) if required a request for an order to lay open books (Rules 141 to 144) in which case the applicant shall provide the matters set out in Rules 141(b) to (e).
2. After any procedure for the laying open of books is complete, or, if that has not been requested in the Application referred to in paragraph 1 the applicant shall indicate:
(a) the redress (damages, licence fees, profits) and the interest thereon requested by him;
(b) an indication of the facts relied on, in particular calculations concerning lost profits or profits made by the unsuccessful party;
(c) the evidence relied on;
(d) a statement as to whether the decision on the merits is the subject of an appeal;
(e) his assessment of the amount of damages due to him.
The applicant shall pay the fixed fee and, where applicable, the value based fee for the determination of damages in accordance with Part 6. Rule 15.2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Where the value of the action exceeds EUR500.000 the applicant shall pay a value based fee for the determination of damages in accordance with Part 6.
1. If the requirements referred to in Rule 131.1 and .2(d) and (e) have been complied with, the Registry shall as soon as practicable:
(a) record the date of receipt of the Application for the determination of damages;
(b) record the Application in the register;
(c) inform the applicant of the date of receipt;
(d) inform the panel which has given the decision on the merits on infringement that an Application for the determination of damages has been lodged;
(e) serve the Application upon the unsuccessful party.
2. The panel which has given the decision on the merits on infringement shall be the panel for the determination of damages unless for any reason this is not possible or practical in which case the presiding judge of the division concerned shall appoint a fresh panel. Rules 17.2 and 18 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
The Court may stay the Application for a determination of damages pending any appeal on the merits pursuant to Rule 295(h) on a reasoned request by the unsuccessful party. The applicant shall be given the opportunity to be heard. If the Court continues the proceedings on the Application, it may order the applicant to render a security according to Rule 352.
The Defence to the Application for the determination of damages shall contain:
(a) the names of the unsuccessful party and of that party’s representative;
(b) postal and electronic addresses for service on the unsuccessful party and the names and addresses of the persons authorised to accept service;
(c) the action number attributed to the file;
(d) the reasons why the Application for the award of damages is contested;
(e) an indication of the facts relied on; and
(f) the evidence relied on.
The applicant may within one month lodge a Reply to the Defence to the Application for the determination of damages, limited to the matters raised in the Defence. The unsuccessful party may lodge a Rejoinder to the Reply within one month of service of the Reply, limited to the matters raised in the Reply.
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
If the applicant has made a request pursuant to Rule 131.1(c), Rules 134 to 136 shall apply mutatis mutandis. The Request shall contain:
(a) particulars in accordance with Rule 131.1(a) and (b);
(b) details of any information ordered by the Court and given by the other party pursuant to Rule 191;
(c) a description of the information held by the unsuccessful party to which the applicant requests access, in particular documents relating to turnover and profits generated by the infringing products or regarding the extent of use of the infringing process as well as accounts and bank documents, and any related document concerning the infringement;
(d) the reasons why the applicant needs access to this information;
(e) the facts relied on; and
(f) the evidence offered in support.
Rule 140 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
1. The Court may:
(a) order the unsuccessful party to open its books to the applicant within a time period to be specified and subject to such terms as the Court may deem appropriate having regard inter alia to Article 58 of the Agreement and Rule 190.1 and .4;
(b) inform the applicant and specify a time period within which the procedure for the award of damages shall be continued.
2. Where the Request to lay open books is not allowable, the Court shall inform the applicant and specify a time period within which the procedure for the award of damages shall be continued [Rule 131.2].
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
According to the Decision of the LD Düsseldorf UPC_CFI_186/2025 of 09.07.2025 (Fujifilm v. Kodak) the Defendants’ demand for reimbursement of representation costs for the cost procedure is unfounded. Proceedings for cost decisions under R. 150 et seq. RoP are summary proceedings, determined by the judge-rapporteur. Awarding compensation for the additional costs that can be attributed to the proceedings for cost decisions as such is not envisaged in the Rules. It would give the parties an incentive to spend considerable resources on these summary proceedings. Awarding costs upon costs cannot have been intended in the Rules. A party, even if successful in the context of proceedings for a cost decision under R. 150 RoP, will normally have to carry its own costs attributable to the cost proceedings. In exceptional cases, a party may be ordered to bear any unnecessary costs it has caused the Court or another party (see Art. 69(3) UPCA, UPC_CoA_618/2024, Decision of 6 June 2025, mn. 54 – Hanshow v VusionGroup).
Where the successful party (hereinafter "the applicant") wishes to seek a cost decision, it shall within one month of service of the decision lodge an Application for a cost decision which shall contain:
(a) particulars in accordance with Rule 13.1(a) to (d);
(b) the date of the decision and the action number of the file;
(c) a statement as to whether the decision on the merits is the subject of an appeal, if known at the date of the Application;
(d) an indication of the costs for which compensation is requested, which may include recovery of court fees and costs of representation, of witnesses, of experts, and other expenses; and
(e) the preliminary estimate of the legal costs that the party submitted pursuant to Rule 118.5.
In UPC_CFI_249/2023 (Meril GmbH v. Edwards Lifesciences Corporation, order of 19 December 2023, the Local Division Munich found that a decision on the principle of costs under Rule 118.5 RoP may be followed by cost determination proceedings pursuant to Rule 151 RoP.
Application for a cost decision acc. to Rule 151 RoP; reasonable cost for representation acc. to Rule 152 RoP; appeal proceedings pursuant Rule 220.2 RoP; ceiling of reimbursable costs:
Concerning the above-mentioned issues the LD Hamburg came in its Decision UPC_CFI_730/2025 issued on 05.01.2026 (Nera vs. Xiaomi) to the following conclusions:
Concerning the start of the one-month period under R.151 RoP it is referrd to the Cost Decision of the LD Brussels UPC_CFI_2265/2025 issued on 07.05.2026 (YEALINK v. BARCO), which was preceded by proceedings for an interim injunction, and in which the application for an interim injunction was dismissed at both first and second instance on the grounds of lack of urgency, and in which the defendant in that case unsuccessfully contested the competence of the Brussels Local Court as a preliminary objection.
The aforementioned cost decision deals among others with the right to request compensation for the costs related to the dismissed competence challenge as a defence in the cost proceedings initiated by the defendant of the PI proceedings with the following result:
R. 150.1 RoP provides that a cost decision “may be the subject of separate proceedings following a decision on the merits”. The one-month period under R. 151 RoP initiates with the service of the decision in the proceedings on the merits. The Court of Appeal in its decision of 6 June 2025 stated that “R. 150 and 151 RoP apply mutatis mutandis” (CoA order of 20 January 2025, UPC_CoA_297/2025, SharkNinja (see also order of 6 June 2025 UPC_CoA_618/2024, Hanshow v. Vusion)) in circumstances where “no proceedings on the merits are already pending and the applicant for provisional measures does not start proceedings on the merits of the case, (for example, if the application for provisional measures was unsuccessful), and the claimant was ordered to bear the costs of the defendant”, and stated further in § 43 that where merits proceedings are introduced it is open to the defendant (to be read as “(partly) successful party”) in PI proceedings "to either lodge an application within the one month's period of the final order in the proceedings on provisional measures, or wait for the decision on the merits”.
As the claimant of the PI proceedings (hereafter referred to as: claimant) initiated proceedings on the merits on 29 August 2025, followed by a counterclaim for revocation introduced by the defendant of the PI proceedings (hereafter referred to as: defendant) , the R. 151 RoP deadline initiates from the date on which the decision on the merits is issued. As in the present case this deadline has not yet started, the objection to the late filing of the claimant’s request is dismissed. The fact that the PI proceedings were decided due to lack of urgency does not alter this approach. While the Court would have preferred to address all costs issues (PI proceedings and on the merits) in one decision based on the overall outcome of both proceedings, the defendant has the right to initiate cost proceedings after a final order has been issued in the PI proceedings. Where the defendant has opted to initiate cost proceedings before the case on merits is assessed and a decision is issued, it would be inconsistent and procedurally inefficient to address only one side of the cost equation in these cost proceedings while leaving the other to a separate future procedure.
Therefore, the claimant has indeed the right to claim its own costs as a defence solely as a matter of procedural efficiency and no separate application for a cost award is necessary, in order to avoid the burden of parallel proceedings. Such approach is consistent with the flexibility envisaged in preamble 4 of the RoP and with Article 41(3) UPCA.
Waiving rights, and specifically waiving rights to compensation, needs an explicit statement from the holder of such right. As such the fact that the claimant would have admitted the defendant to be the “successful party” in first instance proceedings does not imply that it waived its right for compensation for the costs incurred in successfully challenging the competence issues raised by the defendant. Therefore, the claimant remains entitled to raise such request (as a defence) in the subsequent cost proceedings.
The fact that the defendant did not claim itself any costs related to its own work on the competence challenges (in first instance and in cross-appeal), does not hinder the claimant to request for costs it incurred in successfully challenging the competence issues raised by the defendant in the preceding PI proceedings.
According to UPC_CFI_16/2024, UPC_CFI_121/2025 andUPC_CFI_124/2025 (Ortovox Sportartikel GmbH v. Mammut Sports , LD Düsseldorf of 22 April 2025) infringement analyses to prepare main proceedings, secretarial work as well as the drafting of a warning letter, an application for interim measures or a statement of claim are costs to be considered as reimbursable.
Even if the settlement of the costs of provisional, resp. interim proceedings is usually reserved for a uniform cost assessment procedure following the main proceedings, the costs incurred in the provisional proceedings are separately reimbursable. The upper limits of the recoverable costs for the proceedings for provisional measures and for the main proceedings must therefore be determined separately. Further, the upper limits also apply for both the first instance and for the second instance separately.
Application for a cost decision acc. to Rule 151 RoP; reasonable cost for representation acc. to Rule 152 RoP; appeal proceedings pursuant Rule 220.2 RoP; ceiling of reimbursable costs:
Concerning the above-mentioned issues the LD Hamburg came in its Decision UPC_CFI_730/2025 issued on 05.01.2026 (Nera vs. Xiaomi) to the following conclusions:
The compensation for costs of experts of the parties [Rule 181] exceeding the expenses referred to in Rule 180.1 shall be based on the rates that are customary in the respective sector, with due regard to the required expertise, the complexity of the issue and the time spent by the expert for the services rendered.
Where the Court has ordered the deposit of a sum sufficient to cover the expenses of a witness in accordance with Rule 180.2 or of a party’s expert in accordance with Rule 180, compensation may be requested for payments made by the Registry towards the expenses incurred by a witness or an expert.
The decision of the judge-rapporteur as to costs only may be appealed to the Court of Appeal in accordance with Rule 221.
Relation with Agreement: Article 69
Part 1 - Procedures before the Court of First Instance
Relation with the Agreement: Article 69(4)
According to an Order in UPC_CoA_431/2025 of 09 July 2025 (Chint v. Jingao) the Court of Appeal stated:
When exercising its discretion under Art. 69(4) of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (hereinafter: UPCA) and R.158 RoP, the Court must determine, in the light of the facts and arguments brought forward by the parties, whether the financial position of the claimant gives rise to a legitimate and real concern that a possible order for costs may not be recoverable and/or how likely it is that a possible order for costs by the Court may not be enforceable, or that enforcement may be unduly burdensome. The burden of substantiation and proof of why an order for security for costs is appropriate in a particular case is on the party applying for security for costs (CoA 17 September 2024, UPC_CoA_218/2024 APL_25922/2024, Audi v NST). To this end, the applicant shall not only provide evidence as to the foreign law applicable in the territory where the order is to be enforced, but also on its application (CoA 29 November 20204, UPC_CoA_548/2024 APL_52969/2024, Aarke v Sodastream).
In the context of the assessment of the likelihood of successful enforcement of a cost decision, the fact that a party has its registered office in a country that is not a Member State of the European Union or the European Economic Area, is a relevant factor. Whereas Union law guarantees the recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts of Member States, including this Court, in other Member States, similar guarantees may not be in place for the recognition and enforcement in states that are not members of the European Union or the European Economic Area.
In view of the difficulties the UPC-Courts and the courts of the UPCA-Member States have experienced the enforcement of a cost decision in China appears unduly burdensome a request for security for costs has to be granted if applied for.
According to the Order UPC_CoA_8/2025 issued by the Court of Appeal on 30102025 (Oerlikon Textile v. Bhagat Textile) concerning the time of an application for security for costs the following is to be considered:
Except where deposits are rendered pursuant to Rule 180.2, the Court may order that either or both parties provide adequate security (either by deposit or bank guarantee) to cover costs incurred and/or to be incurred in the proceedings by the Court, pending a cost decision pursuant to Rule 150.1. Rule 158.2 and .3 shall apply.
1. In proceedings before the Court, the means of evidence shall include in particular the following:
(a) written evidence, whether printed, hand-written or drawn, in particular documents, written witness statements, plans, drawings, photographs;
(b) expert reports and reports on experiments carried out for the purpose of the proceedings;
(c) physical objects, in particular devices, products, embodiments, exhibits, models;
(d) electronic files and audio/video recordings.
2. Means of obtaining evidence shall include in particular the following:
(a) hearing of the parties;
(b) requests for information;
(c) production of documents;
(d) summoning, hearing and questioning of witnesses;
(e) appointing, receiving opinions from, summoning and hearing and questioning of experts;
(f) ordering inspection of a place or a physical object;
(g) conducting comparative tests and experiments;
(h) sworn statements in writing (written witness statements).
3. Means of obtaining evidence shall further include [Article 59 and 60 of the Agreement]:
(a) ordering a party or a third party to produce evidence;
(b) ordering measures to preserve evidence.
Uncontested facts
In an order of the Court of Appeal UPC_CoA_402/2024 (order of the CoA of 19 June 2025 re: Alexion v. Samsung Bioepsis) it is stated that where a statement of fact is not specifically contested by any party, it follows from R. 171.2 RoP that it shall be held to be true as between the parties. However, even if there is such an uncontested fact, this does not imply that the legal consequence for which this fact was submitted automatically follows. It still falls upon the Court to decide whether the facts advanced justify such a legal consequence (Court of Appeal, Kodak v Fujifilm, 17 April 2025, UPC_CoA_312/2025, par. 12).
The same principle was applied specifically to the assessment of patent infringement in UPC_CoA_36/2026 (Court of Appeal, order of 8 July 2026, Align Technology v. Angelalign Technology). Where late-filed non-infringement arguments disputing the technical functioning of the contested embodiment were disregarded, the claimant's factual submissions concerning that functionality had to be regarded as uncontested. However, this did not mean that infringement itself had to be assumed. Even on the basis of uncontested facts, the Court must assess whether those facts justify the legal conclusion that the contested embodiment falls within the scope of the patent claim.
Accordingly, a distinction must be made between the factual characteristics or functioning of the contested embodiment and the legal assessment of those facts under the properly construed patent claim. The former may be treated as established pursuant to R. 171.2 RoP if not specifically contested. The latter remains a question for the Court.
Pleading ignorance
In UPC_CFI_505/2024 – Decision of 13 May 2025, the Düsseldorf Local Division rejected the Defendants’ repeated reliance on “pleading ignorance” (in German civil procedure called: Bestreiten mit Nichtwissen), e.g. when contesting the standing of Claimant 1) as an exclusive licensee. The Düsseldorf Local Division held that such general denials did not fulfil the requirements of Rule 171.2 RoP, which states that facts which are not specifically contested shall be treated as admitted. This marks a clear divergence from German civil procedural law (Zivilprozessordnung – ZPO), where § 138(4) ZPO permits a party to declare lack of knowledge with respect to an allegation if the party has made reasonable efforts to obtain the necessary information and cannot, without its own fault, confirm or deny the fact. German courts typically accept such declarations if the relevant fact lies in the exclusive knowledge of the other party.
Relation with Agreement: Article 53
For the judicial cooperation in the taking of evidence, the Court shall apply any method provided by:
Part 2 - Evidence
(a) any current or past relationship between the witness and the party offering the evidence; and
(b) any actual or potential conflict of interest that may affect the impartiality of the witness.
Subject to the orders of the Court referred to in Rules 104(e) and 112.2(b) a party seeking to offer oral witness evidence shall make an Application for the hearing of a witness in person which shall set out:
(a) the reasons why the witness should be heard in person;
(b) the facts which the party expects the witness to confirm; and
(c) the language in which the witness shall give evidence.
1. The Court may order that a witness be heard in person:
(a) of its own motion;
(b) where a written witness statement is challenged by the other party; or
(c) on an Application for the hearing of a witness in person [Rule 176].
2. An order of the Court summoning a witness to the oral hearing shall in particular indicate:
(a) the name, address and description of the witness;
(b) the date and place of the oral hearing;
(c) an indication of the facts of the action about which the witness is to be examined;
(d) information about the reimbursement of expenses incurred by the witness;
(e) a statement that the witness will be questioned by the Court and the parties; and
(f) the language of the proceedings and the possibility of arranging simultaneous interpretation between that language and the language of the witness, if necessary [Rule 109].
3. In its order summoning the witness, the Court shall also inform the witness of his duties and rights as a witness under Rules 178 and 179, including the sanctions which may be imposed on a defaulting witness.
1. After the identity of the witness has been established and before hearing his evidence, the presiding judge shall ask the witness to make the following declaration:
"I solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth."
2. The witness shall give his evidence to the Court.
3. The hearing of a witness who has signed a written witness statement shall begin with the confirmation of the evidence given therein. The witness may elaborate on the evidence contained in his written witness statement.
4. The presiding judge and the judges of the panel may put questions to the witness.
5. Under the control of the presiding judge, the parties may put questions to the witness. The presiding judge may prohibit any question which is not designed to adduce admissible evidence.
6. With the consent of the Court a witness may give evidence in a language other than the language of proceedings.
1. A witness shall be entitled to reimbursement of:
(a) expenses for travelling and stay; and
(b) loss of income caused by his hearing in person.
After the witness has carried out his duties and upon his request, the Registry shall make a payment to the witness towards the expenses incurred.
2. The Court shall make the summoning of a witness conditional upon the deposit by the party relying on the witness of a sum sufficient to cover the expenses referred to in paragraph 1.
(a) an expert has a duty to assist the Court impartially on matters relevant to his area of expertise which overrides any duty to the party retaining him; and
(b) an expert is to be independent and objective, and shall not act as an advocate for any party to the proceedings.
Part 2 - Evidence
1. Where the Court must resolve a specific technical or other question in relation to the action, it may of its own motion, and after hearing the parties, appoint a court expert.
2. The parties may make suggestions regarding the identity of the court expert, his technical or other relevant background and the questions to be put to him.
3. The court expert shall be responsible to the Court and shall possess the expertise, independence and impartiality required for being appointed as court expert. The parties shall be entitled to be heard on the expertise, independence and impartiality of the court expert.
4. The Court shall appoint a court expert by way of order which shall in particular specify:
(a) the name and address of the expert appointed;
(b) a short description of the facts of the action;
(c) the evidence submitted by the parties in respect of the technical or other question;
(d) the questions put to the expert, with the appropriate level of detail, including where appropriate suggestions relating to any experiments to be carried out;
(e) when and under what conditions the expert may receive other relevant information;
(f) the time period for the presentation of the expert report;
(g) information about the reimbursement of expenses incurred by the expert;
(h) information about the sanctions which may be imposed on a defaulting expert; and
(i) his duties under Rule 186.
5. The expert shall receive a copy of the order, together with the documents and other evidence that the Court considers to be necessary for carrying out his task.
6. The expert shall be required upon receipt of the order to confirm in writing that he will present the expert report within the time period specified by the Court.
7. The Court shall agree with the expert on a fee covering his written expert report and his participation in the oral hearing. The Court may reduce this fee by an equitable amount if the expert does not deliver his report within the time period specified by the Court or if the report did not have the quality to be expected of the expert.
8. If an appointed court expert does not present his report within the time period specified or, if extended at the expert’s request, the extended period, the Court may appoint another expert in his place. The Court may hold the expert liable for all or part of the costs of appointing and reimbursing another expert.
9. The Registry shall maintain an indicative list of technical experts.
Once the report of the court expert has been presented to the Court, the Court shall invite the parties to comment on it either in writing or during the oral hearing.
Rules 178 to 180 shall apply mutatis mutandis to a court expert.
Relation with Agreement: Article 57
Part 2 - Evidence
1. Where a party has presented reasonably available and plausible evidence in support of its claims and has, in substantiating those claims, specified evidence which lies in the control of the other party or a third party, the Court may on a reasoned request by the party specifying such evidence, order that other party or third party to produce such evidence. For the protection of confidential information the Court may order that the evidence be disclosed to certain named persons only and be subject to appropriate terms of non-disclosure.
2. During the written and interim procedures, a party may request such an order to produce evidence.
3. The judge-rapporteur may make such order in the written procedure or in the interim procedure having given the other/third party an opportunity to be heard.
4. An order to produce evidence shall in particular specify:
(a) under which conditions, in what form and within what time period the evidence shall be produced;
(b) any sanction which may be imposed if the evidence is not produced according to the order.
5. Where the Court orders a third party to produce evidence, the interests of that third party shall be duly taken into account.
6. An order to produce evidence shall be subject to the provisions of Rules 179.3, 287 and 288. The order shall indicate that an appeal may be brought in accordance with Article 73 of the Agreement and Rule 220.1.
7. If a party fails to comply with an order to produce evidence, the Court shall take such failure into account when deciding on the issue in question.
Relation with Agreement: Article 59
According to a Procedural Order UPC_1357/2025 of the LD Brussels issued on 14.04.2026 ( GC v. Establishments LABS ) the following cumulative conditions have to be considered by the Court when assessing an application to produce evidence (cf. LD The Hague of 14.10.2024 in the case of Winnow v. Orbisk, § 8, as further developed ) :
1. The requesting party must have presented evidence “reasonably available” in support of its claims. The assessment of this condition is prima facie and twofold:
(a) Did the requesting party present “reasonable available” evidence to support its underlying assertions?
(b) As an implied condition, could the requested evidence enable the requesting party to conclusively prove its assertions?
2. The evidence to which access is requested must
(i) be “specified” and
(ii) lie in control of the other party.
3. The other party’s confidential information must be protected.
4. The requirements of proportionality, equity, and fairness must be satisfied. This assessment is twofold:
(a) The “timing” of the application as such taking into consideration the stage of the proceedings.
(b) Each individual request as a final assessment.
In this respect also the decision UPC_CFI_770/2024,UPC_CFI_566/2025 of the LD Milan issued on 26.05.2026 (Pirelli v. Sichuan) appears remarkable where it is stated in Headnote 2)=English translation:
The principle of proximity of evidence permits a redistribution of the burden of proof where the party bearing the burden of proof has provided strong indicia in relation to the fact to be proven (here: the patent proprietor by means of photographic reproductions of the defendant’s products), and the opposing party (here: the defendant accused of patent infringement) has privileged access to the documents and information that make it possible to establish that fact directly. The Court of Justice focused attention on this point in cases where the refusal of the defendant to provide information in its direct possession may compromise the effectiveness of the evidentiary regime, requiring the national court to assess the informational asymmetry between the parties (see judgment of 21 July 2011, Kelly, C-104/10, paras. 38 et seq.).
The background of this statement was as follows:
The claimant relied, inter alia, on photographic reproductions of the defendant’s products, including materials obtained at the EICMA trade fair, to establish infringement.
The defendant challenged the evidentiary value of that material.
The Court rejected a purely formalistic allocation of evidentiary burdens.
Relying on the principle of proximity of evidence, the Milan Local Division held that where the party bearing the burden of proof has presented strong indicia supporting the alleged facts, and the opposing party has direct access to the relevant information and evidence, evidentiary burdens may be redistributed accordingly.
The Court expressly referred to the CJEU’s judgment in Kelly (C-104/10), noting that refusal by a defendant to provide information within its direct possession may undermine the effectiveness of evidentiary rules and requires courts to take account of informational asymmetry between the parties.
This is a potentially important statement for UPC infringement litigation. Patent proprietors will often face practical limitations in obtaining direct technical evidence regarding allegedly infringing products, particularly where relevant details lie within the defendant’s internal documentation or technical sphere.
The decision suggests that the UPC may be prepared to respond pragmatically where claimants provide persuasive circumstantial evidence rather than requiring unattainable direct proof.
At the same time, the threshold remains that you need strong indicia before any redistribution of evidentiary burdens becomes justified.
The Court may in response to a reasoned request by a party order the other party or any third party to communicate such information in the control of that other party or third party as is specified in Article 67 of the Agreement or such other information as is reasonably necessary for the purpose of advancing that party’s case. Rule 190.1 second sentence, .5 and .6 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Relation with the Agreement: Article 67
Part 2 - Evidence
1. An Application for preserving evidence may be lodged by a party (within the meaning of Article 47 of the Agreement) (hereinafter "the applicant") at the division where the applicant has commenced infringement proceedings on the merits. If the application is lodged before proceedings on the merits have been started it shall be lodged at the division where the applicant intends to start proceedings on the merits.
2. The Application for preserving evidence shall contain:
(a) particulars in accordance with Rule 13.1(a) to (i);
(b) a clear indication of the measures requested [Rule 196.1], including the exact location of the evidence to be preserved where it is known or suspected with good reason;
(c) the reasons why the proposed measures are needed to preserve relevant evidence; and
(d) the facts and evidence relied on in support of the Application.
Where main proceedings on the merits of the case have not yet been started before the Court, the Application shall in addition contain a concise description of the action which will be started before the Court, including an indication of the facts and evidence which may be relied on in support.
3. Where the applicant requests that measures to preserve evidence be ordered without hearing the other party (hereinafter "the defendant"), the Application for preserving evidence shall in addition set out the reasons for not hearing the defendant having regard in particular to Rule 197. The applicant shall be under a duty to disclose any material fact known to it which might influence the Court in deciding whether to make an order without hearing the defendant. The application shall not be entered on the register until notice has been given to the defendant pursuant to Rule 197.2.
4. Where the Application for preserving evidence is lodged after main proceedings on the merits of the case have been started before the Court, the Application shall be drawn up in the language of the proceedings. Where the Application is lodged before main proceedings on the merits of the case have been started before the Court, Rule 14 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
5. The applicant shall pay the fee for the Application for preserving evidence, in accordance with Part 6. Rule 15.2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Relation with Agreement: Article 60
According to the Order UPC_CoA_3/2026 (Ecovacs v. Roborock) issued on 16.03.2026 the Court of Appeal summarized the conditions for measures to preserve evidence without hearing the other party (ex parte oder for inspection) as follows:
Measures to preserve evidence without hearing the other party raise issues of due process. The applicant’s duty to disclose any material fact known to it which might influence the Court in deciding whether to make an order without hearing the defendant is there so that the Court can take due account of the interests of both parties, in spite of having to rely only on the facts presented in the Application. Representatives are generally obliged not to misrepresent facts (R. 284 RoP). R. 192.3 RoP imposes a heightened requirement where the applicant must disclose, and not leave out, any material facts that might be relevant for an ex parte order. This includes (for example) facts that may be relevant for the proportionality assessment. Omissions and distorted accounts of material facts which might be of central importance for the Local Division’s assessment on whether to allow the request at all cannot be compensated or circumvented by later submissions in response to a Request for review.
Legal framework
1. At the request of the applicant which has presented reasonably available evidence to support the claim that the patent has been infringed or is about to be infringed the Court may, even before the commencement of proceedings on the merits of the case, order prompt and effective provisional measures to preserve relevant evidence in respect of the alleged infringement, subject to the protection of confidential information (Art. 60(1) UPCA).
2. Measures shall be ordered, if necessary without the other party having been heard, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the proprietor of the patent, or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed (Art. 60(5) UPCA).
3. Where an applicant requests that measures to preserve evidence be ordered without hearing the defendant, the Application for preserving evidence shall (in addition to the items in R. 192.2 RoP) set out the reasons for not hearing the defendant having regard in particular to R. 197 RoP. The applicant shall be under a duty to disclose any material fact known to it which might influence the Court in deciding whether to make an order without hearing the defendant (R. 192.3 RoP).
4. R. 197.1 RoP duplicates Article 60(5) UPCA and must be read with reference to Article 7 Directive 2004/48, concerning measures for preserving evidence. Article 7(1), first part, provides that Member States shall ensure that, even before the commencement of proceedings on the merits of the case, the competent judicial authorities may, on application by a party who has presented reasonably available evidence to support his/her claims that his/her intellectual property right has been infringed or is about to be infringed, order prompt and effective provisional measures to preserve relevant evidence in respect of the alleged infringement, subject to the protection of confidential information. Such measures may include the detailed description, with or without the taking of samples, or the physical seizure of the infringing goods, and, in appropriate cases, the materials and implements used in the production and/or distribution of these goods and the documents relating thereto. Those measures shall be taken, if necessary, without the other party having been heard, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the rightholder or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed.
5. Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/48 states that measures, procedures and remedies shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.
6. The principle of proportionality requires that measures do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 5 October 1994, Crispoltoni and Others v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi and Others, C-133/93, EU:C:1994:364, para 41). This is often referred to as a three-pronged test of legitimate objective (or purpose), suitability (or appropriateness) and necessity (less restrictive means). It applies to the legislation but also to its application to the case at hand. Reasons why the legislation is proportionate will often translate into a method to ensure that the application is proportionate.
7. As for the underlying EU legislation, the objective pursued by Directive 2004/48 is, as stated in recital 10 thereof, to approximate the legislative systems of the Member States in respect of the means of enforcing intellectual property rights so as to ensure a high, equivalent and homogeneous level of protection in the internal market (see judgment of 18 October 2018, Bastei Lübbe, C-149/17, EU:C:2018:841, paras 33-34). The appropriateness of ensuring that effective means of presenting, obtaining and preserving evidence are available has been recognized as well (Bastei Lübbe at para 40). Necessity is a requirement in Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/48; “measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by this Directive”, and 7 as already mentioned, in Article 7(1) of the directive “Those measures shall be taken, if necessary, without the other party having been heard”.
8. The UPCA and the RoP are drafted accordingly. - When the Court decides on ex parte measures in R. 197.1 RoP, the purpose is satisfied once the applicant has presented reasonably available evidence to support the claim that the patent has been infringed or is about to be infringed (Art. 60(1) UPCA).
9. Furthermore, when R. 197.1 RoP is applied, it entails a proportionality test in the strict sense; meaning that a balancing is conducted with reference to the facts of the case. This involves weighing opposing interests.
10. Here, in relation to enabling the injured party to obtain the evidence within the control of the opposing party necessary for supporting its claims under Directive 2004/48, case-law pinpoints the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of several fundamental rights, namely the right to an effective remedy and the right to intellectual property, on the one hand, and the right to respect for private and family life, on the other (see Bastei Lübbe, para 44).
11. The interference with the business activities of the defendant, or with the private life of a natural person, is an interest to be weighed against the applicant’s interest in evidence preservation. This interference is more acute when carried out without the defendant being heard. However, once the purpose, appropriateness and necessity have been established (see para 30 above), the weighing will normally come down to determining whether the requests are within a meaningful range, or if the operative part of the order must be limited in relation to what is requested to ensure proportionality. In rare cases this could result in denying the measures altogether, for example if the evidence to be preserved can be 8 obtained in a less intrusive manner, rendering the sought measures disproportionate. Similarly, requests that are of a more speculative nature (fishing expeditions) in relation to the reasonably available evidence in support of the claim that the patent has been infringed or is about to be infringed, should be denied (see CoA, 28 May 2025, UPC_CoA_239/2025, Centripetal/Palo Alto Networks para. 12)
12. Measures to preserve evidence without hearing the other party raise issues of due process. The applicant’s duty to disclose any material fact known to it which might influence the Court in deciding whether to make an order without hearing the defendant is there so that the Court can take due account of the interests of both parties, in spite of having to rely only on the facts presented in the Application. Representatives are generally obliged not to misrepresent facts (R. 284 RoP). R. 192.3 RoP imposes a heightened requirement where the applicant must disclose, and not leave out, any material facts that might be relevant for an ex parte order. This includes (for example) facts that may be relevant for the proportionality assessment.
1. The Court shall have the discretion - including where the Application is made pursuant to Rule 192.3 - to:
(a) inform the defendant about the Application and invite him to lodge, within a time period to be specified, an Objection to the Application for preserving evidence which shall contain: (i) the reasons why the Application shall fail; (ii) the facts and evidence relied on, in particular any challenge to the facts and evidence relied on by the applicant; (iii) where main proceedings on the merits of the case have not yet been started before the Court, the reasons why the action which will be started before the Court shall fail and an indication of the facts and evidence relied on in support;
(b) summon the parties to an oral hearing;
(c) summon the applicant to an oral hearing without the presence of the defendant;
(d) decide the Application without having heard the defendant.
2. In exercising its discretion, the Court shall take into account:
(a) the urgency of the action;
(b) whether the reasons for not hearing the defendant [Rule 192.3 and 197] appear well-founded;
(c) the probability that evidence may be destroyed or otherwise cease to be available [Rule 197].
3. The presiding judge may decide that he or the judge-rapporteur or other single judge or the standing judge may decide on the Application.
4. In cases of extreme urgency the standing judge appointed in accordance with Rule 345.5 may decide immediately on an Application to preserve evidence and the procedure to be followed on the Application.
5. If the Court decides to inform the defendant about the Application the Court will first give the applicant the possibility to withdraw the Application. In the event of such withdrawal the applicant may request that the Court shall order that the Application and its contents shall remain confidential.
6. If the patent the subject of the Application is also the subject of a Protective letter pursuant to Rule 207 the applicant may withdraw the Application pursuant to paragraph 5.
Acc. to the Headnotes of the Order UPC_CoA_327/2025 of 15-07-2025 (Maguin v. Tiru) the following is to be considered in relation to urgency as well as preserving evidence being ordered without hearing the other party, respectively without hearing the defendant:
(i) When examining an Application for preserving evidence, the Court exercises its discretion by taking into account the urgency of the action (R. 194.2(a) RoP) in order to determine whether, and to what extent, it wishes to hear the defendant (R. 194.1(a) RoP), summon the parties to an oral hearing (R. 194.1(b) RoP), summon the applicant to an oral hearing without the presence of the defendant (R. 194.1(c) RoP), or decide the Application without having heard the defendant (R. 194.1(d) RoP). The R.196.1 RoP and R.197.1 RoP are to be read in conjunction with those of Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (hereinafter 'Directive 2004/48'), in particular Article 7 concerning measures for preserving evidence, which provides that, even before the commencement of proceedings on the merits of the case, measures to preserve evidence must be capable of being ordered, if necessary without the other party having been heard, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the rightholder or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed.
(ii) The time taken by the applicant (within two months upon receipt of an initial suspicion of patent infringement based on a YouTube video) to file the Application for preserving evidence does not, in the case at hand, cast doubt on the urgency of the action (R. 194.2(a) RoP).
(iii) It is necessary to distinguish between the assessment of urgency in the context of an application for preserving evidence (R. 194.2(a) RoP) and the assessment of urgency in the context of an application for provisional measures (R. 209.2(b) RoP). In exercising its discretion to determine whether provisional measures should be ordered, the Court shall also have regard to any unreasonable delay in seeking provisional measures (R. 211.4 RoP). No such requirement is imposed either by the UPC Agreement or by the Rules of Procedure when assessing whether an application for preserving evidence should be granted.
(iv) The risk of the disappearance or unavailability of evidence must be assessed with reference to probability (R. 194.2(c) RoP) or to the demonstrable risk (R. 197.1 RoP) of evidence being destroyed or otherwise ceasing to be available, and not with reference to the certainty of the disappearance or the unavailability of evidence.
(v) Unlike provisional measures (Part 3 of the Rules of Procedure), for which the Court must, among the required conditions, be satisfied – with a sufficient degree of certainty – that the patent is valid (R. 211.2 RoP), no such criterion is required within the framework of the Court’s discretion to order measures to preserve evidence. When examining an application for preserving evidence and for inspection of premises, the Court is therefore not required to assess the validity of the patent at issue. This matter remains solely within the competence of the judge ruling on the merits or on provisional measures, except where the presumption of validity can clearly be called into question, for example, following a decision by an Opposition Division or a Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office in a parallel opposition procedure, or in revocation proceedings before another court concerning the same patent.
(vi) The assessment of the relevance of a prior art document remains, however, within the competence of the judge ruling on the merits or, to a different extent, of the judge competent to decide on applications for provisional measures. Accordingly, it is not for the applicant seeking measures to preserve evidence, at the stage of the application, to identify and disclose prior art of which it may be aware, unless such prior art is, for specific reasons, likely to influence the ex parte decision to be taken. Nor is it for the judge responsible for ordering measures to preserve evidence and inspect premises to examine any prior art that may be submitted to them, unless such prior art is, for obvious reasons, likely to influence their decision.
Relation with Agreement: Article 60
1. The Court may order, in particular, the following:
(a) preserving evidence by detailed description, with or without the taking of samples;
(b) physical seizure of allegedly infringing goods;
(c) physical seizure of the materials and implements used in the production and/or distribution of these goods and any related document;
(d) the preservation and disclosure of digital media and data and the disclosure of any passwords necessary to access them.
For the protection of confidential information the Court may order that any of the above be disclosed only to certain named persons and subject to appropriate terms of non-disclosure.
2. An order to preserve evidence shall specify that, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the outcome of the measures to preserve evidence may only be used in the proceedings on the merits of the case.
3. The order to preserve evidence shall be enforceable immediately, unless the Court decides otherwise. The Court may set conditions to the enforceability of the order, specifying in particular:
(a) who may represent the applicant when the measures to preserve evidence are being carried out and under what conditions;
(b) any security which shall be provided by the applicant. If necessary, the Court may set penalties applicable to the applicant if these conditions are not observed.
4. The order to preserve evidence shall specify a person who shall carry out the measures referred to in paragraph 1 and present a written Report on the measures to preserve evidence, all in accordance with the national law of the place where the measures are executed, to the Court within a time period to be specified.
5. The person referred to in paragraph 4 shall be a professional person or expert, who guarantees expertise, independence and impartiality. Where appropriate and allowed under applicable national law, the person may be a bailiff or assisted by a bailiff. In no circumstances may an employee or director of the applicant be present at the execution of the measures.
6. The Court may order the applicant to provide adequate security for the legal costs and other expenses and compensation for any injury incurred or likely to be incurred by the defendant which the applicant may be liable to bear. The Court shall do so where the order to preserve evidence was made without the defendant having been heard, unless there are special circumstances not to do so. The Court shall decide whether it is appropriate to order the security by deposit or bank guarantee.
7. The order to preserve evidence shall indicate that an appeal may be lodged in accordance with Article 73 of the Agreement and Rule 220.1.
Relation with Agreement: Article 60(1)-(4)
1. The Court may order measures to preserve evidence [Rule 196.1] without the defendant having been heard, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the applicant or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed or otherwise ceasing to be available.
2. Where measures to preserve evidence are ordered without the defendant having been heard, Rule 195 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the oral hearing without the presence of the defendant. In such cases, the defendant shall be given notice, immediately at the time of the execution of the measures.
3. Within 30 days after the execution of the measures, the defendant may request a review of the order to preserve evidence. The Request for review shall set out:
(a) the reasons why the order to preserve evidence shall be revoked or modified; and
(b) the facts and evidence relied on.
4. The Court shall order an oral hearing to review the order without delay. Rule 195 shall apply. The Court may modify, revoke or confirm the order. In case the order is modified or revoked the Court shall oblige the persons to whom confidential information has been disclosed to keep this information confidential [Rule 196.1].
Relation with Agreement: Article 60(6)
According to the Order UPC_CoA_3/2026 (Ecovacs v. Roborock) issued on 16.03.2026 the Court of Appeal summarized the conditions for measures to preserve evidence without hearing the other party (ex parte oder for inspection) as follows:
Measures to preserve evidence without hearing the other party raise issues of due process. The applicant’s duty to disclose any material fact known to it which might influence the Court in deciding whether to make an order without hearing the defendant is there so that the Court can take due account of the interests of both parties, in spite of having to rely only on the facts presented in the Application. Representatives are generally obliged not to misrepresent facts (R. 284 RoP). R. 192.3 RoP imposes a heightened requirement where the applicant must disclose, and not leave out, any material facts that might be relevant for an ex parte order. This includes (for example) facts that may be relevant for the proportionality assessment. Omissions and distorted accounts of material facts which might be of central importance for the Local Division’s assessment on whether to allow the request at all cannot be compensated or circumvented by later submissions in response to a Request for review.
Legal framework
1. At the request of the applicant which has presented reasonably available evidence to support the claim that the patent has been infringed or is about to be infringed the Court may, even before the commencement of proceedings on the merits of the case, order prompt and effective provisional measures to preserve relevant evidence in respect of the alleged infringement, subject to the protection of confidential information (Art. 60(1) UPCA).
2. Measures shall be ordered, if necessary without the other party having been heard, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the proprietor of the patent, or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed (Art. 60(5) UPCA).
3. Where an applicant requests that measures to preserve evidence be ordered without hearing the defendant, the Application for preserving evidence shall (in addition to the items in R. 192.2 RoP) set out the reasons for not hearing the defendant having regard in particular to R. 197 RoP. The applicant shall be under a duty to disclose any material fact known to it which might influence the Court in deciding whether to make an order without hearing the defendant (R. 192.3 RoP).
4. R. 197.1 RoP duplicates Article 60(5) UPCA and must be read with reference to Article 7 Directive 2004/48, concerning measures for preserving evidence. Article 7(1), first part, provides that Member States shall ensure that, even before the commencement of proceedings on the merits of the case, the competent judicial authorities may, on application by a party who has presented reasonably available evidence to support his/her claims that his/her intellectual property right has been infringed or is about to be infringed, order prompt and effective provisional measures to preserve relevant evidence in respect of the alleged infringement, subject to the protection of confidential information. Such measures may include the detailed description, with or without the taking of samples, or the physical seizure of the infringing goods, and, in appropriate cases, the materials and implements used in the production and/or distribution of these goods and the documents relating thereto. Those measures shall be taken, if necessary, without the other party having been heard, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the rightholder or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed.
5. Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/48 states that measures, procedures and remedies shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.
6. The principle of proportionality requires that measures do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 5 October 1994, Crispoltoni and Others v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi and Others, C-133/93, EU:C:1994:364, para 41). This is often referred to as a three-pronged test of legitimate objective (or purpose), suitability (or appropriateness) and necessity (less restrictive means). It applies to the legislation but also to its application to the case at hand. Reasons why the legislation is proportionate will often translate into a method to ensure that the application is proportionate.
7. As for the underlying EU legislation, the objective pursued by Directive 2004/48 is, as stated in recital 10 thereof, to approximate the legislative systems of the Member States in respect of the means of enforcing intellectual property rights so as to ensure a high, equivalent and homogeneous level of protection in the internal market (see judgment of 18 October 2018, Bastei Lübbe, C-149/17, EU:C:2018:841, paras 33-34). The appropriateness of ensuring that effective means of presenting, obtaining and preserving evidence are available has been recognized as well (Bastei Lübbe at para 40). Necessity is a requirement in Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/48; “measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by this Directive”, and 7 as already mentioned, in Article 7(1) of the directive “Those measures shall be taken, if necessary, without the other party having been heard”.
8. The UPCA and the RoP are drafted accordingly. - When the Court decides on ex parte measures in R. 197.1 RoP, the purpose is satisfied once the applicant has presented reasonably available evidence to support the claim that the patent has been infringed or is about to be infringed (Art. 60(1) UPCA).
9. Furthermore, when R. 197.1 RoP is applied, it entails a proportionality test in the strict sense; meaning that a balancing is conducted with reference to the facts of the case. This involves weighing opposing interests.
10. Here, in relation to enabling the injured party to obtain the evidence within the control of the opposing party necessary for supporting its claims under Directive 2004/48, case-law pinpoints the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of several fundamental rights, namely the right to an effective remedy and the right to intellectual property, on the one hand, and the right to respect for private and family life, on the other (see Bastei Lübbe, para 44).
11. The interference with the business activities of the defendant, or with the private life of a natural person, is an interest to be weighed against the applicant’s interest in evidence preservation. This interference is more acute when carried out without the defendant being heard. However, once the purpose, appropriateness and necessity have been established (see para 30 above), the weighing will normally come down to determining whether the requests are within a meaningful range, or if the operative part of the order must be limited in relation to what is requested to ensure proportionality. In rare cases this could result in denying the measures altogether, for example if the evidence to be preserved can be 8 obtained in a less intrusive manner, rendering the sought measures disproportionate. Similarly, requests that are of a more speculative nature (fishing expeditions) in relation to the reasonably available evidence in support of the claim that the patent has been infringed or is about to be infringed, should be denied (see CoA, 28 May 2025, UPC_CoA_239/2025, Centripetal/Palo Alto Networks para. 12)
12. Measures to preserve evidence without hearing the other party raise issues of due process. The applicant’s duty to disclose any material fact known to it which might influence the Court in deciding whether to make an order without hearing the defendant is there so that the Court can take due account of the interests of both parties, in spite of having to rely only on the facts presented in the Application. Representatives are generally obliged not to misrepresent facts (R. 284 RoP). R. 192.3 RoP imposes a heightened requirement where the applicant must disclose, and not leave out, any material facts that might be relevant for an ex parte order. This includes (for example) facts that may be relevant for the proportionality assessment.
Relation with Agreement: Article 60(8) and (9)
In its Order UPC_CFI_885/2025 issued on 04.05.2026 (OTEC v. STEROS) the LD Düsseldorf has clarified the consequences of a failed follow-up main proceedings after an ex parte order for inspection and preservation of evidence. If the applicant does not bring proceedings on the merits within the period set by Art. 60(8) UPCA and Rule 198.1 RoP the order must be lifted on request of the respondent.
Where the measure results in an expert description, the relevant period for commencing proceedings on the merits begins when the expert description is disclosed to the applicant. In the case at hand, the period therefore began when the unredacted expert description was released to the applicant, rather than when the inspection was carried out or the expert description was prepared.
The Court also ordered the return, destruction and deletion of the evidence obtained. However, legal costs incurred in evidence-preservation proceedings do not constitute “damage” within the meaning of Art. 60(9) UPCA and R. 198.2 RoP. Such costs must instead be claimed in cost determination proceedings under R. 151 et seqq. RoP.
Relation with Agreement: Article 60
In its Order UPC_CFI_885/2025 issued on 04.05.2026 (OTEC v. STEROS) the LD Düsseldorf has clarified the consequences of a failed follow-up main proceedings after an ex parte order for inspection and preservation of evidence. If the applicant does not bring proceedings on the merits within the period set by Art. 60(8) UPCA and Rule 198.1 RoP the order must be lifted on request of the respondent. The Court also ordered the return, destruction and deletion of the evidence obtained, but rejected a request for compensation where the respondent had only relied on legal costs rather than substantiated damage.
In § 17of the aforementioned Order the Court stated that the same mechanism applies to inspection orders according to Rule 199.2 RoP.
Part 2 - Evidence
Relation with Agreement: Article 61
1. Without prejudice to the possibility for parties or parties’ experts to carry out experiments, the Court may, on a reasoned request by a party, order an experiment to prove a statement of fact for the purpose of proceedings before the Court.
2. A party requesting to be allowed to prove a statement of fact by means of experiments shall lodge a request as soon as practicable in the written procedure or the interim procedure to carry out experiments which shall:
(a) identify the facts intended to be established by the experiments, describe the proposed experiments in detail and the reasons for carrying out the proposed experiments;
(b) propose an expert to carry out such experiments; and
(c) disclose any previous attempts to carry out similar experiments.
3. Other parties to the proceedings shall be invited to state whether they dispute the facts intended to be established by the experiments. They shall also be invited to comment on the request, including the identity of the expert proposed and the description of the experiments.
4. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court the party requesting experiments shall initially bear the costs of the experiment.
5. The order of the Court allowing the experiments shall specify the detailed experiments and:
(a) the name and address of the expert who is to carry out the experiments as Court’s expert and draw up the report on the experiments;
(b) the time period for carrying out the experiments and, where appropriate, the exact time and place where they are to be carried out;
(c) if necessary, other conditions for carrying out the experiments; and
(d) the time period for presenting the report on the experiments and, where appropriate, directions relating to the contents of the report.
6. Where appropriate, the Court may order that the experiments be carried out in the presence of the parties and their experts.
7. Once the report on the experiments is presented to the Court, it shall invite the parties to comment on it either in writing or during the oral hearing. The expert may be summoned to the oral hearing.
Provisional measures are treated by way of summary proceedings which shall consist of the following stages:
(a) a written procedure; and
(b) an oral procedure, which may include an oral hearing of the parties or of one of the parties.
In the Order UPC_CFI_449/2025 of 03.09.2025 (Hewlett-Packard v. Zhuhai & Rentmeister) the LD Düsseldorf stated:
Pursuant to R. 209.1(a) RoP, the Court shall have discretion to inform the defendant about the application for provisional measures and to invite him to lodge, within a time period to be specified, an objection to the application, which shall contain the reasons why the application shall fail and the facts and evidence relied on, in particular any challenge to the facts and evidence relied on by the applicant.
If the defendant does not lodge an objection within the time period set by the Court or decides not to substantiate its objection for reasons outside the court proceedings, the application for provisional measures can be decided based on the applicant’s submissions by means of a regular order in the PI proceedings (follow up to UPC_CFI_213/2025 (LD Düsseldorf), Order of 10 July 2025, headnote 1 and mn. 213 - 214 – Aesculap v Shanghai International Holding). In a situation like this, a decision by default (R. 355.1(a) RoP) is not something to be considered for several reasons. First, such a decision is not provided for in Rules R. 205 et seq. RoP for that scenario. Second, only a regular PI order is consistent with the underlying interests involved: It is up to the defendant to decide whether to accept the invitation and lodge an objection, which fulfils the requirements of R. 209.1(a) RoP. If the defendant declines the invitation, there is no reason to grant him the advantages of a decision by default. The associated possibility of setting aside the decision (see R. 356 RoP) would conflict with the Applicant’s interest in effectively enforcing its patent in the PI proceedings.
summary nature of provisional measures proceedings
The summary nature of proceedings for provisional measures and the short time limits applicable to such proceedings may, depending on the circumstances of the individual case, justify a more lenient approach towards late-filed submissions than in proceedings on the merits (UPC_CoA_36/2026, order of 8 July 2026 – Align Technology v. Angelalign Technology).
However, there may be less reason for leniency where a defendant, despite being aware of the patent rights, launches its product at risk and should therefore have been properly prepared for proceedings for provisional measures. This applies in particular to submissions concerning the functioning of the defendant's own products.
1. An Application for provisional measures may be lodged by a party (hereinafter "the applicant") before or after main proceedings on the merits of the case have been started before the Court.
2. An Application for provisional measures shall contain:
(a) particulars in accordance with Rule 13.1(a) to (i);
(b) a indication of the provisional measures which are being requested [Rule 211.1];
(c) the reasons why provisional measures are necessary to prevent a threatened infringement, to forbid the continuation of an alleged infringement or to make such continuation subject to the lodging of guarantees;
(d) the facts and evidence relied on in support of the Application, including evidence to support the claim that provisional measures are necessary including the matters referred to in Rule 211.2 and .3; and
(e) a concise description of the action which will be started before the Court, including an indication of the facts and evidence which will be relied on in support of the main proceedings on the merits of the case.
3. Where the applicant requests that provisional measures be ordered without hearing the other party (hereinafter "the defendant"), the Application for provisional measures shall in addition contain:
(a) the reasons for not hearing the defendant having regard in particular to Rule 197; and
(b) information about any prior correspondence between the parties concerning the alleged infringement.
4. The applicant shall be under a duty to disclose any material fact known to it which might influence the Court in deciding whether to make an order without hearing the defendant including any pending proceedings and/or any unsuccessful attempt in the past to obtain provisional measures in respect of the patent.
5. Rule 14 shall apply mutatis mutandis. The applicant shall pay the fee for the Application for provisional measures, in accordance with Part 6. Rule 15.2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Relation with Agreement: Articles 32(1)(c) and 62.
The quartet of early orders of the Local Divisions Munich (UPC_CFI_755/2024, Avago v. Realtek, decision of 9 December 2024; UPC_CFI_791/2024, Huawei v. Netgear, decision of 12 December 2024; UPC_CFI_112/2025, Nokia v. Sunmi, decision of 19 Februar 2025) and Mannheim (UPC_CFI_445/2025, InterDigital v. The Walt Disney Company et al., decision of 27 May 2025) already provide a systematic foundation for the AASI practice at the UPC’ practise on anti‑anti‑suit injunctions (AASI), which is already remarkably coherent and reveals a distinctly European doctrinal identity that relies on constitutional concepts of effective judicial protection, the proprietary character of patent rights and the principle of mutual respect between fora.
At the jurisdictional level, all panels confirmed the UPC’s jurisdiction under Art. 31, 32 (1) (c), and 33 (1) (a) UPCA, in conjunction with Art. 7 (2) and Art. 71b (2) Brussels Ia Regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012). It held that the threat of interference with proceedings before the UPC – such as via foreign anti-suit injunctions (ASIs) – constitutes an imminent infringement under Art. 32 (1) (a) and 32 (1) (c) UPCA. Such interference could prevent enforcement of patents that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the UPC, including ongoing infringement actions before the respective Local Divisions (cf. Art. 32 UPCA for more details).
Substantively, the courts conceptualise the patent proprietor’s access to the UPC as an element of the property right itself. According to Art. 17 (2) of the EU Charter, intellectual property constitutes in any case property-like rights, which are to be protected under the Charter. Avago/Realtek grounded the analysis in Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and German constitutional doctrine on the Justizgewährungsanspruch, treating foreign ASIs as offences against that guarantee and, by analogy, as delictual behaviour under § 823 I BGB. Mannheim’s InterDigital/Disney order refined the argument: the procedural enforceability of a patent, secured through Art. 62 et seq. UPCA, is labelled an “inherent” attribute of the substantive right whose denial may be restrained even without recourse to national law. The doctrinal shift from a national tort paradigm to a pan‑European property paradigm resembles the CJEU’s approach in Turner and West Tankers, authorities expressly relied upon by the Mannheim panel when it situated AASIs in the EU acquis on effective judicial protection.
Because interim relief under Art. 62 UPCA in conjunction with R. 211.1 - 3. RoP, requires urgency and a risk of irreparable harm; the courts have elaborated a nuanced “imminence” test. The Nokia/Sunmi panel stated that a violation is impending when “serious and tangible indications” show that only the defendant’s final decision remains outstanding; the wrongful act “must merely depend on the defendant’s will”. That formulation, derived from German practice yet transplanted into Union law, accommodates pre‑emptive applications even before a foreign motion is actually lodged. The Mannheim division accepted the same yardstick, observing that evasive or ambiguous statements by the potential ASI‑seeker can themselves create the requisite imminence. Such pre-emptive AASIs are in line the German national case law of the Munich District Court and Munich Higher Regional Court but deviate from the case law of the Higher Reginal Court of Dusseldorf, which adopted a more restrained approach regarding pre-emptive AASIs (HRC Dusseldorf, Decision of 17.6.2024 – I-26 W 7/24).
Procedurally, all AASIs to date were issued ex parte under Rule 206.3 RoP. Both Munich decisions reasoned that prior service would enable a race to the foreign forum, thereby frustrating effective protection. Yet the handling of securities is less uniform. In Avago/Realtek the court demanded a bond, making clear that the mere logistical difficulty of arranging security does not in itself justify a waiver under R. 211.5. The Nokia order, faced with an ongoing trade‑fair situation, dispensed with the bond as a “special circumstance”. Conversely, Mannheim required a security, but deferred enforceability for twenty days to permit its provision, while openly acknowledging that an AASI affects the respondent only procedurally, not substantively, and therefore justifies a comparatively modest sum.
In defining the scope of relief, the courts converge on a four‑pronged prohibition: filing, continuing or enforcing any ASI/AEI, and seeking measures with equivalent effect. The orders invariably include an obligation to withdraw existing foreign motions and to exercise “corporate control” over affiliates, thereby preventing circumvention through asset‑light subsidiaries. The Mannheim panel expressly justified the inclusion of equivalent measures by stressing that legal effect – rather than nomenclature – must govern, since a restraint labelled “temporary restraining order” may be functionally identical to an ASI.
The proportionality assessment required by Art. 62 (2) UPCA has so far invariably favoured patentees. Courts underscore that an AASI does not inhibit the foreign court’s resolution of contractual or FRAND defences; it merely prevents an order that would paralyse European proceedings. Mannheim described the measure as “forum‑protective, not forum‑interfering”, a distinction that served to tip the balance in favour of the applicant.
Finally, comity arguments have played a visible but ultimately subordinate role. While acknowledging that AASIs can be perceived as an intrusion, the UPC frames them as a defence of its exclusive competence over European patents and thus of the primacy of Union law.
Taken together, these orders articulate six emergent principles. First, jurisdiction under Art. 32 UPCA extends to any act that seeks to neutralise UPC litigation. Second, the right to litigate is part of the substance of the patent. Third, a threat becomes actionable when objective, concrete signals render an ASI a realistic prospect. Fourth, ex parte relief is normally justified, though security may be adapted to circumstances. Fifth, the injunction’s ambit must be functional rather than nominal, reaching equivalent restrictions and group companies. Sixth, proportionality tilts towards the patentee because an AASI preserves, rather than disrupts, judicial autonomy within the Union.
1. If a person entitled to start proceedings under Article 47 of the Agreement considers it likely that an Application for provisional measures against him as a defendant may be lodged before the Court in the near future, he may file a Protective letter.
2. The Protective letter shall be filed with the Registry in the language of the patent and shall contain:
(a) the name of the defendant or defendants filing the Protective letter and of the defendant’s representative;
(b) the name of the presumed applicant for provisional measures;
(c) postal and electronic addresses for service on the defendant filing the Protective letter and the names of the persons authorised to accept service;
(d) postal and, where available, electronic addresses for service on the presumed applicant for provisional measures and the names of the persons authorised to accept service if known;
(e) where available, the number of the patent concerned and, where applicable, information about any prior or pending proceedings referred to in Rule 13.1(h); and
(f) the statement that the letter is a Protective letter.
3. The Protective letter may contain:
(a) an indication of the facts relied on, which may include a challenge to the facts expected to be relied on by the presumed applicant and/or, where applicable, any assertion that the patent is invalid and the grounds for such assertion;
(b) any available written evidence relied on;
(c) the arguments of law, including the reasons why any Application for provisional measures should be rejected.
4. The defendant or defendants filing the Protective letter shall pay the fee for filing a Protective letter, in accordance with Part 6. Rule 15.2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
5. The Registry shall as soon as practicable examine whether the requirements of paragraphs 2(a) to (f) and 4 have been complied with. If these requirements have been complied with, the Registry shall as soon as practicable:
(a) record the date of receipt and assign a number to the Protective letter;
(b) subject to paragraph 7, record the Protective letter in the register;
(c) provide details of the Protective letter to all divisions; and
(d) where an Application for provisional measures has already been lodged, inform the panel or the single judge dealing with the Application about the filing of the Protective letter.
6. If the defendant has not complied with the requirements of paragraph 2 the Registry shall as soon as practicable invite the defendant to:
(a) correct the deficiencies within 14 days of service of such notification; and
(b) where applicable, pay the fee referred to in paragraph 4.
7. The protective letter shall not be publicly available on the register until it has been forwarded to the applicant pursuant to paragraph 8.
8. Where an Application for provisional measures is subsequently lodged the Registrar shall forward a copy of the protective letter to the panel or judge appointed under Rule 208 together with the Application for provisional measures and shall forward a copy to the applicant as soon as practicable.
9. If no Application for provisional measures has been lodged within six months from the date of receipt of the Protective letter, the Protective letter shall be removed from the register unless the person who has lodged the Protective letter has prior to the expiry of such period applied for an extension of six months and paid a fee for the extension in accordance with Part 6. Further extensions may be obtained on further payments of the fee.
10. Rule 15.2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Relation with Statute: Article 19
1. Without prejudice to the Court’s decision on the Application for provisional measures, the Court shall have the discretion – including where the Application is made pursuant to Rule 206.3 – to:
(a) inform the defendant about the Application and invite him to lodge, within a time period to be specified, an Objection to the Application for provisional measures which shall contain: (i) the reasons why the Application shall fail; (ii) the facts and evidence relied on, in particular any challenge to the facts and evidence relied on by the applicant; and (iii) where main proceedings on the merits of the case have not yet been started before the Court, the reasons why the action which will be started before the Court shall fail and the facts and evidence relied on in support;
(b) summon the parties to an oral hearing;
(c) summon the applicant to an oral hearing without the presence of the defendant.
2. In exercising its discretion pursuant to paragraph 1, the Court shall in particular take into account:
(a) whether the patent has been upheld in an opposition procedure before the European Patent Office or has been the subject of proceedings in any other court;
(b) the urgency of the action;
(c) whether the applicant has requested provisional measures without hearing the defendant and whether the reasons for not hearing the defendant appear well-founded; and
(d) any Protective letter filed by the defendant; the Court shall in particular consider summoning parties to an oral hearing if a relevant Protective letter has been filed by the defendant.
3. In cases of extreme urgency the standing judge appointed in accordance with Rule 345.5 may decide immediately on the Application for provisional measures and the procedure to be followed on the Application.
4. If the applicant has applied for provisional measures without hearing the defendant and the Court decides not to grant provisional measures without hearing the defendant the applicant may withdraw the Application and may request that the Court order that the Application and the contents of the Application remain confidential.
5. If the patent the subject of the Application is also the subject of a protective letter pursuant to Rule 207 the applicant may withdraw the Application pursuant to paragraph 4.
In the Order UPC_CFI_449/2025 of 03.09.2025 (Hewlett-Packard v. Zhuhai & Rentmeister) the LD Düsseldorf stated:
Pursuant to R. 209.1(a) RoP, the Court shall have discretion to inform the defendant about the application for provisional measures and to invite him to lodge, within a time period to be specified, an objection to the application, which shall contain the reasons why the application shall fail and the facts and evidence relied on, in particular any challenge to the facts and evidence relied on by the applicant.
If the defendant does not lodge an objection within the time period set by the Court or decides not to substantiate its objection for reasons outside the court proceedings, the application for provisional measures can be decided based on the applicant’s submissions by means of a regular order in the PI proceedings (follow up to UPC_CFI_213/2025 (LD Düsseldorf), Order of 10 July 2025, headnote 1 and mn. 213 - 214 – Aesculap v Shanghai International Holding). In a situation like this, a decision by default (R. 355.1(a) RoP) is not something to be considered for several reasons. First, such a decision is not provided for in Rules R. 205 et seq. RoP for that scenario. Second, only a regular PI order is consistent with the underlying interests involved: It is up to the defendant to decide whether to accept the invitation and lodge an objection, which fulfils the requirements of R. 209.1(a) RoP. If the defendant declines the invitation, there is no reason to grant him the advantages of a decision by default. The associated possibility of setting aside the decision (see R. 356 RoP) would conflict with the Applicant’s interest in effectively enforcing its patent in the PI proceedings.
See also Order UPC_CFI_515/2025 issued by the LD Düsseldorf on 17.10.2025 re: Hewlett-Packard v. Rentmeister/Shenzen Moan, confirmed by Order UPC_CFI_515/2025 issued by the LD Düsseldorf on 19.12.2025 based on the following facts.
Service to the Defendant 2., who is based in China, was initiated via the official online portal of the Central Authority of China on 18 June 2025. According to the available online processing history, the documents to be delivered were forwarded within the Chinese authorities to the Supreme People’s Court for further processing, where they arrived on 19 June 2025. No further processing by the Chinese authorities could then be detected on the online portal. Therefore, the Applicant asked Defendant 2. to voluntarily accept service of the application for provisional measures. The Applicant set a deadline of 15 September 2025. This request was unsuccessful. Against this background, on 10 October 2025, the Applicant requested the Düsseldorf Local Division to make an inquiry to the Central Authority of China regarding the status of service of the application for provisional measures. The Court complied with this request by submitting corresponding inquiries in Chinese via the online portal on 20 October 2025 and on 4 November 2025. However, both inquiries remained unanswered.
Following an Applicant’s request, the Düsseldorf Local Division ordered on 11 November 2025 that the steps already taken to bring the application for provisional measures in the proceedings UPC_CFI_515/2025 to the attention of Defendant 2. constitute good service pursuant to R. 275.2 RoP. Furthermore, the Court ordered that service is deemed to be effective as of the date of the present order. The order was published on UPC’s website.
Until the present order was issued, no objection to the application for provisional measures had been received by the Düsseldorf Local Division.
The grounds for the Order issued by the LD Düsseldorf on 19.12.2025 were as follows:
If the defendant does not lodge an objection within the time period set by the Court or decides not to substantiate its objection for reasons outside of the court proceedings, as in the present case, the application for provisional measures can be decided based on the applicant’s submissions by means of a regular order in the PI proceedings (follow up to UPC_CFI_213/2025 (LD Düsseldorf), order of 10 July 2025, headnote 1 and mn. 213 - 214 – Aesculap v Shanghai International Holding). In a situation like this, a decision by default (R. 355.1(a) RoP) is not something to be considered for several reasons. First, such a decision is not provided for in Rules R. 205 et seq. RoP for that scenario. Second, only a regular PI order is consistent with the underlying interests involved: It is up to the defendant to decide whether to accept the invitation and lodge an objection, which fulfils the requirements of R. 209.1(a) RoP. If the defendant declines the invitation, there is no reason to grant him the advantages of a decision by default. The associated possibility of setting aside the decision (see R. 356 RoP) would conflict with the Applicant’s interest in effectively enforcing its patent in the PI proceedings (UPC_CFI_449/2025 (LD Düsseldorf), order of 3 September 2025, mn. 21 – Hewlett-Packard v Rentmeister; UPC_CFI_449/2025 (LD Düsseldorf), order of 28 November 2025, mn. 26 – Hewlett-Packard v Zhuhai).
content of the Objection
A defendant should therefore raise in its Objection any available non-infringement arguments that dispute the applicant's factual description of the functioning of the contested embodiment. This applies in particular where the relevant arguments concern the functioning of the defendant's own products. If such factual challenges are raised only at a later stage without justification, they may be disregarded and the applicant's corresponding factual submissions may be treated as uncontested (UPC_CoA_36/2026, order of 8 July 2026 – Align Technology v. Angelalign Technology).
1. The Court may in particular order the following provisional measures:
(a) injunctions against a defendant;
(b) the seizure or delivery up of the goods suspected of infringing a patent right so as to prevent their entry into or movement within the channels of commerce;
(c) if an applicant demonstrates circumstances likely to endanger the recovery of damages, a precautionary seizure of the movable and immovable property of the defendant, including the blocking of his bank accounts and other assets;
(d) an interim award of costs.
2. In taking its decision the Court may require the applicant to provide reasonable evidence to satisfy the Court with a sufficient degree of certainty that the applicant is entitled to commence proceedings pursuant to Article 47, that the patent in question is valid and that his right is being infringed, or that such infringement is imminent.
3. In taking its decision the Court shall in the exercise of its discretion weigh up the interests of the parties and, in particular, take into account the potential harm for either of the parties resulting from the granting or the refusal of the injunction.
4. The Court shall have regard to any unreasonable delay in seeking provisional measures.
5. The Court may order the applicant to provide adequate security for appropriate compensation for any injury likely to be caused to the defendant which the applicant may be liable to bear in the event that the Court revokes the order for provisional measures. The Court shall do so where interim measures are ordered without the defendant having been heard unless there are special circumstances not to do so. The Court shall decide whether it is appropriate to order the security by deposit or bank guarantee. The order shall be effective only after the security has been given to the defendant in accordance with the Court’s decision.
6. The order on provisional measures shall indicate that an appeal may be brought in accordance with Article 73 of the Agreement and Rule 220.1.
Relation with Agreement: Article 62(2) and (4)
Rule 211.2 – sufficient degree of certainty as to infringement
The requirement to establish infringement with a sufficient degree of certainty is not dispensed with merely because the applicant's factual submissions concerning the contested embodiment are uncontested. The Court must still assess whether the facts advanced establish that the contested embodiment implements the features of the patent claim as properly construed. Uncontested facts therefore do not, as such, establish infringement (UPC_CoA_36/2026, order of 8 July 2026 – Align Technology v. Angelalign Technology).
Rule 211.3-Balance of interests
According to the Order UPC_CFI_515/2025 issued by the LD Düsseldorf on 17.10.2025 re: Hewlett-Packard v. Rentmeister/Shenzen Moan, the following principles have to be considered in relation to the required balance of interest before ordering provisional measures:
Rule 211.4
According to R. 211.4 RoP, the Court shall have regard to any unreasonable delay caused by the Patentee in seeking provisional measures. The term “unreasonable delay” is of course open to interpretation.
In UPC_CFI_195/2024 (Amycel LLC v. a redacted Polish producer), a delay of ten months between the finding of the allegedly infringing product in the Netherlands and the filing of the application for preliminary injunction was not considered to represent an unreasonable delay. According to the Local Division in The Hague, ten months were required to prepare technical reports as evidence for the infringement, and the plaintiff started proceedings as soon as it had gathered reasonable evidence, which means that there was no unreasonable delay.
The Local Division in The Hague described the standard to be applied in more detail item 25 of the order. Accordingly, the plaintiff must as soon as it has knowledge of the alleged infringement, investigate it, take the necessary measures to clarify it, and obtain the evidence required to support its claims. In doing so, it must diligently initiate and complete the required steps at each stage in a timely fashion. As soon as the Applicant has all the knowledge and evidence that reliably enable a promising legal action, it must file the application for provisional measures without unreasonable delay.
The LD Düsseldorf has in its Order UPC_CFI_1928/2025 issued on 07.05.2026 (Ottobock v. Teufe/MedEnvoy) provided further guidance on urgency in UPC preliminary injunction proceedings.
In particular, the Court’s detailed statements on Rule 211.4 RoP are of broader significance.
In its Headnotes the Court stated:
Correspondingly, constructive knowledge is not presumed – but defendants must provide concrete indicators
The Court addressed constructive knowledge.
It held that constructive knowledge exists where, under ordinary circumstances and the normal course of events, the applicant should have become aware of potentially infringing characteristics.
However, the Court did not place the full burden on the applicant from the outset.
Instead, defendants bear the burden of substantiating and proving the factual indicators from which earlier constructive knowledge and dilatory conduct may be inferred. Only once such indicators are specifically established does the burden shift back to the applicant to rebut that inference or explain why earlier knowledge should not be assumed.
This is a notable clarification. The decision avoids an overly claimant-unfriendly approach under which patentees would effectively need to disprove hypothetical earlier awareness in every case.
In the decided case, the applicant failed to explain why earlier action was impossible.
On the facts, the defendants pointed to several circumstances suggesting that the PI applicant should have acted earlier.
The allegedly infringing product had already appeared at US trade fairs in 2024 and early 2025. It had been advertised in specialist publications from February 2025 and was launched in Europe at Expolife in Kassel in March 2025. The PI applicant itself was active in the relevant market and maintained an extensive care network.
The PI applicant argued that meaningful technical analysis required acquisition of the product, app access, and gait-laboratory testing.
The Court accepted in principle that a PI applicant must be sufficiently prepared and cannot be expected to conduct essential investigations only after filing. But that did not resolve the decisive issue: why those steps were not initiated earlier.
The Court considered that the PI applicant had not sufficiently explained why it could not or should not have sought acquisition and investigation already by around July 2025. Even assuming that later testing was diligently performed, the Court concluded that the filing in December 2025 came too late.
Importantly, the Court did not definitively find actual undue delay. Rather, it held that such delay could not be excluded, which was enough to defeat urgency.
Relation with Agreement: Article 60(5) and (6)
Relation with Agreement: Article 60(9).
1. An appeal by a party adversely affected may be brought against:
(a) final decisions of the Court of First Instance;
(b) decisions terminating proceedings as regards one of the parties;
(c) orders referred to in Articles 49(5), 59, 60, 61, 62 or 67 of the Agreement.
2. Orders other than those referred to in paragraph 1 and Rule 97.5, may be either the subject of an appeal together with the appeal against the decision or may be appealed with the leave of the Court of First Instance within 15 days of service of the Court’s decision to that effect.
3. In the event of a refusal of the Court of First Instance to grant leave within 15 days of the order of one of its panels a request for a discretionary review to the Court of Appeal may be made within 15 calendar days from the end of that period. Rule 333.3 shall apply mutatis mutandis. The request shall set out the matters referred to in Rule 221.2.
4. The Registrar shall assign the request for a discretionary review to the standing judge (Rule 345.5 and .8). The standing judge may deny the request without giving reasons. If the standing judge allows the request after having heard the other party, he shall order what further steps, if any, the parties shall take and within what time limits and the President of the Court of Appeal shall assign the review to a panel of the Court of Appeal for a decision. The Court of Appeal may consult the presiding judge or the judgerapporteur of the panel of the Court of First Instance which has refused the leave order.
5. The Court of Appeal may hear appeals against separate decisions on the merits in infringement proceedings and in validity proceedings together.
Relation with Agreement: Article 73
Cross-appeal inadmissible if the only purpose is to change a certain part of the reasoning
In the Order UPC_CoA_901/2025 issued on 17.04.2026 (Abbott vs. Sinocare/Menarini) the Court of Appeal stated:
Pursuant to R. 220.1 RoP, only a party adversely affected by a decision may lodge an appeal. The same applies to a cross-appeal pursuant to R. 237 RoP. A cross-appeal is however inadmissible if the only purpose of the cross-appeal is to change (a certain part of) the reasoning of the Court in First Instance, which in its result is in favour of the party filing the cross-appeal.
This means that in general an appeal may be considered inadmissible if the only purpose of the appeal is to change (a certain part of) the reasoning of the Court in First Instance.
Application for a cost decision acc. to Rule 151 RoP; reasonable cost for representation acc. to Rule 152 RoP; appeal proceedings pursuant Rule 220.2 RoP; ceiling of reimbursable costs:
Concerning the above-mentioned issues the LD Hamburg came in its Decision UPC_CFI_730/2025 issued on 05.01.2026 (Nera vs. Xiaomi) to the following conclusions:
1. A party adversely affected by a decision referred to in Rule 157 may lodge an Application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal within 15 days of service of the decision of the Court.
2. The Application for leave to appeal shall set out:
(a) the reasons why the appeal should be heard;
(b) where necessary, the facts, evidence and arguments relied on.
3. The Application for leave to appeal shall be assigned to the standing judge (Rule 345.5 and .8) who shall decide on granting leave to appeal.
4. If leave to appeal a cost decision is granted the standing judge shall decide the appeal.
(a) whether a party seeking to lodge new submissions is able to justify that the new submissions could not reasonably have been made during proceedings before the Court of First Instance;
(b) the relevance of the new submissions for the decision on the appeal;
(c) the position of the other party regarding the lodging of the new submissions.
Relation with Agreement: Article 73(4)
Defendant's objection regarding the plaintiff's poor financial situation only in the appeal proceedings generally rejected as time-barred pursuant to Rule 222 (2) RoP – Application for security rejected.
According to UPC_CoA_365/2025 (order of 21 May 2025, Knaus Tabbert v. Yellow Spehre et al), insofar as the defendant of the first instance proceedings asserts that the plaintiff’s (of the first instance proceedings) financial situation is inadequate, it does not follow from the submission that the financial situation of plaintiff was already the subject of the first instance, nor that the defendant was not able to present the financial situation before the court of first instance.
There is no reason why this submission should be made for the first time in the proceedings for an order of suspensive effect (see R. 222.2 VerfO). An order to provide security is at the discretion of the court. The court of first instance is responsible for weighing up the relevant interests. The ordering of a security is not dependent on the application of a party, it can also be ordered ex officio (see UPC Court of Appeal, order of 3 March 2025, UPC_CoA_523/2024, APL_51115/2024, Sumi/Syngenta, para. 112 and 115). However, it is incumbent on the defendant to establish facts that make it necessary to order a security, as for example the poor financial situation of the plaintiff (cf. Sumi/Syngenta R. 115). The fact that submissions on financial circumstances are necessary in the proceedings before the CFI is also appropriate. Findings on the financial circumstances of the claimant can only be made after hearing the adverse party.
Findings of fact can also be necessary. The procedure for requesting suspensive effect, in which the court of appeal decides on the application without delay (R. 223.3 VerfO) is not suitable for this purpose.
Change from an application for preserving evidence and inspecting premises to an application to produce specific documents when filing an appeal against the first instance decision in a case where the inspection on site was unsuccessful = inadmissible since too lately applied for acc. to Rule 222 (2) RoP.
In the Order UPC_CoA_891/2025 issued on 04.02.2026 (Centripetal vs. Palo Alto) the Court of Appeal argued in a case as mentioned above as follows:
factual disputes versus legal arguments
In proceedings for provisional measures, the summary nature of the proceedings and the short applicable time limits may, depending on the circumstances of the individual case, justify a more lenient approach towards late-filed submissions than in proceedings on the merits (Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_36/2026, order of 8 July 2026, Align Technology v. Angelalign Technology).
However, there may be less reason for such leniency where a defendant, despite being aware of the relevant patent rights, launches its product at risk and should therefore have been prepared for provisional measures proceedings. This applies in particular to submissions concerning the functioning of the defendant's own products.
When assessing late-filed non-infringement arguments, a distinction may be relevant between arguments disputing the technical facts concerning the contested embodiment and arguments concerning whether an undisputed functionality falls within the scope of the patent claim. Late-filed factual disputes may be disregarded under R. 222.2 RoP. By contrast, where the technical functionality is undisputed and the remaining question is whether that functionality is covered by the claim as construed by the Court, the submission concerns the legal assessment of the established facts.
1. A party may lodge an Application for suspensive effect, in accordance with Article 74 of the Agreement.
2. The Application for suspensive effect shall set out:
(a) the reasons why the lodging of the appeal shall have suspensive effect;
(b) the facts, evidence and arguments relied on.
3. The Court of Appeal shall decide the Application without delay.
4. In cases of extreme urgency the applicant may apply at any time without formality for an order for suspensive effect to the standing judge [Rule 345.5 and .8]. The standing judge shall have all the powers of the Court of Appeal and shall decide the procedure to be followed on the application, which may include a subsequent written Application.
5. There shall be no suspensive effect for an appeal of an order pursuant to Rule 220.2, Rule 220.3 or 221.3.
Relation with Agreement: Article 74
According to the Order UPC_CoA_000935/2025 issued by the Court of Appeal on 16.01.2026 (N.N. vs Amycel) the Court stated in relation to an application for suspensive effect as follows:
An appeal shall not have suspensive effect unless the Court of Appeal decides otherwise at the motivated request of one of the parties (Article 74.1 UPCA). According to R. 223.2 RoP, the application for suspensive effect shall set out
(a) the reasons why the lodging of the appeal shall have a suspensive effect and
(b) the facts, evidence and arguments relied on.
The Court of Appeal therefore, grants the application only if the circumstances of the case justify an exception to the principle that an appeal shall have no suspensive effect. It must be examined whether, on the basis of these circumstances, the appellant's interest in maintaining the status quo until the decision on its appeal exceptionally outweighs the respondent's interest. An exception to the principle that an appeal has no suspensive effect may apply, for instance, if the appealed order or decision is manifestly erroneous, or if the appeal becomes devoid of purpose in the absence of suspensive effect (CoA 24 November 2025, UPC_CoA_000911/2025, Suinno v Microsoft; CoA 20 May 2025, UPC_CoA_430/2025 APL_23093/2025 App_23094/2025, Chint v. Jingao).
The requirement of exceptional circumstances has to be established by the applicant.
In the aforementioned case the Applicant has claimed that the sending of registered letters to the parties to whom it offered for sale, sold, delivered or otherwise traded in the infringing product informing them of the impugned decision and requesting them to return any current stock of the infringing products (part III of the impugned decision) would be impossible to revert and that the publication of a message on the website of the Applicant (part IV of the impugned decision) would entail "irreversible consequences”, without establishing that the impugned decision is manifestly erroneous.
Even if the Court were to accept that the consequences of these orders are not fully reversible, it does not follow that the appeal becomes devoid of purpose in the absence of suspensive effect and that the Applicant's interest in maintaining the status quo until the decision on appeal outweighs Amycel's legitimate interest informing the Applicant’s customers of the decision.
The Court of Appeal decided without having heard Amycel, since the Court of Appeal must decide on an application for suspensive effect without delay (R. 223.3 RoP) and the outcome was in favour of Amycel.
In its Order UPC_CoA_44/2026 (ALPINA v. CUP&CINO) issued on 24.03.2026 the Court of Appeal summarized all the conditions for suspensive effect in accordance with Rule 223 of the Rules of Procedure as follows:
1.Pursuant to Section 74(1) of the UPCA, an appeal does not have suspensive effect unless the appeal court decides otherwise upon a reasoned application by a party. The appeal court may therefore only grant the application if the circumstances of the case justify an exception to the principle that an appeal has no suspensive effect.
In doing so, it must be examined whether the appellant’s interest in maintaining the status quo until a decision is made on their appeal exceptionally outweighs the respondent’s interest (see, for example, UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_365/2025, Order of 21 May 2025, Knaus Taubert v. Yellow Sphere; UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_894/2025, Order of 2 December 2025, Windhager v. Belissa; UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_935/2025, order of 16 January 2026, AMYCELL).
2. An order granting suspensive effect may be considered in particular where the order against which the appeal is directed is manifestly erroneous (UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_365/2025, order of 21 May 2025, Knaus Taubert v. Yellow Sphere; UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_894/2025, order of 2 December 2025, Windhager v. Belissa; UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_935/2025, Order of 16 January 2026, AMYCELL) or enforcement of the contested decision would render the appeal largely moot (UPC Court of Appeal, Order of 6 November 2023, UPC_CoA_407/2023, Ocado v third party; UPC Court of Appeal, order of 2 May 2024, UPC_CoA_177/2024, Progress Maschinen & Automation; UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_365/2025, Order of 21 May 2025, Knaus v. Yellow; UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_935/2025, Order of 16 January 2026, AMYCELL).
3. Furthermore, a breach of fundamental procedural rights, such as the principle of the right to be heard, may also justify the granting of suspensive effect if it cannot be ruled out from the outset that the court would have reached a different conclusion had the breach not occurred (UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_549/2024, Order of 29 October 2024, Philips v. Belkin; UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_ 737/2025, Order of 15 August 2025, RiVOLUTiON v. Cilag).
4. Pursuant to Rule 223.2 of the RoP, the application for suspensive effect must contain
(a) the reasons why the lodging of the appeal should have suspensive effect and
(b) the facts, evidence and legal arguments put forward.
This means that such an application must, on its own, enable the Court of Appeal to rule on it without the need for further information (see, for example, UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_365/2025, Order of 21 May 2025, Knaus Taubert v. Yellow EPG Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_ 737/2025, Order of 15 August 2025, RiVOLUTiON v Cilag; UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_894/2025, Order of 2 December 2025, Windhager v BelissSphere; ; UPC Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_935/2025, order of 16 January 2026, AMYCELL).
In light of the above principles regarding the suspensive effect of an appeal against a first-instance decision finding infringement of the first of three European patents asserted, the argument that, with regard to the contested form of infringement, two further decisions concerning the possible infringement of two further European patents should be awaited, so that the contested form of infringement could then be modified into a non-infringing embodiment, taking these two further decisions into account, was rejected as grounds for suspensive effect of the appeal against the decision concerning the infringement of the first of three European patents.
Part 4 - Procedures before the Court of Appeal
1. A Statement of appeal shall be lodged by the appellant:
(a) within two months of service of a decision referred to in Rule 220.1(a) and (b); or
(b) within 15 days of service of an order referred to in Rule 220.1(c) or a decision referred to in Rule 220.2 or 221.3.
2. The Statement of grounds of appeal shall be lodged by the appellant:
(a) within four months of service of a decision referred to in Rule 220.1(a) and (b); or
(b) within 15 days of service of an order referred to in Rule 220.1(c) or a decision referred to in Rule 220.2 or 221.3.
Relation with Agreement: Article 73(1) and (2)
The Statement of appeal shall contain:
(a) the names of the appellant and of the appellant’s representative;
(b) the names of the respondent and of the respondent’s representative;
(c) postal and electronic addresses for service on the appellant and on the respondent, as well as the names of the persons authorised to accept service;
(d) the date of the decision or order appealed against and the action number attributed to the file in proceedings before the Court of First Instance; and
(e) the order or remedy sought by the appellant, including any order for expedition of the appeal pursuant to Rule 9.3(b) and the reasons justifying such order for expedition.
The Statement of grounds of appeal shall contain:
(a) an indication of which parts of the decision or order are contested;
(b) the reasons for setting aside the contested decision or order; and
(c) an indication of the facts and evidence on which the appeal is based in accordance with Rule 222.1 and .2.
The Statement of appeal and the Statement of grounds of appeal shall be drawn up:
(a) without prejudice to Article 50(3) of the Agreement, in the language of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance; or
(b) where the parties have agreed in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Agreement, in the language in which the patent was granted. Where the parties have agreed in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Agreement, evidence of the respondent’s agreement shall be lodged by the appellant together with the Statement of appeal.
Relationship with Agreement: Article 50
The appellant shall pay the fixed fee and, where applicable, the value based fee for the appeal, in accordance with Part 6. Rule 15.2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
1. The Registry shall, as soon as practicable after the lodging of the Statement of appeal, examine whether the requirements of Rules 224.1, 225, 227 and 228 have been complied with.
2. If the appellant has not complied with the requirements referred to in Rules 225, 227 or 228, the Registry shall invite the appellant to:
(a) correct the deficiencies within 14 days of service of such notification; and
(b) where applicable, pay the fee for the appeal within said 14 days.
3. The Registry shall at the same time inform the appellant that if the appellant fails to correct the deficiencies or to pay the fee within the time stated, a decision by default may be given in accordance with Rule 357.
4. If the appellant has not met the requirements of 225, 227 and 228 and fails to correct the deficiencies or pay the fee the Registry shall inform the President of the Court of Appeal who shall reject the appeal as inadmissible by a decision by default. He may give the appellant an opportunity to be heard beforehand.
5. If the appellant has not met the requirements of Rule 224.1, the Registry shall inform the President of the Court of Appeal who shall reject the appeal as inadmissible. He may give the appellant an opportunity to be heard beforehand.
1. If the Statement of appeal complies with the requirements referred to in Rule 229.1, the Registry shall:
(a) record the date of receipt to the Statement of appeal and an action number to the appeal file;
(b) record the appeal file in the register;
(c) inform the appellant of the action number and the date of receipt; and
(d) serve the Statement of appeal on all parties to the proceedings at first instance.
2. The action shall be assigned to a panel according to Rule 345.3 and .8.
3. The panel shall as soon as practicable decide whether to grant any order for expedition pursuant to Rule 225(e) having given the parties an opportunity to be heard.
The presiding judge of the panel to which the action has been assigned shall designate one legally qualified judge of the panel as judge-rapporteur. The presiding judge may designate himself as the judgerapporteur. The Registry shall as soon as practicable notify the appellant and respondent of the identity of the judge-rapporteur.
1. If the language of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal is not the language of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, the judge-rapporteur may order the appellant to lodge, within a time period to be specified, translations into the language of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal of:
(a) written pleadings and other documents lodged by the parties before the Court of First Instance, as specified by the judge-rapporteur;
(b) decisions or orders of the Court of First Instance.
The judge-rapporteur shall at the same time inform the appellant that if the appellant fails to lodge the translations within the time period specified, a decision by default may be given in accordance with Rule 357.
2. If the appellant fails to lodge the translations under paragraph 1 within the time period specified, the judge-rapporteur shall reject the appeal by a decision by default in accordance with Rule 357. He may give the appellant an opportunity to be heard beforehand.
3. The appellant may request that documented costs of translations be taken into account when the Court fixes the amount of costs in accordance with Part 1, Chapter 5.
Relation with Agreement: Article 50(2) and (3)
Part 4 - Procedures before the Court of Appeal
1. The Statement of response shall contain:
(a) the names of the respondent and the respondent’s representative;
(b) postal and electronic addresses for service on the respondent and the names and addresses of the persons authorised to accept service;
(c) the action number of the appeal file; and
(d) a response to the grounds of appeal.
2. The respondent may support the decision of the Court of First Instance on grounds other than those given in the decision.
Part 4 - Procedures before the Court of Appeal
Part 4 - Procedures before the Court of Appeal
Part 4 - Procedures before the Court of Appeal
The oral hearing for an appeal of a cost decision pursuant to Rule 157 shall be heard by the standing judge [Rule 345.5 and .8] who shall have all the powers of the Court of Appeal.
Part 4 - Procedures before the Court of Appeal
(a) exercise any power within the competence of the Court of First Instance;
(b) in exceptional circumstances refer the action back to the Court of First Instance for decision or for retrial [Rule 243]. It shall not normally be an exceptional circumstance justifying a referral back that the Court of First Instance failed to decide an issue which it is necessary for the Court of Appeal to decide on appeal.
Relation with Agreement: Article 75
Relation with Agreement: Article 75
Part 4 - Procedures before the Court of Appeal
(a) where the Application for rehearing is based on the ground of a fundamental procedural defect, within two months of the discovery of the fundamental defect or of service of the final decision, whichever is the later;
(b) where the Application for rehearing is based on an act which has been held, by a final court decision, to constitute a criminal offence, within two months of the date on which the criminal offence has been so held or service of the final decision, whichever is the later;
(c) but in any event no later than ten years of service of the final decision.
Relation with Agreement: Article 81
According to the Order UPC_CFI_414/2024 of the LD Mannheim (Centripetal v. Keysight) issued on 05.12.2025 an oral hearing can be reopened only for exceptional cases.
The Court decided that on the instant facts, a reopening of the oral hearing and a call for further evidence was not warranted. This has to be reserved for exceptional cases (R. 114 RoP). R. 114 RoP is applicable only in situations where, during the oral hearing, a specific issue or a specific in-depth investigation is identified as necessary and cannot reasonably be completed within the existing hearing slot. In such a case, the court may postpone the hearing in order to obtain, for example, further testimony or experimental evidence which has proved necessary as a result of what emerged in the oral hearing. It is, however, not a tool to present new infringement allegations after the closure of the oral hearing as in the decided case suggested by Claimant’s arguments.
This becomes even more evident, when R. 114 RoP is put into context with R. 245 RoP. Under Rule 245(1) RoP, an application for rehearing may only be lodged by a party adversely affected by a final decision for which the time limit for appeal has expired (or by a party adversely affected by a final decision of the Court of Appeal), and must be brought before the Court of Appeal within narrow deadlines. The grounds on which such a rehearing may be requested are likewise strictly limited. Rule 245(2) RoP and Article 81 UPCA confine rehearing primarily to cases of fundamental procedural defect or to situations involving an act later held to be a criminal offence. Mere errors in the assessment of facts, evidence or law are explicitly not sufficient. The Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_405/2024, 19 June 2025, Alexion v Amgen confirmed that rehearing is not a second or small appeal, but a truly extraordinary legal remedy available only for the most serious procedural deficiencies. These requirements restrict a rehearing to rare, clearly circumscribed situations that affect the integrity of the procedure itself, not to re-litigate or “supplement” the merits. Claimant’s broad reading of R. 114 RoP would therefore also run counter to this exceptional rule.
1. The Application for rehearing shall contain:
(a) the names of the petitioner and of the petitioner’s representative;
(b) postal and electronic addresses for service on the petitioner and the names and addresses of the persons authorised to accept service; and
(c) an indication of the decision to be reviewed.
2. The Application for rehearing shall indicate the reasons for setting aside the final decision, as well as the facts and evidence on which the Application is based.
A fundamental procedural defect under Article 81(1) of the Agreement may have occurred, for example, where:
(a) a judge of the Court took part in the decision in breach of Article 17 of the Agreement or Article 7 of the Statute;
(b) a person not appointed as a judge of the Court sat on the panel which took the final decision;
(c) a fundamental violation of Article 76 of the Agreement occurred in the proceedings which have led to the final decision;
(d) the decision was made without deciding on a request relevant to that decision; or
(e) a breach of Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has occurred.
In UPC_CoA_335/2024 (10x Genomics v. NanoString Technologies, order of 6 August 2024) the Court of Appeal decided that a statement of reasons for a decision “After assessment by the technically competent court” is not to be understood as meaning that the court has used the personal opinion of one or more of its judges as evidence for which no (sufficient) supporting evidence has been presented. Rather, it means that the court is particularly equipped and qualified to assess the arguments and evidence presented in a technically complex matter, especially if it is clear from the order that the court based its assessment not only on the parties' submissions, but also on the description of the patent in dispute itself and on the evidence presented.
In UPC_CoA_405/2024 (Alexion v Amgen, order of 19 June 2025) the Court of Appeal clarified that a violation of Art 76 UPCA amounts to a fundamental defect under Rule 247(c) RoP only where the breach is so serious that it is “intolerable for the legal system” and outcome determinative. Disagreement with the Court’s evaluation of evidence or with its claim construction – no matter how forceful – does not reach that bar.
A criminal offence shall only be considered to have occurred if it is finally held to be such an offence by a competent court or authority. A conviction is not necessary.
The petitioner shall pay the fee for the rehearing, in accordance with Part 6. Rule 15.2 shall apply mutatis mutandis. The Court may waive payment of the fee in the circumstances contemplated by Rule 245.2(a) or (b).
Rule 230.1 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
The lodging of an Application for rehearing shall not have suspensive effect unless the Court of Appeal decides otherwise.
Relation with Agreement: Article 81(2)
1. The Registry shall, as soon as practicable after the lodging of the Application for rehearing, examine whether the requirements of Rules 245, 246 and 250 have been complied with.
2. If the petitioner has not complied with the requirements referred to in paragraph 1, the Registry shall invite the petitioner to:
(a) correct the deficiencies within 14 days; and
(b) where applicable, pay the fee for the rehearing within 14 days.
If the petitioner fails to correct the deficiencies or pay the fee the case shall be assigned to the standing judge by the Registrar (Rule 345.5 and .8) who may reject the Application for rehearing as inadmissible. He shall give the petitioner an opportunity to be heard beforehand.
After hearing the parties the panel may make:
(a) a decision to reject the Application for rehearing as not allowable; such a decision shall be by a majority vote of the judges on the panel.
(b) a decision to allow the Application for rehearing; such a decision shall set aside or suspend the decision under review, in whole or in part, and re-open the proceedings for a new hearing and decisions. Where proceedings are re-opened, the panel shall give directions for the future proceedings.
Relation with Agreement: Article 81(3)
Part 5 - General Provisions
Relation with Agreement: Article 83(3) and (4)
Relation with Statute: Articles 23 and 24
All pleadings and documents lodged with pleadings shall bear a time and a date which shall be the time and date of receipt of pleadings at the Registry. The time shall be the local time of the Registry. The Registrar shall be responsible for time and date marking.
1. Without prejudice to Articles 58 and 60(1) of the Agreement and subject to Rules 190.1, 194.5, 196.1, 197.4, 199.1, 207.7, 209.4, 315.2 and 365.2, and following, where applicable, redaction of personal data within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and confidential information according to paragraph 2
(a) decisions and orders made by the Court shall be published,
(b) written pleadings and evidence, lodged at the Court and recorded by the Registry shall be available to the public upon reasoned request to the Registry; the decision is taken by the judge-rapporteur after consulting the parties.
2. A party may request that certain information of written pleadings or evidence be kept confidential and provide specific reasons for such confidentiality. To this end content of the register is made publicly available according to paragraph 1 (b) only 14 days after it has been available to all recipients. The Registrar shall ensure that beyond this time period information subject of a request for confidentiality shall not be made available pending an Application pursuant to paragraph 3 or an appeal pursuant to Rule 220.2. When a party lodges a request that parts of written pleadings or evidence shall be kept confidential, he shall also provide copies of the said documents with the relevant parts redacted when making the request.
3. A member of the public may lodge an Application with the Court for an order that any information excluded from public access pursuant to paragraph 2 may be made available to the applicant.
4. The Application shall contain:
(a) details of the information alleged to be confidential, so far as possible;
(b) the grounds upon which the applicant believes the reasons for confidentiality should not be accepted; and
(c) the purpose for which the information is needed.
5. The Court shall invite written comments from the parties prior to making any order.
6. The Court shall allow the Application unless legitimate reasons given by the party concerned for the confidentiality of the information outweigh the interest of the applicant to access such information.
7. The Registrar shall as soon as practicable take all such steps with regard to access to the register as may be necessary to give effect to an order of the Court under this Rule.
Relation with Agreement: Articles 10, 45, 58 and 60(1)
Relation with Statute: Article 24(2)
In UPC_CFI_135/2024 (Epson v. Dolby | Dolby v. Beko / Arcelik, procedural order of 09.04.2025) the Local Division Düsseldorf stated that an admissible request requires not only an indication of the documents and evidence to which access is sought, but also an indication of the purpose of the request and an explanation of why access to the specified documents is necessary for that purpose. Whether an interest in access is expressed in relation to all or only part of the documents and whether all the documents mentioned are pleadings and evidence within the meaning of Rule 262.1(b) of the Rules of Procedure is to be examined only in the context of the merits of the application.
In UPC_CoA_404/2023 (Ocado v. Autostore, decision of 10.04.2024), the Court of Appeal stated that a reasoned request under R.262.1(b) RoP is not the same, and has to be distinguished from, an application under R.262.3 RoP.
In UPC_CoA_480/2024 and UPC_CoA_481/2024 (Abbott v. Powell Gilbert, decision of 09.01.2025) the Court of Appeal stated in para. 11 that disclosure of pleadings could have the effect of exposing judicial activities to external pressure, albeit only in the perception of the public, and could disturb the serenity of the proceedings.
b) General Interest:
In UPC_CFI_135/2024 (Dolby v. BEKO / Arcelik, procedural order of 09.04.2025) the Local Division Düsseldorf stated that a general interest arises generally only after the conclusion of the proceedings at first instance.
In UPC_CoA_404/2023 (Ocado v. Autostore, decision of 10.04.2024), the Court of Appeal stated that a general interest of a member of the public usually arises after a decision is rendered. Then, a member of the public generally has an interest that written pleadings and evidence are made available. This allows for a better understanding of the decision rendered, in view of the arguments brought forward by the parties and the evidence relied on. It also allows scrutiny of the Court, which is important for trust in the Court by the public at large. At this point, there is a decision that needs to be understood and the handling of the dispute by the Court can be scrutinized.
In UPC_CoA_480/2024 and UPC_CoA_481/2024 (Abbott v. Powell Gilbert, decision of 09.01.2025) the Court of Appeal stated in headnotes 2, that the principle of general interest applies regardless of whether or not
b) Specific Interest:
In UPC_CFI_135/2024 (Epson v. Dolby | Dolby v. Beko / Arcelic, procedural order of 09.04.2025) the Local Division Düsseldorf stated that a member of the public may also have a more specific interest in the pleadings and evidence in a particular case than the general interest mentioned above. This applies in particular if the member of the public has a direct interest in the subject matter of the proceedings, such as the legal validity of a patent that also affects them as a competitor or licensee, or if a party in that case is accused of infringing a patent with a product that is identical or similar to a product that the member of the public has placed or intends to place on the market.
Justifies a request for a access to any documents filed in a main proceeding after a decision on the merits has been made with the argument of
'gaining a better understanding of the decision, in view of the arguments brought forward by the parties and the evidence relied on. Such understanding will enhance the applicant's ability to provide professional and expert advice to their clients before the UPC, thereby also serving the interests of the court and its users’ ?
In the final Order UPC_CFI_941/2025 issued by the CD Milan on 16.10.2025 (Herbert Smith Freehills v. INSULET/EOFLOW) the Court came to the conclusion as follows:
The applicant's asserted interest in receiving access must be weighed against the legitimate interests of the parties to the proceedings, bearing in mind the stated purpose of gaining a better understanding of the decision, as clarified by the Court of Appeal in the Ocado v Autostore case (decision of 10 April 2024, UPC_CoA_404/2023, para. 43). The CoA noted that “the general interest of justice and public order also have to be taken into account. The general interest of justice includes the protection of the integrity of proceedings. Public order is at stake, for example, when a request is abusive or when security interests are at stake”.
Since the Judge Rapporteur (=JR) considered that a comprehensive understanding of the decision can be achieved simply by reading the redacted defence briefs and that he did not see how disclosing the exhibits attached to the defence briefs could help the applicant to ‘provide professional and expert advice to its clients before the UPC’
the JR decided that the Respondents have to provide the Applicant only with a redacted copy of the Claimant’s’s application in the main proceedings as well as with a redacted copy of the Respondents= Defendant’s objections in the said main proceedings, but not with any exhibits as referred to in the main proceedings.,
Relation with Agreement: Article 58
In UPC_CoA_221/2025, 222/2025 & 223/2025 (NST v Qualcomm, order of 3 July 2025) the Court of Appeal reconfirmed the strict necessity test under Rule 262A.6. Access to the opposing party’s confidential material may be given only to “no greater than [the] number necessary” to guarantee each side’s fair trial rights. Applying that test, the Court upheld the Local Division’s decision to allow exactly one of NST’s US attorneys (Mr Stringfield) inside the confidentiality ring, finding:
Concerning the persons (legal team and internal support staff) getting access to confidential information the Court of Appeal summarized in its Order UPC_CoA_791/2025; UPC_CoA_793/2025 issued on 26.012026 (Sun patent vs. VIVO) the following aspects to be considered:
(i) When deciding on the measures for the protection of confidential information and assessing their proportionality, the Court must take into account the need to ensure the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the legitimate interests of the parties and, where appropriate, of third parties, and any potential harm for either of the parties, and, where appropriate, for third parties, resulting from the granting or rejection of such measures.
(ii) In the event that one of the parties is a legal person, that party should be able to propose a natural person or natural persons who ought to form part of that circle of persons entitled to have access so as to ensure proper representation of that legal person, subject to appropriate judicial control to prevent the objective of the restriction of access to evidence and hearings from being undermined.
(iii) Whether the person proposed by a party may be granted access to the confidential information must be determined on the basis of the relevant circumstances of the case, including the role of that person in the proceedings before this Court, the relevance of the confidential information to the performance of that role and the trustworthiness of the person in keeping the information confidential.
(iv) The fact that a person is an employee of a party is, as a general rule, not sufficient to deny access to that person. The exclusion of employees would severely restrict a party’s freedom to choose who will represent it in the proceedings. Furthermore, an employee of a party will often be better positioned to present the party’s view, provide and review relevant information and instruct the representatives than persons external to the party’s organization. Consequently, access for a party’s employee will often be essential to ensure compliance with the right of that party to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. The interest of the party in having full access for, at least, one of its employees therefore, as a general rule, outweighs the interests of the applicant, even if imposing an ‘External Eyes Only’ regime would be preferable from the perspective of safeguarding confidentiality.
(v) Furthermore, where the confidential information concerns a licence agreement between a party and a third party, the potential harm for this third party resulting from allowing access to one or more employees of the other party to the proceedings, may be mitigated by requiring said employee(s) to refrain from involvement in patent licensing negotiations with the third party for a certain period. Such a bar prevents said employee(s) from using such confidential information in these negotiations, whether intentionally or not. It thereby facilitates compliance with the confidentiality regime and provides all parties with a greater degree of legal certainty, as the involvement of the employee(s) in negotiations is easier to establish than the employee’s use - advertent or otherwise - of the confidential information in such negotiations.
Acc. to the Procedural Order No. App_25881/2025 UPC_CFI_484/2025 of the Central Division (Paris Seat) of 16.07.2025 (Kinexon v. Ballinno) the information concerning litigation costs is not publicly available information, both for the legal representative and for the Claimant. Such an information is a strategic financial information that is not accessible to Claimant’s competitors; its disclosure would allow conclusions to be drawn about Claimant’s internal resource allocation. The information, provided in an Application for a cost decision, is of economic value also for the representative, as law firms that handle patent law mandates are in direct competition with each other in terms of their invoiced costs. Although a legal representative is not a “party” in the sense of Art. 58 UPCA, the extension of protection of confidential information to third parties allows the conclusion a fortiori that the legal representative is protected under this provision. If the secrets of a person who is alien the proceedings may be protected, the secrets of a person who is not a party to the proceedings but is nevertheless involved therein must also be protected. According to the aforementioned scope of protection r, the interest of the public to learn about the exact legal costs, which has to be weighed against the Claimant´s interests, is limited. The Court’s decision regarding the allocation of costs is sufficient to duly inform the public.
Furthermore, as lawyers' fees in patent disputes are generally subject to individual agreements, no well-founded conclusions can be drawn about potential costs in other court proceedings based on the legal expenses incurred by other parties.
Nothing else follows from the public's oversight function either, which is sufficiently ensured through access to the Court's decision regarding which party is to bear the costs and in what amount.
According to the LD Mannheim in UPC_CFI_336/2025 issued on 06.08.2025 (NUC Electronics v. Warmcook) the following applies with respect to the disclosure of the costs of legal representatives which are submitted in a proceedings concerning an application for a cost decision pursuant to R. 150 et seqq. RoP:
The breakdown of hours worked between the lawyers involved is confidential information belonging to both the lawyers and their client and is also subject to the attorney-client-privilege. The distribution of hours could allow conclusions to be drawn about the working methods and, in some circumstances, the importance attached to the case. Confidential information of the UPC representatives of a party to the proceedings is not excluded from protection under R. 262A RoP 4 (cf. LD Dusseldorf, order of 22 April 2025, UPC_CFI_16/2024, 121/2025, 124/2025; different opinion CD Milan Seat, order of 5 June 2025, UPC_CFI_477/2025, p. 5). There is no indication for the a priori exclusion of such information. Rather, R. 262A RoP allows for the protection of confidential information belonging to third parties in accordance with Art. 58 UPCA, and the UPC representatives of the parties to the proceedings qualify as third party within the meaning of Art. 58 UPCA (cf. LD Dusseldorf, order of 22 April 2025, UPC_CFI_16/2024, 121/2025, 124/2025, para. 8; CD Paris Seat, order of 16 July 2025, UPC_CFI_484/2025, p. 5 (in the context of R. 262.2 RoP); different opinion CD Milan Seat, order of 5 June 2025, UPC_CFI_477/2025, p. 5). Again, there is no sufficient indication that confidential information belonging to UPC representatives is excluded from protection from the outset.
An Applicant and its UPC representatives have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the information is not used for other purposes than the cost proceedings and is not disclosed to third parties. Since the information is being provided solely for the purpose of the cost proceedings at hand, the Respondents and their representatives are anyway obliged to maintain the confidentiality of the information and not to use it for any other purpose. They will not be unduly burdened by the fact that a breach may be sanctioned by a penalty pay
The access to the aforementioned confidential information cannot be limited to the legal representatives alone without consent. The reason for this is that despite the protection of confidential information the procedural fairness demands that not only the legal representatives get access to the said information, but also their clients, however only for the purpose of the (cost) proceedings. The right to be heard is no longer guaranteed if a party has to rely on the assessment of its lawyer without having the opportunity to verify it itself. The said party, however, is obliged not to disclose the said confidential information to persons within its organisation who do not need it for the purpose of the cost proceedings. Similarly, the said party is obliged to make sure that its employees maintain the confidentiality and observe the restricted purpose for which the information is to be used.
In the event of a culpable breach of confidentiality, the court may impose a periodic penalty payment for each violation, which will be determined having regard to the circumstances of the individual breach.
According to the Order UPC_CFI_481/2025 of the LD Mannheim issued on 19.01.2026 (Huawei vs. HMD) a general order stipulating that submissions on details of FRAND negotiations also covers submissions introduced into the proceedings in future pleadings. In the aforementioned case the information to be protected by the general order related to not publicly known details from confidential licence negotiations. In such a case, it is further justified to also extend the protection to future submissions dealing with the FRAND licence negotiations between the parties. This avoids the request and issuance of (essentially) identical orders after each written submission. Of course, the parties are free to request further confidentiality measures for a written submission, if a higher level of protection may be required in individual cases, e.g. for third-party licence agreements, or challenge it if the other party marks information as confidential despite not being confidential or makes unjustified redactions.
The protection also covers the confidential information if it should be discussed in an oral hearing or repeated in a decision on the merits.
The exclusion of the public and unauthorised persons from an oral hearing shall be announced at the relevant oral hearing if the confidential information is to be discussed there. Any request pursuant to R. 262.2 RoP will also be dealt with later, should the underlying situation arise. However, it should be noted that the protection relates to the specific information only. Therefore, in particular, the abstract FRAND discussion will take place publicly.
Only if specific circumstances that are the subject of the R. 262A RoP order are affected will the public be excluded. The same applies to the reasoning in the decision on the merits in this regard, if any. If there is a need for discussion on this matter in the oral hearing, a non-public discussion will be held on whether and to what extent the public should be excluded.
Concerning the protection of confidential information the LD Düsseldorf stated in its Order UPC_CFI_1035/2025 issued on 11.05.2026 (Yangtze Memory v Micron) :
Pursuant to Art. 58 UPCA, to protect the trade secrets, personal data or other confidential information of a party to the proceedings of a third party, or to prevent an abuse of evidence, the Court may order that the collection and use of evidence in proceedings before it be restricted or prohibited or that access to such access to such evidence be restricted to specific persons (underlining added by the Court).
In accordance with R. 262A RoP, a party may make an Application to the Court for an order that certain information contained in its pleadings or the collection and use of evidence in proceedings may be restricted or prohibited or that access to such information or evidence be restricted to specific persons.
Consequently, confidentiality orders are not limited to the protection of trade secrets.What is decisive is that the information in question is of a nature that requires it to be kept confidential. The extent to which a party has access to confidential information contained in submitted pleadings or evidence must be assessed in light of the circumstances of the case in question. When doing so, the interest of the parties involved in the proceedings must be weighed against each other. Particular consideration must be given the right to be heard and the right to the effective exercise of rights in a fair trial of the party affected by a possible restriction of access; and to the interest of the holder of the confidential information in protecting that information of the applicant (UPC_CFI_471/2023 (LD Mannheim), Order of 22 July 2024, p. 4 – DISH Technologies v. AYLO PREMIUM).
Based on these principles, the conditions for the R. 262A RoP-order to protect confidential information sought by the Claimant are met.
a) The formal requirements of R. 262A.2 and .3 RoP were complied with. The Defendants’ representatives were also heard before the confidentiality order was issued, as required by R. 262A.4 RoP. They made use of the opportunity to submit observations.
b) The Claimant has demonstrated why the information contained in the passages marked in grey in the “T….report” is confidential and requires protection. The Defendants were unable to substantially challenge this.
There is no indication that the “T…. report”, commissioned by the Claimant’s US counsel, is publicly available. Insofar as the Defendants refer to the Claimant’s remark that the report was “published on 21 June 2024,” the Claimant has clarified that this does not mean that the report was freely available from the date onwards. From that point in time, the content of the report could only be acquired by means of a licence. To obtain such a licence, T……. requires a contractual agreement to be concluded and a licence fee to be paid.
In light of the current status of the proceedings, it is reasonable to protect the Claimant against potential US export control restrictions and grant the requested confidentiality.
There is no need for a time-consuming further investigation into whether such restrictions exist and, if so, to what extent. The Claimant has sufficiently demonstrated that submitting the “T….. report” in these proceedings could violate US export control restrictions. The Claimant will be protected from this risk by the order to protect confidential information. This order will not disadvantage the Defendants to any extent that outweighs the Claimant’s interest in ensuring confidentiality. Therefore, the question raised by the Claimant regarding the basis for the protection of trade secrets under R. 288 RoP is not decisive. Even setting this aside, the conditions for a confidentiality order are met here.
In addition it is to be mentioned that there are no issues with excluding all natural persons on the Claimant’s side.
R. 262A.6 RoP explicitly states that the group of authorised persons must include at least one natural person from the concerned party. In other words, when seeking a confidentiality order, a party generally cannot require the other party to ensure that all of their natural persons are excluded from the confidentiality club (UPC_CoA_755/2025, Order of 26 January 2026, Headnote 2 and mn. 25 – Sun Patent v. Vivo; UPC_CFI_359/2023 (LD Mannheim), Or der of 21 March 2024 – Fujifilm v. Kodak; UPC_CFI_471/2023 (LD Mannheim), Order of 22 July 2024, p. 4 – DISH v. AYLO). 28. However, the parties may agree to waive the requirement for a natural person to be a member of the confidentiality club, as defined in R. 262A.6 RoP (UPC_CFI_169/2024 (LD Hamburg), Order of 24 October 2024, Headnote 3 – 10x Genomics v. Vizgen). In such circumstances, there is no obvious reason why the party against whom the confidentiality order is to be issued cannot waive this right independently (UPC_CFI_240/2023 (LD Milan), Order of 23 July 2024, p. 4 – Oerlikon v. Himson). This provision is intended to protect the addressee of the confidentiality order, who may waive this protection. There is no indication that R. 262A.6 RoP is a mandatory provision to the extent that the person it is intended to protect cannot waive this protection.
The Court of Appeal stated in its Decision UPC_CoA_61/2026 issued on 22.05.2026(SharkNinja v. Group SEB) in relation to purchased third-party market data that such data may still be considered being confidential.
The substantive application concerned a Rule 262A RoP confidentiality request relating to market data from a third-party commercial provider.
SEB argued that the information could not be confidential because it was commercially available for purchase by anyone willing to pay.
The Court disagreed. It held that information does not cease to be confidential merely because access may be purchased. What matters is whether the information is readily accessible. Here, the fact that access required payment indicated that it was not freely available. The commercial value of the information followed from that restricted accessibility, and the provider’s controlled licensing arrangements demonstrated reasonable steps to preserve confidentiality.
The Court therefore recognised the data as confidential information for the purposes of Art. 58 UPCA and Rules 262/262A RoP.
Concerning a proper Confidentiality club the Court accepted a broader access than requested
SharkNinja had sought a relatively narrow confidentiality club.
The Court took a broader approach. Because the confidential material included market data concerning SEB itself, the Court accepted that SEB should be able to involve not only legal personnel but also relevant commercial employees capable of assessing the information properly.
Access was therefore granted to two marketing/business personnel and two legal department employees, in addition to external UPC representatives and internal assistants
1. A party may at any stage of the proceedings apply to the Court for leave to change its claim or to amend its case, including adding a counterclaim. Any such application shall explain why such change or amendment was not included in the original pleading.
2. Subject to paragraph 3, leave shall not be granted if, all circumstances considered, the party seeking the amendment cannot satisfy the Court that:
(a) the amendment in question could not have been made with reasonable diligence at an earlier stage; and
(b) the amendment will not unreasonably hinder the other party in the conduct of its action.
3. Leave to limit a claim in an action unconditionally shall always be granted.
4. The Court may re-consider fees already paid in the light of an amendment.
Rule 263 RoP provides the framework for parties seeking to amend their claims or cases during proceedings before the Unified Patent Court (UPC). Such amendments may include changes to the claims, the introduction of counterclaims, or other substantial modifications to the case as initially pleaded.
Key Considerations under Rule 263
The Local Division Düsseldorf clarified the application of Rule 263 in the context of revocation counterclaims (UPC_CFI_11/2024, Grundfos Holding A/S v. Hefei Xinhu Canned Motor Pump Co., Ltd., Decision of 8 May 2025); the case concerned the admissibility of new prior art introduced in a reply to a revocation counterclaim. The Division confirmed that such amendments constitute an extension of the counterclaim under Rule 263 and are subject to the same rigorous standards as other amendments. Similarly, the introduction of a new line of attack based on already submitted prior art requires a comparable justification, including demonstrating that it could not have been reasonably included at the time of the original counterclaim. The burden of proof rests on the party seeking to introduce the new prior art or line of attack to establish both due diligence and the absence of unfair prejudice to the opposing party.
In UPC_CFI_9/2023 (LD Munich, Huawei Technologies v. Netgear Inc. et al., order of 11 December 2023), it was confirmed that under Rule 263.1 RoP, a party can request permission to change its claim or to amend its case at any stage of the proceedings unless the proposed change/amendment (a) could not have been made earlier with due diligence and (b) does not unduly hinder the other party in its conduct of the proceedings. The Local Division held that the plaintiff acted with due diligence by waiting for the conclusion of the EPO limitation procedure, avoiding the necessity of constantly adjusting its claim to unpredictable developments in the limitation procedure. Procedurally, filing a complaint based on the still unrestricted European Patent 3 678 321 from the outset would not have been more economically advantageous. Therefore, the change of the claim after the limitation procedure does not unreasonably hinder the defendants. Additionally, when multiple patents are jointly pursued in the same infringement proceedings, the court is obligated to grant the defendants largely the same defence opportunities for the second patent as they would have in the case of a new, separate lawsuit. This can include extending or prolonging response deadlines. Furthermore, the option of separating the subject of the claim expansion exists, depending on the specific circumstances. To sum up, When planning to base an action on two or more European Patents, with one or more patents intended for limitation before the European Patent Office under Article 105a EPC, the complaint before the UPC can either encompass all patents from the outset, adjusting claims during the proceedings, or initially focus on patents not subject to limitation and later expand the claim under Rule 263.1 RoP after the conclusion of the limitation procedure.
With a second order lodged on the same day as the above discussed first order, the Division asked the parties to comment on the - in view of the Division reasonable – separation of the subject of the claim expansion.
Making a revocation counterclaim conditional on an infringement finding = admissible limitation under R.263. RoP?
According to the Decision UPC_CFI_628/2024 and UPC_CFI_125/2025 of the LD Munich issued on 13.01.2026 (Emboline vs. AorticLab) the unconditional transition from a counterclaim to a dependent counterclaim, which is dependent on the occurrence of an intra-procedural condition (i.e. a finding of patent infringement by the Court), means that the counterclaim is limited in accordance with Rule 263.3 of the Rules of Procedure (RoP). The corresponding request can be forwarded even in the oral hearing, since there is no prohibition in the UPCA or RoP for doing so. If infringement is denied, the aforementioned intra-procedural condition (namely infringement) failed, and therefore no decision is to be made on the counterclaim (Art.76 (1) UPCA).
In such a situation, the patent owner or claimant, respectively, who was unsuccessful with his infringement action must bear the defendant’s costs, and the defendant, who by his own procedural choice made his counterclaim conditional and thus due to non-infringement indirectly withdrew his counterclaim must bear the claimant’s costs.
At the end, both parties bear their own costs.
In GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals SA v. Moderna et al, UPC_CFI_616/2025, order of 18 February 2026, The Hague Local Division makes an important – and practical – point under Rule 263 RoP: an injunction does not have to be framed as a closed list of product names.
GSK sought to amend its case to expressly include Moderna’s updated vaccine, mNEXSPIKE, following an EMA step in December 2025. The Court granted the amendment. But it went further: strictly speaking, the express addition was not even necessary. Where the statement of claim already seeks relief against “further versions or variants”, and the patent claim scope remains the anchor, the injunction is not limited to the originally named products.
Even if treated as a formal amendment, Rule 263.2 RoP was satisfied. The Court accepted that a Europe-relevant regulatory step can mark the point at which reasonable diligence allows pleading. This means: Rule 263 is not a trap where commercial developments evolve during proceedings – provided the core infringement case remains consistent.
The above cited Decision UPC_CFI_628/2024 and UPC_CFI_125/2025 of the LD Munich issued on 13.01.2026 (Emboline vs. AorticLab) has been confirmed by the Decision UPC_CFI_180/2025 and UPC_CFI_210/2025 (BFexaQC et al v. NVIDIA) issued on 11.03.2026 where the LD Munich stated in relation to a counterclaim for revocation as subject to the condition subsequent that the infringement action is unsuccessful as follows:
It is admissible in procedural terms for the defendant to file a counterclaim for revocation in response to an infringement action, subject to the condition subsequent that the infringement action is unsuccessful. If this condition is met because the patent at issue is not infringed regardless of its validity, no decision is required on the counterclaim for revocation.
In more detail the Court stated:
The defendants have made a decision on the counterclaim for revocation contingent upon the infringement claim being successful in all other respects. Since the latter is not the case, no further decision on the counterclaim is required.
The court considers it procedurally permissible for the defendant to bring a counterclaim for declaration of invalidity in response to an action for infringement and to make this subject to the condition subsequent that the action for infringement is unsuccessful. If this condition is met because the patent in dispute is not infringed, regardless of the validity of the patent in dispute, there is no longer any need to rule on the counterclaim for revocation.
It can be left open whether this constitutes an amendment to the claim pursuant to Rule 263.3 of the Rules of Procedure, a partial withdrawal of the claim pursuant to Rule 265 of the Rules of Procedure, or even a form of settlement within the meaning of Rule 360 of the Rules of Procedure, if the defendant only declares during the ongoing proceedings that the decision on the counterclaim is to be dependent on the outcome of the infringement action (also leaving this open: Mannheim Local Division, decision of 5 December 2025, UPC_CFI_414/2024 – Centripetal v Keysight; regarding Rule 263.3 of the Rules of Procedure: Munich Local Division (Panel 1), decision of 13 January 2026, UPC_CFI_628/2024 – If the defendant has made the counterclaim for revocation contingent upon the outcome of the infringement proceedings, the claimant generally has no interest in the counterclaim being decided even if the infringement claim is otherwise unsuccessful. It is the defendant and counter-claimant who articulates the legal interest in bringing a counterclaim for revocation. Where the defendant, as in the present case, makes the decision on the counter-claim contingent upon the outcome of the infringement proceedings, this interest lies solely in the defence against the infringement claim (see Rule 25.1 of the Rules of Procedure). This is because the counterclaim for revocation is intrinsically linked to the infringement action and is generally the direct consequence of the infringement action brought by the claimant (Court of Appeal, Order of 20 June 2025, UPC_CoA_393/2025 – Emboline v. Aorticlab). If the defence against the infringement action is successful on other grounds, there is therefore no longer any interest in a decision on the counterclaim. Nor can the claimant have such an interest outside the scope of Art. 105a EPC, as he runs the risk of unintentionally losing the patent if the counterclaim is successful. However, even the possible dismissal of the counterclaim does not, as a rule, constitute grounds for refusing the defendant the conditional counterclaim. In so far as the plaintiffs expressed an interest during the oral hearing in wishing to communicate a decision in their favour on the counterclaim to other potential opponents in order to encourage out-of-court discussions, this cannot constitute a legal interest on the part of the plaintiffs. This is because the court’s decision is limited in such a case to the dismissal of the counterclaim. The validity of a patent is not positively established; the counterclaim is not directed at such a confirmation of validity and cannot be demanded of the claimant and counter-defendant. Furthermore, the dismissal of the counterclaim is not binding on third parties or other courts. The mere possibility that a potential opponent of the plaintiffs might take the dismissal of the counterclaim into account in out-of-court discussions and that this might therefore lead to an out-of-court settlement avoiding further court proceedings and the associated costs may appear advantageous to the plaintiffs but does not constitute a legal interest.
Whether a decision must be made on the costs of the counterclaim for annulment if no decision is reached on the counterclaim has not yet been clarified by the highest court (see Mannheim Local Division, decision of 5 December 2025, UPC_CFI_414/2024 – Centripetal v. Keysight; Local Division Munich (Panel 1), decision of 13 January 2026, UPC_CFI_628/2024 – Emboline v. Aorticlab). However, even in the event of a dispute, this does not require a final decision, as the parties have agreed on a cost allocation that takes precedence over any court decision on costs.
Further, in the Decision UPC_CFI_180/2025 and UPC_CFI_210/2025 (BFexaQC et al v. NVIDIA) issued on 11.03.2026 the LD Munich made it clear that it does not constitute an amendment to the claim within the meaning of Rule 263 of the RoP if, according to the defendant's Statement of Defence, the attacked product differs in technical details from that described by the claimant in the Statement of Claim and the claimant bases the allegation of infringement in the Reply to the Statement of Defence on the technical functioning described by the defendant, as long as the infringement claim continues to relate to the generally described product and its attacked function.
Interesting is also that according to the Decision UPC_CFI_180/2025 and UPC_CFI_210/2025 (BFexaQC et al v. NVIDIA) issued on 11.03.2026 the LD Munich accepted that a change from claims for direct infringement to claims for indirect infringement is not necessarily a change of claims or an amendment of case for which a separate leave according to Rule 263 of the RoP is to be granted. In this respect the Court stated:
According to the case law of the Court of Appeal, not every new argument constitutes an amendment to the claim that requires a party to apply for leave under Rule 263 of the Rules of Procedure. An amendment to the claim occurs when the nature or scope of the dispute changes. In infringement proceedings, this is the case, for example, where the claimant asserts a different patent or objects to a different product (Court of Appeal, Order of 21 November 2024, UPC_CoA_456/2024 – OrthoApnea).
The nature and scope of a legal dispute are determined, on the one hand, by the claims made but also by the facts put forward in support of those claims and the underlying claims. In line with the Court of Appeal, it must be assumed that not every additional or amended statement of facts automatically leads to an amendment of the claim. This also applies where, following the defendant’s statement of defence, the product in question appears in detail to be different from how the claimant had described it in the statement of claim, provided that the allegation of infringement continues to relate in fact to the generally described product. The claimant is not always aware of all the technical details of a product in question, so it must be possible for them to respond to clarifications and corrections made by the defendant in the defence and to adapt their statement of claim accordingly.
Change from literal to equivalent infringement does not change the claim
The extension of an infringement-by-equivalence argument to additional claim features does not, as such, constitute a change of claim requiring leave under R. 263 RoP. Whether such an extended argument may nevertheless be disregarded as late filed is a separate question to be assessed under R. 9.2 RoP (LD Düsseldorf, UPC_CFI_807/2024 and UPC_CFI_334/2025, procedural order confirmed by the panel on 14 October 2025 – Wonderland v Cybex)
Where these Rules provide that a party shall or may be given an opportunity to be heard before the Court makes an order or takes some action, the Court shall or may (as the case may be) request the parties to provide written submissions within a specified period and/or shall or may invite the parties to an oral hearing on a fixed date by the Court. The Court may also order that a hearing takes place by telephone or video conference. Rules 105 and 106 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
1. As long as there is no final decision in an action, a claimant may apply to withdraw his action. The Court shall decide the application after hearing the other party. The application to withdraw shall not be permitted if the other party has a legitimate interest in the action being decided by the Court.
2. If withdrawal is permitted, the Court shall:
(a) give a decision declaring the proceedings closed;
(b) order the decision to be entered on the register; and
(c) issue a cost decision in accordance with Part 1, Chapter 5.
The withdrawal of an action by the claimant shall have no effect on any counterclaim in the action. The Court may however refer any counterclaim for revocation to the Central Division.
According to the decision UPC_CFI_496/2025 of the LD Düsseldorf issued on 29.09.2025 between Headwater and Samsung
If a Claimant withdraws its infringement action before the closure of the written procedure and the Defendant agrees the Court will definitely follow the parties jointly expressed will (Rule R265.1 RoP).
In case that both parties also agree to bear its own costs, the Court will decide correspondingly acc. to Rule 265.2 ( c ) RoP.
According to R. 370.9(b)(i) RoP, fixed and value-based fees may be reimbursed by 60 % if an action is withdrawn before the closure of the written procedure. R. 370.11 RoP states that the Court shall deal with applications for a reimbursement of Court fees without delay, provided it is satisfied that the reimbursement is appropriate.
According to the Decision UPC_CFI_180/2025 and UPC_CFI_210/2025 (BFexaQC et al v. NVIDIA) issued on 11.03.2026 the LD Munich stated in relation to a counterclaim for revocation as subject to the condition subsequent that the infringement action is unsuccessful as follows:
It is admissible in procedural terms for the defendant to file a counterclaim for revocation in response to an infringement action, subject to the condition subsequent that the infringement action is unsuccessful. If this condition is met because the patent at issue is not infringed regardless of its validity, no decision is required on the counterclaim for revocation.
In more detail the Court stated:
The defendants have made a decision on the counterclaim for revocation contingent upon the infringement claim being successful in all other respects. Since the latter is not the case, no further decision on the counterclaim is required.
The court considers it procedurally permissible for the defendant to bring a counterclaim for declaration of invalidity in response to an action for infringement and to make this subject to the condition subsequent that the action for infringement is unsuccessful. If this condition is met because the patent in dispute is not infringed, regardless of the validity of the patent in dispute, there is no longer any need to rule on the counterclaim for revocation.
It can be left open whether this constitutes an amendment to the claim pursuant to Rule 263.3 of the Rules of Procedure, a partial withdrawal of the claim pursuant to Rule 265 of the Rules of Procedure, or even a form of settlement within the meaning of Rule 360 of the Rules of Procedure, if the defendant only declares during the ongoing proceedings that the decision on the counterclaim is to be dependent on the outcome of the infringement action (also leaving this open: Mannheim Local Division, decision of 5 December 2025, UPC_CFI_414/2024 – Centripetal v Keysight; regarding Rule 263.3 of the Rules of Procedure: Munich Local Division (Panel 1), decision of 13 January 2026, UPC_CFI_628/2024 – If the defendant has made the counterclaim for revocation contingent upon the outcome of the infringement proceedings, the claimant generally has no interest in the counterclaim being decided even if the infringement claim is otherwise unsuccessful. It is the defendant and counter-claimant who articulates the legal interest in bringing a counterclaim for revocation. Where the defendant, as in the present case, makes the decision on the counter-claim contingent upon the outcome of the infringement proceedings, this interest lies solely in the defence against the infringement claim (see Rule 25.1 of the Rules of Procedure). This is because the counterclaim for revocation is intrinsically linked to the infringement action and is generally the direct consequence of the infringement action brought by the claimant (Court of Appeal, Order of 20 June 2025, UPC_CoA_393/2025 – Emboline v. Aorticlab). If the defence against the infringement action is successful on other grounds, there is therefore no longer any interest in a decision on the counterclaim. Nor can the claimant have such an interest outside the scope of Art. 105a EPC, as he runs the risk of unintentionally losing the patent if the counterclaim is successful. However, even the possible dismissal of the counterclaim does not, as a rule, constitute grounds for refusing the defendant the conditional counterclaim. In so far as the plaintiffs expressed an interest during the oral hearing in wishing to communicate a decision in their favour on the counterclaim to other potential opponents in order to encourage out-of-court discussions, this cannot constitute a legal interest on the part of the plaintiffs. This is because the court’s decision is limited in such a case to the dismissal of the counterclaim. The validity of a patent is not positively established; the counterclaim is not directed at such a confirmation of validity and cannot be demanded of the claimant and counter-defendant. Furthermore, the dismissal of the counterclaim is not binding on third parties or other courts. The mere possibility that a potential opponent of the plaintiffs might take the dismissal of the counterclaim into account in out-of-court discussions and that this might therefore lead to an out-of-court settlement avoiding further court proceedings and the associated costs may appear advantageous to the plaintiffs but does not constitute a legal interest.
Whether a decision must be made on the costs of the counterclaim for annulment if no decision is reached on the counterclaim has not yet been clarified by the highest court (see Mannheim Local Division, decision of 5 December 2025, UPC_CFI_414/2024 – Centripetal v. Keysight; Local Division Munich (Panel 1), decision of 13 January 2026, UPC_CFI_628/2024 – Emboline v. Aorticlab). However, even in the event of a dispute, this does not require a final decision, as the parties have agreed on a cost allocation that takes precedence over any court decision on costs.
1. At any stage of the proceedings where a question is raised before the Court and the Court considers that a decision on the question by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) is necessary before the Court can give judgment, the Court of First Instance may and the Court of Appeal shall request the CJEU to give a ruling thereon.
2. The Court shall in requesting a ruling follow the procedure set out in the Rules of the CJEU.
3. If the Court requests the CJEU to apply its expedited procedure the request shall in addition set out:
(a) the matters of fact and law which establish its urgency; and
(b) the reasons why an expedited ruling is appropriate.
4. The Registrar shall as soon as practicable forward the request and any request to apply the expedited procedure to the Registrar of the CJEU.
5. The Court may stay the proceedings. Where it does not stay proceedings, it shall not give judgement until the CJEU has given a ruling on the question.
Where an action for damages has been brought against a Contracting Member State pursuant to Article 22 of the Agreement, the President of the Court of Appeal shall, as soon as practicable following a request from the competent authority in the Contracting Member State, provide the competent authority with copies of all pleadings, evidence, decisions and orders available to the Court in its proceedings that are relevant to the action for damages. The President of the Court of Appeal shall have an opportunity to comment.
Part 5 - General Provisions
1. The Registry shall serve the Statement of claim by electronic means if the conditions referred to in Article 19 of the Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 are met
(a) on the defendant at an electronic address which the defendant has provided for the purpose of service in the proceedings; or
(b) on a representative of the defendant if the defendant has provided the electronic address of a representative pursuant to Rule 8.1 as an address at which the defendant may be served with the Statement of claim; or
(c) on a representative of the defendant pursuant to Rule 8.1 if the representative has notified the Registry or the claimant that he accepts service of the Statement of claim on behalf of the defendant at an electronic address.
2. Where a representative pursuant to Rule 8.1 accepts service on behalf of a party service may be effected within the closed electronic system of the UPC Case Management System (CMS).
3. For the purpose of serving a Statement for revocation [Rule 44] or of serving a Statement for declaration of non-infringement [Rule 63], reference to representative under paragraph 2(b) or (c) shall additionally include professional representatives and legal practitioners as defined in Article 134 EPC who are recorded as the appointed representative for the patent, the subject of the proceedings, in the Register for unitary patent protection [Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012, Article 2(e)] or in the national patent register [Rule 8.5(a)].
4. Where service by electronic means cannot be effected, the Registry shall serve the Statement of claim on the defendant by:
(a) any other method foreseen by the law of the European Union on the service of documents in civil and commercial matters [Regulation (EU) 2020/1784], in particular by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt or equivalent [Article 18 Regulation (EU) 2020/1784]; or
(b) where service in accordance with paragraph 4(a) could not be effected any method permitted by the law of the Member State of the European Union where service is to be effected or authorised by the Court under Rule 275.
5. Service under this Section shall be effected at the following place:
(a) where the defendant is a company or other legal person, at its statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business within the Contracting Member States or at any place within the Contracting Member States where the company or other legal person has a permanent or temporary place of business;
(b) where the defendant is an individual, at his usual or last known residence within the Contracting Member States; or
(c) for the purpose of serving a Statement for revocation [Rule 44] or of serving a Statement for a declaration of non-infringement [Rule 63], at the place of business of a professional representative or legal practitioner as defined in Article 134 EPC who is recorded as the appointed representative for the patent, the subject of the proceedings, in the Register for unitary patent protection [Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012, Article 2(e)] or of the patent office of a Contracting Member State.
6. Subject to Rule 272.2 and .3, a Statement of claim served in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 5 is deemed to be served on the defendant:
(a) where service takes place by means of electronic communication, on the day when the relevant electronic message was sent (GMT+1);
(b) where service takes place by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt or equivalent such letter shall be deemed to be served on the addressee on the tenth day following posting unless it has failed to reach the addressee, has in fact reached him on a later date or the acknowledgement of receipt or equivalent has not been returned. Such service shall, except where paragraph 8 applies, be deemed effective even if acceptance of the letter has been refused.
7. The Registry shall advise the defendant that he may refuse to accept a Statement of Claim if it is not written or not accompanied by a translation into a language that he understands or that is an official language of the place where service is to be effected, by enclosing with the document to be served form L in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2020/1784.
8. Where the defendant is entitled to refuse service and where he has notified the refusal to the Registry within two weeks of the attempted service together with an indication of the language(s) he understands, the Registry shall inform the claimant. The claimant shall provide to the Registry translations of at least the Statement of claim and the information required in Rule 13.1(a) to (p) in a language provided for by paragraph 7.
In UPC_CoA_320/2023, order of 13 October 2023, the Court of Appeal stated in its 1st headnote that under Rule 271 RoP, a Statement of claim, even if it refers to or announces the later submission of Annexes, can be validly served on a defendant, provided that the Statement of claim without the Annexes enables the defendant to assert its rights in legal proceedings before the courts of the UPC. A Statement of claim must therefore at least state with certainty the subject matter and cause of action.
According to the decision UPC_CFI_318/2025 issued by the Local Division of Düsseldorf on 05.08.2025, between igus and Whale, the statement of claim may be served at a trade fair booth. It is stated:
According to R. 271.5 (a) RoP, service may be effected at any location within the contracting member states where the company or other legal entity has a permanent or temporary place of business. The latter may be the case at a trade fair booth according to R.271.5(a) RoP if – as is usually the case – at least some advertising for deliveries is carried out there (UPC_CFI_316/2024 (LD Düsseldorf), order of 17 June 2024 – M-A-S v. Altech; see also Tilmann/Plassmann/v. Falck/Stoll, Einheitspatent, Einheitliches Patentgericht, UPC RoP R. 271 marginal no. 14). This can be assumed if there are no indications to the contrary (cf. UPC_CFI_316/2024 (LD Düsseldorf), order of 17 June 2024 – M-A-S v. Altech).
Part 5 - General Provisions
This Section applies to service of a Statement of claim outside the Contracting Member States.
1. Where a Statement of claim is to be served outside the Contracting Member States, it shall be so served by the Registry
(a) by any method provided by: (i) The law of the European Union on the service of documents in civil and commercial matters [Regulation (EU) 2020/1784] where it applies; (ii) The Hague Service Convention or any other applicable convention or agreement where it applies; or (iii) to the extent that there is no such convention or agreement in force, either by service through diplomatic or consular channels from the Contracting Member State in which the sub-registry of the relevant division is established;
(b) where service in accordance with paragraph 1(a) could not be effected by any method permitted by the law of the state where service is to be effected or as authorised by the Court under Rule 275.
2. No Statement of claim may be served under this Rule 274 in a manner which is contrary to the law of the state where service is effected.
3. The Registry shall inform the claimant of the date on which the Statement of claim is deemed served under paragraph 1.
4. The Registry shall inform the claimant if for any reason service pursuant to paragraph 1 cannot be effected.
Part 5 - General Provisions
1. Where service in accordance with Section 1 or 2 could not be effected the Court on an application by the claimant that there is a good reason to authorise service by a method or at a place not otherwise permitted by this chapter, the Court may by way of order permit service by an alternative method or at an alternative place.
2. On a reasoned request by the claimant, the Court may order that steps already taken to bring the Statement of claim to the attention of the defendant by an alternative method or at an alternative place is good service.
3. An order under this rule shall specify:
(a) the method or place of service;
(b) the date on which the Statement of claim is deemed served; and
(c) the period for filing the Statement of defence.
4. No order for alternative service under this Rule shall be made permitting service in a manner that is contrary to the law of the state where service is to be effected.
In UPC_CoA_69/2024 (NEC Corp. v. TCL, order of 29 July 2024) the Court of Appeal stated that while Regulation 2020/1784 is intended for intra-Community service, the Hague Convention applies for transmission of judicial documents abroad in cross border litigation in relations with third states. Service outside the Contracting Member States is governed by R. 273 and 274 RoP. Art. 15.2 of the Hague Convention provides that each Contracting State shall be free to declare that the judge may give judgment even if no certificate of service or delivery has been received, if all the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in the Convention,
b) a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed since the date of the transmission of the document,
c) no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made to obtain it through the competent authorities of the State addressed.
The implication of Article 15.2 of the Hague Convention is that an attempt shall normally be made to serve the Statement of claim by any method provided for by the Hague Convention shall be made, before the Court authorises or orders service by an alternative method or at an alternative place (R. 274.1(b) and R. 275 RoP). R. 275.1 RoP includes a requirement of a prior service attempt. This precludes an interpretation that fully ignores this requirement. It would also be contrary to the Hague Convention that, as said, implies a prior service attempt in accordance with the Convention.
In UPC_CoA_205/2024 (Nera Innovations Ltd. v. Xiaomi et al., order of 6 August 2024) the Court of Appeal refers to the guarantee of actual and effective receipt of documents, that is to say, service on the defendant, together with the existence of a period of time sufficient to enable the defendant to prepare his or her defence, is a requirement of respect for the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Authority for a subsidiary to receive on behalf of its parent company judicial documents intended for it cannot be presumed, otherwise there is a risk of prejudicing the parent company’s rights of defence. (See judgment of the CJEU of 11 July 2024 in Case C-632/22 AB Volvo v Transsaqui S.L., ECLI:EU:C:2024:601, paras 50-51). A defendant company in China can not, as a starting point, be served a Statement of claim via a company within the same group in a Contracting Member State. Such a group company cannot automatically be seen as a statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business of a defendant company in China, nor a place where such defendant company has a permanent or temporary place of business. This view is supported by the principle of corporate separation prevalent in national law, which is also a source of law for the Court when interpreting the RoP (Art. 24(1)(e) UPCA).
All the aforementioned is being confirmed by the Order UPC_CFI_449/2025 issued by the LD Düsseldorf on 16.10.2025 ( Hewlett-Packard v. Zhuhai ouguan Electronic/Rentmeister) when stating:
If an application for provisional measures is to be served under the Hague Convention, and the authority responsible for the service informs the Court several months after the request that service cannot be effected because the defendant does not exist at the provided address, the Court may deem the steps taken so far sufficient for proper service, provided that the applicant has credibly demonstrated that the address at which service was attempted is correct.
In the aforementioned case the Court tried to deliver all documents concerning an application for provisional measures to a Defendant located in China via the official online portal of the Central Authority of China. These documents were forwarded within the Chinese authorities to the Supreme People’s Court for further processing. No further processing by the Chinese authorities could then be detected on the online portal. About three and a half months later on request in Chinese language the Court received from the online portal a certificate that the documents have not been served since:” No such company at the address provided”.
However, since the Applicant for provisional measures could prove with reference to the address provided on Amazon, the website that the Defendant uses to sell its products and with an independent verification of the address through an internal Company Overview Report (“ICO Report”) and in addition with reference to the website “www.qcc.com”, which is the website of a third party commercial corporate database that the business address of the Chinese Defendant as mentioned in the application for provisional measures is correct, the Court accepted all these efforts made by the Applicant for provisional measures as sufficient steps for a proper service in accordance with R.275.2 RoP. Correspondingly, the Court ordered to publish the names and the file number on the Court’s website, so that the Order can be found under the Orders and Decisions published on the said website.
In this respect it is also interesting that the said Order has been issued within about 5 months after the application for provisional measures was filed, i.e. before the expiry of the six months period as to be considered by the Hague Service Convention.
In this respect, the Court stated that Art. 15(2) of the Hague Service Convention does not preclude a proper service. Insofar as this provision stipulates as one condition to be fulfilled that a period of time of not less than six months has elapsed since the date of the transmission of the document, this time limit cannot apply without restriction in Preliminary Injunction proceedings. Applying this time limit formally puts the Applicant at risk of its legal protection potentially becoming ineffective. Art. 15(3) of the Hague Service Convention shows that the Convention also recognises this issue by allowing the order of provisional measures in urgent cases, despite the formal service requirements.
Part 5 - General Provisions
No decision by default shall be entered under Part 5, Chapter 11 unless the Court is satisfied that either:
(a) the Statement of claim was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the state addressed for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory; or
(b) the Statement of claim was actually served on the defendant under this Chapter 2.
1. As soon as practicable after written pleadings have been received at the Registry, the Registry shall serve the pleadings and any other document lodged with the pleadings on the other party by means of electronic communication except if the pleading contains a request for an ex parte proceeding.
2. Where service by means of electronic communication cannot be effected, the Registry shall serve the written pleadings on the party by:
(a) registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt or equivalent; or
(b) any method authorised by the Court under Rule 275.
3. Service under paragraph 2(a) shall be effected at the following place:
(a) where the party is a company or other legal person: at its statutory seat, central administration, principal place of business or at any place within the Contracting Member States where the company or other legal person has a place of business;
(b) where the party is an individual: at his usual or last known residence within the Contracting Member States.
4. Rule 271.6 and 272 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
5. Where a party is represented pursuant to Rule 8.1, the pleadings and other documents referred to in paragraph 1 shall be served on that representative. Paragraph 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Where the electronic address for service of a party changes, that party must give notice in writing of the change as soon as it has taken place to the Registry and every other party [Rule 6.3].
Part 5 - General Provisions
A representative of a party shall not misrepresent cases or facts before the Court either knowingly or with good reasons to know.
Relation to Agreement: Article 48(6)
1. Where a client seeks advice from a lawyer or a patent attorney he has instructed in a professional capacity, whether in connection with proceedings before the Court or otherwise, then any confidential communication (whether written or oral) between them relating to the seeking or the provision of that advice is privileged from disclosure, whilst it remains confidential, in any proceedings before the Court or in arbitration or mediation proceedings before the Centre.
2. This privilege applies also to communications between a client and a lawyer or patent attorney employed by the client and instructed to act in a professional capacity, whether in connection with proceedings before the Court or otherwise.
3. This privilege extends to the work product of the lawyer or patent attorney (including communications between lawyers and/or patent attorneys employed in the same firm or entity or between lawyers and/or patent attorneys employed by the same client) and to any record of a privileged communication.
4. This privilege prevents the lawyer or patent attorney and his client from being questioned or examined about the contents or nature of their communications.
5. This privilege may be expressly waived by the client.
6. For the purpose of Rules 287 and 288:
(a) the expression “lawyer” shall mean a person as defined in Rule 286.1 and any other person who is qualified to practise as a lawyer and to give legal advice under the law of the state where he practises and who is professionally instructed to give such advice.
(b) the expression “patent attorney” shall include a person who is recognised as eligible to give advice under the law of the state where he practises in relation to the protection of any invention or to the prosecution or litigation of any patent or patent application and is professionally consulted to give such advice.
7. The expression “patent attorney” shall also include a professional representative before the European Patent Office pursuant to Article 134 (1) EPC.
Relation to Agreement: Article 48(4)
Where a client, or a lawyer or patent attorney as specified in Rule 287.1, .2, .6 and .7 instructed by a client in a professional capacity, communicates confidentially with a third party for the purposes of obtaining information or evidence of any nature for the purpose of or for use in any proceedings, including proceedings before the European Patent Office, such communications shall be privileged from disclosure in the same way and to the same extent as provided for in Rule 287.
Relation to Agreement: Article 48(5)
1. Representatives appearing before the Court shall enjoy immunity in respect of words spoken or written by them concerning the action or the parties.
2. Representatives shall enjoy the following further privileges and facilities:
(a) papers and documents relating to the proceedings shall be exempt from both search and seizure;
(b) any allegedly infringing product or device relating to the proceedings shall be exempt from both search and seizure when brought to the Court for the purposes of the proceedings.
In the event of a dispute, customs officials or police may seal those papers, documents or allegedly infringing products or devices. They shall then be immediately forwarded to the Court for inspection in the presence of the Registrar and of the person concerned.
3. Representatives shall be entitled to travel in the course of duty without hindrance.
4. The privileges, immunities and facilities specified in paragraphs 1 to 3 are granted exclusively in the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings.
5. The Court may waive the immunity where it considers that a representative is guilty of conduct which is contrary to the proper conduct of proceedings.
Relation with Agreement: Article 48
Relation with Agreement: Article 48(4)
Any change of representative shall take effect from the receipt by the Registry of notification that a new representative shall in future be representing the party concerned. Until the moment where such statement is received, the former representative remains responsible for the conduct of the proceedings and for communications between the Court and the party concerned.
An Application to remove a representative’s name, being a representative qualified pursuant to Article 48(1) of the Agreement, from the register of representatives may be made:
(a) by the representative himself in the event he retires or for any other reason ceases to satisfy the requirements of Rule 286;
(b) by a representative on behalf of a listed representative who has died.
Part 5 - General Provisions
The Court may stay proceedings:
(a) where it is seized of an action relating to a patent which is also the subject of opposition proceedings or limitation proceedings (including subsequent appeal proceedings) before the European Patent Office or a national authority where a decision in such proceedings may be expected to be given rapidly;
(b) where it is seized of an action relating to a supplementary protection certificate which is also the subject of proceedings before a national court or authority;
(c) where an appeal is brought before the Court of Appeal against a decision or order of the Court of First Instance: (i) disposing of the substantive issues in part only; (ii) disposing of an admissibility issue or a Preliminary objection;
(d) at the joint request of the parties;
(e) pursuant to Rule 37;
(f) pursuant to Rules 75 and 76;
(g) pursuant to Rule 118;
(h) pursuant to Rule 136;
(i) pursuant to Rule 266;
(j) pursuant to Rules 310 and 311;
(k) pursuant to Rule 346;
(l) to give effect to Union law, in particular the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 and the Lugano Convention;
(m) in any other case where the proper administration of justice so requires.
staying foreign-designation infringement proceedings pending national revocation proceedings
Where the UPC has jurisdiction over an infringement action based on a European patent designation in an EU Member State or a State party to the Lugano Convention, but lacks jurisdiction to determine the validity of that designation, the defendant may be given an appropriate period to commence revocation proceedings before the competent national court.
If such national revocation proceedings are pending or are commenced within the period granted, it is generally appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion and case-management powers under R. 295(l) and (m) RoP to stay the infringement proceedings insofar as they are based on the relevant foreign designation until a final decision on validity has been rendered by the competent national court. If the defendant does not commence national revocation proceedings within the period granted, the Court must assume that the patent is valid and decide the infringement action on that basis (Court of Appeal, UPC_CoA_312/2025, UPC_CoA_333/2025, UPC_CoA_880/2025 and UPC_CoA_882/2025, decision of 2 June 2026 – Fujifilm v Kodak).
Any decision referred to in Rule 296.2 ordering the resumption of proceedings before the end of the stay shall be made by order of the judge-rapporteur after hearing the parties. The judge-rapporteur may refer the matter to the panel.
The Court may of its own motion or at the request of a party request that opposition proceedings or limitation proceedings (including any subsequent appeal proceedings) before the European Patent Office be accelerated in accordance with the proceedings of the European Patent Office. The Court may stay its proceedings in accordance with Rule 295(a) pending the outcome of such request and any subsequent accelerated proceedings.
Part 5 - General Provisions
Any period of time prescribed by the Agreement, the Statute, these Rules or any order of the Court for the taking of any procedural step shall be laid down in terms of full days, weeks, months or years and shall be reckoned as follows:
(a) computation shall start on the day following the day on which the relevant event occurred; in the case of service of a document, the relevant event shall be the receipt of that document in accordance with Part 5, Chapter 2;
(b) when a period is expressed as one year or a certain number of years, it shall expire in the relevant subsequent year in the month having the same name and on the day having the same number as the month and the day on which the said event occurred. If the relevant subsequent month has no day with the same number, the period shall expire on the last day of that month;
(c) when a period is expressed as one month or a certain number of months, it shall expire in the relevant subsequent month on the day which has the same number as the day on which the said event occurred. If the relevant subsequent month has no day with the same number, the period shall expire on the last day of that month;
(d) when a period is expressed as one week or a certain number of weeks, it shall expire in the relevant subsequent week on the day having the same name as the day on which the said event occurred;
(e) day shall mean a calendar day unless expressed as a working day;
(f) calendar days shall include official holidays of the Contracting Member State in which the division or the seat of the central division or its section concerned or the Court of Appeal is located, Saturdays and Sundays;
(g) working days shall not include official holidays of the Contracting Member State in which the division or the seat of the central division or its section concerned or the Court of Appeal is located, Saturdays and Sundays;
(h) periods shall not be suspended during the judicial vacations.
Extension of deadlines:
In UPC_CoA_320/2023, order of 13 October 2023, the Court of Appeal stated in its 2nd and 3rd headnotes that given the purpose of Rule 13.2 RoP, if a claimant did not upload the Annexes simultaneously with the Statement of claim in the CMS, and thus did not comply with Rule 13.2 RoP, and as a consequence these have not been available when the representative of the defendant accessed the CMS with the Access Code contained in the Notice, this in itself is sufficient to constitute a reasoned request by a defendant for an extension of the terms mentioned in Rules 19.1 and 23 RoP for lodging a Preliminary objection and the Statement of defense, regardless of the nature and/or content of the Annexes. Failing any specific circumstances of an individual case which calls for another term, which have to be brought forward by the claimant, the extension of the terms mentioned in Rules 19.1 and 23 shall compensate for and thus be equal to the period during which the Annexes have not been available after service of the Statement of claim contrary to Rule 13.2 RoP.
Part 5 - General Provisions
Part 5 - General Provisions
1. The Court may, on application by a party, order a person to:
(a) be added as a party;
(b) cease to be a party;
(c) be substituted for a party.
2. The Court shall invite other parties to the proceedings to comment on the application, as soon as practicable after service of the application.
3. When ordering that a person shall become a party or shall cease to be a party
Part 5 - General Provisions
1. If a party dies or ceases to exist during proceedings, the proceedings shall be stayed until such party is replaced by his successor. The Court may specify a period in this respect.
2. If there are more than two parties to the proceedings, the Court may decide that:
(a) proceedings between the remaining parties be continued separately; and
(b) the stay shall only concern the proceedings regarding the party that no longer exists.
3. If the successor of the party that died or ceased to exist does not continue the proceedings of his own motion, within a period specified by the Court, any other party may apply to have the successor added to or substituted for a party.
4. The Court shall decide who shall be added or substituted as a party pursuant to Rule 305 and 306 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Rule 311 RoP provides guidelines for the UPC procedure in case a party is administered before insolvency or declared insolvency. The reference to the respective national insolvency law allows the court to take the specific circumstances of bankruptcy into consideration.
In UPC_CoA_335/2023 (Nanostring Technologies Inc. et.al. vs. 10x Genomics, Inc. et al., Order of 26. February 2024) the Court of Appeal stated that In accordance with the principles of procedural economy and cost efficiency as well as a fair balance between the legitimate interests of the parties, which must be considered in the interpretation of the RoP pursuant to Art. 41.3 UPCA, the proceedings are not required to be stayed under R. 311.1 RoP, if a party is declared insolvent only after the oral proceedings have concluded and the dispute is ready for a decision. At this stage of the proceedings, the parties have already taken all procedural steps, and all costs have already been incurred by the parties. There is no difference on the effect of a decision or order to the bankruptcy estate compared to a decision or order issued before the declaration of bankruptcy. The interest in a timely order weight particularly heavily in proceedings for interim relief. Furthermore, it leads to a fair balance between the legitimate interests of the parties, if events that only occurred after the conclusion of the oral hearing are no longer to be taken into account in the decision-making process.
Part 5 - General Provisions
In UPC_CFI_145/2024 (Sanofi v. Accord Healthcare, order of 17 January 2025) the Local Division Munic stated that the former patent holder in his function as plaintiff initiating the infringement action and defendant in the revocation action is replaced by the new patent holder after reorganizing the group of companies related to the former patent holder which has been dissolved without liquidation as all the shares came to be held by the new patent holder as single shareholder, which results in the universal transfer of assets including the ownership of the patent in dispute.
Part 5 - General Provisions
1. An Application to intervene may be lodged at any stage of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance or the Court of Appeal by any person establishing a legal interest in the result of an action submitted to the Court (hereinafter “the intervener”).
2. An Application to intervene shall be admissible only if it is made in support, in whole or in part, of a claim, order or remedy sought by one of the parties and is made before the closure of the written procedure unless the Court of First Instance or Court of Appeal orders otherwise.
3. The intervener shall be represented in accordance with Article 48 of the Agreement.
4. The Application to intervene shall contain:
(a) a reference to the action number of the file;
(b) the names of the intervener and of the intervener’s representative, as well as postal and electronic addresses for service and the names of the persons authorised to accept service;
(c) the claim, order or remedy in support of which intervention is sought by the intervener; and
(d) a statement of the facts establishing the right to intervene under paragraphs 1 and 2.
Rule 313 RoP allows any third party having a legal interest in the outcome of the proceedings to become a party by lodging an application to intervene.
1. Term for Intervention
The request to intervene shall be lodged before closure of the written procedure (313.2 RoP).
2. Legal Interest
The intervening party must have a direct legal interest.
In UPC_CoA_404/2023 (Ocado Innovation Ltd. vs. Autostore AS et al., decision of 10. January 2024), it was stated that an interest in the result of the action within the meaning of R.313.1 RoP means a direct and present interest in the grant by the Court of the order or decision as sought by the party, whom the prospective intervener wishes to support and not an interest in relation to the pleas in law put forward. It is necessary to distinguish between prospective interveners establishing a direct interest in the ruling on the specific request sought by the supported party, and those who can establish only an indirect interest in the result of the case by reason of similarities between their situation and that of one of the parties. A similarity between two cases is not sufficient.
A direct legal interest is granted for:
A) Supplier
In UPC_CFI_33/2024 (Swarco vs. Stabag, procedural order of 30. July 2024), it was stated that a legal interest can in any case be affirmed if it is claimed that the product purchased by the intervener infringes the patent in dispute.
In UPC_CoA_621/2024 (Daedalus Prime LLC vs. Xiaomi Technology Netherlands B.V. and the intervener Mediatek Inc., order of 8. January 2025), it was stated that the fact that the confidential information was submitted by Defendant does not rule out that the intervening manufacturer has a legal interest in maintaining its confidentiality. The supplying manufacturer has a direct and present interest in the result of the appeal proceedings, as the confidential information at issue in the appeal proceedings concerns information relating to the architecture of intervener’s processors.
B) Licensee
In UPC_CFI_363/2023 (Seoul Viosys Co., Ltd. et al. vs. Expert e-Commerce GmbH, procedural order of 22. April 2024), it was stated that the intervener as licensee of the patent in suit has a direct and present interest in the outcome of the proceedings related to a revocation counterclaim. If this counterclaim is successful, the patent in suit will be revoked with retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 65.2 and 65.4 UPCA. As a result, the intervener as licensee loses its preferential position over non-licensees, which is also associated with a simple licence. It can therefore join the legal dispute on the plaintiff's side and attempt to prevent such a declaration of nullity (Bopp/Kircher/Lux, Handbuch Europäischer Patentprozess, 2nd ed., § 11 para. 30; Bopp/Kircher/Burrichter/Kirchhofer, loc. cit., § 14 para. 167).
In this decision, the court further states that such an intervention is not only admissible in isolation in relation to the revocation counterclaim. If the local division has opted for a joint hearing of the infringement and revocation counterclaims (Art. 33.3 lit. a) UPCA), it must decide on both the infringement and the legal validity on the basis of a uniform interpretation of the patent in dispute (UPC_CFI_16/2024 (Ortovox Sportartikel GmbH vs. Mammut Sports Group AG et al., Order of 15 April 2024). Infringement action and nullity counterclaim are therefore closely linked in terms of content. Any change in the interpretation and determination of the scope of protection can directly influence not only the answer to the infringement question, but also the assessment of the validity of the patent in dispute. Against this background, the intervener can only effectively pursue its interest in preventing the invalidation of the patent in suit if it joins not only the nullity action in isolation, but the legal dispute as a whole.
C) Patent pool administrators
In UPC_CFI_153/2024 (NEC Corp. vs. TCL et al. and intervener Access Advanced LLC, substantive order of 2. October 2024), it was stated that a patent pool administrator has, in principle, a legal interest in the outcome of proceedings within the meaning of Rule 313 RoP.
In UPC_CFI_457/2023 (Dolby International AB vs. HP Deutschland GmbH et al. and the intervener Access Advance LLC, procedural order of 16. June 2024), it is stated that the intervener has a sufficient legal interest in the outcome of the dispute if it manages a patent pool to which the plaintiff has contributed the patent in suit. The intervener was entrusted by the plaintiff with the licensing of the standard-essential patent portfolio, which comprehensively covers the patent in dispute, and in this capacity fulfills the plaintiff's FRAND obligations and negotiates the conclusion of a pool license. The administrator of the SEP patent pool therefore has a legal interest in the FRAND objection ultimately raised (also) against it being rejected.
A direct legal interest is rejected for:
D) Party of parallel procedure
In UPC_CoA_404/2023 (Ocado Innovation Ltd. vs. Autostore AS et al., decision of 10. January 2024), it was stated that an interest in the result of the action within the meaning of R.313.1 RoP means a direct and present interest in the grant by the Court of the order or decision as sought by the party, whom the prospective intervener wishes to support and not an interest in relation to the pleas in law put forward. It is necessary to distinguish between prospective interveners establishing a direct interest in the ruling on the specific request sought by the supported party, and those who can establish only an indirect interest in the result of the case by reason of similarities between their situation and that of one of the parties. A similarity between two cases is not sufficient.
In UPC_CFI_698/2024 (Accord Healthcare et al. vs. Novartis AG and intervener Zentiva K.S. et al., procedural order of 27. March 2025), it was stated that a distinction must be made between prospective interveners who have a direct interest in the outcome of the specific form of order sought by the party they are supporting, and those who have only an indirect and parallel interest in the outcome of the case by virtue of factual similarity between their situation and that of one of the parties (see also UPC_CFI_380/2024 (Eoflow Co., Ltd. vs. Insulet Corp., procedural order of 15. February 2025) and in UPC_CFI_153/2024 (NEC vs. TCL and intervener Access Advanced, substantive order of 2. October 2024)).
3. Confidentiality
Confidentiality issues are no reason to reject a legal interest.
In UPC_CFI_153/2024 (NEC Corp. vs. TCL et al. and intervener Access Advanced LLC, substantive order of 2. October 2024), it was stated that admission of the intervention is not precluded by the fact that it does not prevent violation of Article 101 TFEU, since the applicant and a party have the possibility to exchange sensitive information under competition law in their written submissions. Allowing an intervention as such does not constitute a violation of Art. 101 TFEU. By admitting the intervention, the applicant becomes a party to the proceedings and is to be treated as a party in accordance with R. 315(4) RoP. Since it must accept the proceedings at this stage, it must be allowed access to the file to be able to conduct the proceedings properly. If the court has already classified certain information as confidential and granted only limited access to the party on whose side the intervener is joining pursuant to R. 262a RoP, the intervener cannot be granted unlimited access to this information.
In UPC_CFI_698/2024 (Accord Healthcare B.V. et al. vs. Novartis AG and the intervener Zentiva K.S. et al., procedural order of 21./27. March 2025), it was stated that parallelism between two cases or the allegation that the outcome of a judgment has a direct impact on another does not establish a legal interest to intervention pursuant to R. 313 RoP.
4. Non-contradictory submissions by the intervener
According to R. 313.2 RoP, an application to intervene shall be admissible only if it is made in support, in whole or in part, of a claim, order or remedy sought by one of the parties and is made before the closure of the written procedure. Therefore, the requests and arguments of the intervener must be in line with the party supported by the intervener.
In UPC_CFI_698/2024 (Accord Healthcare et al. vs. Novartis AG and intervener Zentiva K.S. et al., procedural order of 27. March 2025), it was stated that the expression 'made in support, in whole or in part, of a claim, order or relief sought by one of the parties' in R. 313.2 RoP must be interpreted as meaning that the intervening party's remedies must be non-contradictory to those of the party who has been supported, and therefore in accordance with Art. 67 German ZPO and Art. 105 Italian Code of Procedure, and not in the sense of a partial identity.
5. Rule 313 Rop does not require that the applicant has a legal interest in the final outcome of an action
In the Order UPC_COA_631/2025 issued on 23.09.2025 (Apple/Ericsson v. ASUS/Arvato) the Court of Appeal stated:
Under Rule 313.1 RoP, an application to intervene may be lodged at any stage of the proceedings by any person establishing a legal interest in the result of an action submitted to the Court. Rule 313.2 RoP provides that an application to intervene shall be admissible if it is made in support, in whole or in part, of a claim, order or remedy sought by one of the parties. These provisions do not require that the applicant has a legal interest in the final outcome of the action. An interim order, such as an order establishing a confidentiality regime, is part of “the result of the action” within the meaning of R. 313.1 RoP and is an “order sought by one of the parties” within the meaning of R. 313.2 RoP. Of course, this does not mean that an intervener can choose “arbitrary aspects of proceedings” to join. Intervention will only be permitted if and to the extent that the applicant demonstrates a legal interest in a claim, order or remedy sought by one of the parties.
The judge-rapporteur shall decide on the admissibility of the Application to intervene by way of order. The other parties shall be given an opportunity to be heard beforehand.
The decision on the application to intervene is assigned to the judge-rapporteur alone after the parties have been granted their fundamental right to be heard according to Art. 76 UPCA.
The decision can include an order requesting the intervener for payment of a security of costs according to R. 158 RoP.
In UPC_CFI_33/2024 (Swarco vs. Strabag, order of 30. July 2024) it was stated that while Art. 69.4 UPCA merely provides for the plaintiff to provide security for the costs of the proceedings, R. 158 RoP extends the group of addressees of such an order to “the parties” and thus also to the intervener, if it is admitted. Despite the intervener's existing legal interest, enforcement of the UPC decision in a foreign country outside EU, here the People's Republic of China, is not possible in the absence of a corresponding enforcement agreement, which also applies to the costs of the proceedings. A request for security for costs, on the grounds that, if successful, the claimant would not be able to recover its costs from the intervener by way of enforcement, can be granted after weighing up the interests including the risk of enforcement.
1. If an Application to intervene is admissible, the judge-rapporteur or the presiding judge shall:
(a) inform the parties to proceedings; and
(b) specify a period within which the intervener may lodge a Statement in intervention.
2. The Registry shall as soon as practicable serve on the intervener any written pleading served by the parties. On a reasoned request by a party the Court may for the protection of confidential information order that a pleading or part of a pleading be disclosed only to certain named persons and subject to appropriate terms of non-disclosure.
3. The Statement in intervention shall contain:
(a) a statement as to the issues involving the intervener and one or more of the parties, and their connection to the matters in dispute;
(b) the arguments of law; and
(c) the facts and evidence relied on.
4. The intervener shall be treated as a party, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
The intervener is treated as a party, receives any written pleadings in the file and has the right to lodge a statement within a given period.
The statements in the intervention shall not be contradictory to the statements of the supported party.
In UPC_CFI_440/2023 (Seoul Viosys Co. Ltd. vs. Laser Components and intervener Photon Wave Co. Ltd, LD Paris order on 06. May 2024), it was stated that the intervener may not develop claims contrary to those of the party it supports and may not independently develop claims and procedural methods distinct from those offered to the party it supports. Consequently, an intervener who has not filed a counterclaim for invalidity within the time limit set for the party it is supporting cannot claim an extension of time to file an independent claim. According to R. 315.4 RoP, "an intervener shall be treated as a party unless the court decides otherwise". As such, the intervener has the rights attaching to party status and participates in the proceedings, subject nevertheless, in accordance with R. 313.2 RoP, to the intervention being "made in whole or in part in support of a claim", which means that the intervener may not develop claims contrary to the party he supports and may not to develop claims independently and in accordance with procedural arrangements that are distinct from those offered to the party it is supporting.
Any third party can be invited to intervene either by the judge-rapporteur, the presiding judge or a reasoned request from a party. The invitation related to third parties concerned by the outcome of the dispute. The invited persons must then show a legal interest according to R. 313.1 RoP.
The effect of the intervention is that the intervener can actively support the case by own submissions, and that the intervener is bound by the UPC decision. Thus, the intervening supplier in a dispute about warranty of sales free of legal defects (e.g. according to Art. 42 CISG or national law) is not able to defend himself with lack of patent infringement, once the UPC ordered in the dispute against the buyer that the supplied goods infringe that patent and that the patent is valid.
There shall be no appeal against an order refusing an Application to intervene.
The decision of the judge-rapporteur on the admissibility of the application to intervene according to R. 314 RoP is final and not subject to appeal.
Part 5 - General Provisions
1. Where a party has failed to observe a time-limit set by these Rules or the Court for a cause which, despite all due care having been taken by the party, was outside his control and the non-observance of this time limit has had the direct consequence of causing the party to lose a right or means of redress, the relevant panel of the Court may upon the request of that party re-establish the right or means of redress.
2. The Application for Re-establishment of rights shall be lodged with the Registry within one month of the removal of the cause for non-observance of the time-limit but in any event within six months of the non-observed time-limit. Within that time-limit a fee shall be paid for a Request for Re-establishment of rights, in accordance with Part 6.
3. The Application shall:
(a) state the grounds on which it is based and shall set out the facts on which it relies; and
(b) contain the evidence relied on in the form of affidavits from all persons involved in the nonobservance of the time-limit and the persons involved in establishing the precautionary measures of due care taken in order to avoid such cases of non-compliance.
4. The omitted act shall be performed or completed together with Application for Re-establishment within the time-limit mentioned in paragraph 2.
5. There shall be no grant of Re-establishment of rights in respect of the non-observance of the time limit mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Rule.
6. The panel shall decide on the Application for Re-establishment of rights by way of order. The other parties shall be given an opportunity to be heard beforehand.
7. There shall be no right to appeal from an order rejecting an Application for Re-establishment of rights or from an order granting Re-establishment of rights.
Order UPC_CFI_58/2024 of the Hamburg Regional Court dated 2 June 2025 deals extensively with the issue of reinstatement or restoration under Rule 320.1 RoP.
Accordingly, Rule 320.1 RoP must be interpreted autonomously. The requisite diligence (‘all due care’/‘toute la vigilance nécessaire’) is generally deemed to have been exercised if the party concerned has taken all reasonable precautions to enable it to comply with the time limit. This includes, among other things, the implementation of team functions and replacement rules. It is also noteworthy that, depending on the type of deadline in question – extendable or non-extendable – it considers different standards of care to be required. The standard of care for non-extendable deadlines under Rules 198.1, 231.1 and 224.1 RoP is higher because failure to meet them immediately threatens a loss of rights. It is also noteworthy that, in the court's opinion, it does not constitute due diligence to involve no other legal representatives from a law firm in the proceedings when drafting and submitting pleadings. It is important to apply the ‘four-eyes principle’ and for the legal representative to monitor the persons responsible, at least on a random basis.
In addition, the decision correctly assumes that in proceedings before the UPC, an application for an extension of time after the expiry of the deadline is inadmissible.
Part 5 - General Provisions
Relation with Agreement: Article 49(3)
At any time during the written procedure and the interim procedure, the judge-rapporteur may, of his own motion or on a request by a party, after consulting the panel, propose to the parties that the language of the proceedings be changed to the language in which the patent was granted, in accordance with Article 49(4) of the Agreement. If the parties and panel agree the language of the proceedings shall be changed.
Relation with Agreement: Article 49(4)
Relation with Agreement: Article 49(5)
Case Context
In an order dated January 16, 2024 (Aarke AB v. SodaStream Industries, UPC_CFI_373/2023), the President of the Court of First Instance addressed an application for a change in the language of proceedings in a patent infringement case between Aarke AB and SodaStream Industries Ltd. Aarke AB, a Swedish company, requested a change in the language of proceedings from German to English, as per Rule 323 of the Rules of Procedure (RoP). The President of the Court of First Instance ruled in favour of Aarke AB, declaring the application admissible and granting the request to change the language of the proceedings to English. The decision was based on the principles of fairness, equity, and proportionality outlined in the RoP and the Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPCA). The Court emphasized the need to consider the position of SMEs in such proceedings and the aim of the UPCA to ensure fair access to justice for these entities. The ruling clarifies that requests for changing the language of proceedings can be made independently of the main pleadings and in a different language. The Court balanced the interests of both parties, ensuring that the language change to English did not unfairly disadvantage the larger, more resourceful party.
An Application under Rule 321.1 or 323.1 shall specify whether existing pleadings and other documents should be translated and at whose cost. If the parties cannot agree the judge-rapporteur or the President of the Court of First Instance, as the case may be, shall decide in accordance with Rule 323.3.
Part 5 - General Provisions
Active case management includes:
(a) encouraging the parties to co-operate with each other during the proceedings;
(b) identifying the issues at an early stage;
(c) deciding promptly which issues need full investigation and disposing summarily of other issues;
(d) deciding the order in which issues are to be resolved;
(e) encouraging the parties to make use of the Centre and facilitating the use of the Centre;
(f) helping the parties to settle the whole or part of the action;
(g) fixing timetables or otherwise controlling the progress of the action;
(h) considering whether the likely benefits of taking a particular step justify the cost of taking it;
(i) dealing with as many aspects of the action as the Court can on the same occasion;
(j) dealing with the action without the parties needing to attend in person;
(k) making use of available technical means; and
(l) giving directions to ensure that the hearing of the action proceeds quickly and efficiently.
In UPC_CoA_486/2023 (order of 11 January 2024, Netgear v. Huawei Technologies), the Court of Appeal found that the Judge Rapporteur cannot decide on the admissibility of an application for review by the panel pursuant to Rule 333.1 RoP, but that the panel can only decide on the admissibility of the application because otherwise it would be prevented that a request for discretionary review pursuant to Rule 220.3 may be made, since there is no panel order.
Further it is to be borne in mind that an appeal against an order, e.g. a security for costs order issued by the judge-rapporteur is inadmissible. This type of order is considered a case management order under R. 333.1 RoP (CoA 14 January 2025, UPC_CoA_651/2024, APL_59329/2024, Total Semiconductor v Texas Instruments). Such an order may only be appealed if it has first been reviewed by the panel pursuant to R.333.1 RoP. This system prevents unnecessary involvement of the Court of Appeal where the panel of the Court of First Instance does not share the opinion of the judge-rapporteur (CoA 21 March 2024, UPC_CoA_486/2023, APL_595643/2023, Netgear v Huawei). See Order of the Court of Appeal UPC_CoA_430/2025 issued 09.07.2025 (Chint v. Jingao).
Pursuant to the Procedural Order UPC_CFI_575/2025 issued on 12.02.2026 (Honeywell vs. Sovex, Solvest, Hemtech) the LD Mannheim stated in relation to a rejection of a preliminary objection according to Rule 19 RoP :
If a Preliminary objection is rejected, as an exception to the general principle, leave to appeal may be given by the judge-rapporteur and the order may be appealed against without prior panel review under R.333.1 RoP being required. If leave is granted, the unsuccessful party thus has the choice to either file an appeal or an application for review under R.333.1 RoP. If the judge-rapporteur did not grant leave to appeal, as it was the case here, a party may apply for a panel review. The resulting panel decision may then subsequently be appealed, if leave has been granted by the panel under R.220.2 RoP, or it may be subject to a request for discretionary review under R.220.3 RoP (see UPC_CoA_486/2023 Order of 21 March 2024 Headnote 3). Against the background of the arguments by the Defendants contained in the application for review here, leave to appeal was granted in this order.
Except where the Agreement, the Statute or these Rules provide otherwise, the judge-rapporteur, the presiding judge or the panel may:
(a) extend or shorten the period for compliance with any rule or order [Rule 9.3];
(b) adjourn or bring forward the interim conference or the oral hearing;
(c) communicate with the parties to instruct them about wishes or requirements of the Court;
(d) direct a separate hearing of any issue;
(e) decide the order in which issues are to be decided;
(f) exclude an issue from consideration;
(g) dismiss or decide on a claim after a decision on a preliminary issue makes a decision on further issues irrelevant to the outcome of the action;
(h) dismiss a claim summarily if it has no prospect of succeeding;
(i) consolidate any matter or issue or order them to be heard together;
(j) make any order pursuant to Rules 103 to 109.
The power of the Court to make a case management order includes a power to vary or revoke such order.
The Court may exercise its case management powers on the application by a party or of its own motion, unless otherwise provided.
Where the Court proposes to make an order of its own motion, it may do so but only after hearing the parties.
1. In the interests of the proper administration of justice and of avoiding inconsistent decisions, where more than one action concerning the same patent (whether or not between the same parties) is pending before:
(a) different panels (whether in the same or different divisions); or
(b) different panels of the Court of Appeal, the panels may by agreement, at any time, after hearing the parties, order that two or more actions shall, on account of the connection between them, be heard together. Article 33 of the Agreement shall be respected.
2. The actions may subsequently be disjoined.
Part 5 - General Provisions
Relation with Statute: Article 17
1. The Court shall deal with the actions before it in the order in which they become ready for hearing in accordance with Rule 108.
2. The presiding judge of a panel may, after hearing the parties [Rule 264]:
(a) direct that a particular action be given priority and that time limits provided for in these Rules be shortened;
(b) defer an action to be dealt with later, in particular with a view to facilitating an amicable settlement of the dispute
1. The President of the Court of First Instance or a judge to whom he has delegated this task in a division, the seat of the central division or one of its sections shall allocate the judges to the panels of the local and regional divisions, the seat of the central division and its sections.
2. The allocation shall be in conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement.
3. The actions pending in the division, the seat of the central division or one of its sections shall be assigned to the panels by the Registrar following an action-distribution-scheme established by the presiding judge of each local or regional division, the seat of the central division and its sections (being the judge appointed by the Presidium as the presiding judge) for the duration of one calendar year, preferably distributing the actions according to the date of receipt of the actions at the division or section.
4. Each panel may delegate to one or more judges of the panel:
(a) the function of acting as a single judge; or
(b) the function of acting for the panel in the procedures of Part 1 Chapter 4 (Procedure for the Determination of Damages and Compensation, including the procedure for the laying open of books) and Chapter 5 (Procedure for Cost Decisions). These functions may be delegated to the judge-rapporteur who has prepared the action for the oral hearing.
5. The President of the Court of First Instance or a judge to whom he has delegated this task in a division, the seat of the central division or one of its sections shall designate the judges assigned to each division, the seat of the central division and each of its sections as standing judges for urgent actions. The assignment may be limited to certain periods of time.
6. If all parties agree to having the action heard by a single judge, the presiding judge of the panel to which the action is allocated shall assign the action to a legally qualified judge of the panel.
7. Where paragraphs 1 to 6 apply to decisions by the presiding judge of the seat of the central division or one of its sections, the President of the Court of First Instance may of his own motion review that decision.
8. Paragraphs 1 to 6 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Court of Appeal; the President of the Court of Appeal exercising the respective functions.
Relation with Statute: Article 19
Relation with Statute: Article 7
Part 5 - General Provisions
1. Any decision shall contain:
(a) the statement that it is a decision of the Court;
(b) the date of its delivery;
(c) the names of the presiding judge, the judge-rapporteur and other judges taking part in it;
(d) the names of the parties and of the parties’ representatives;
(e) an indication of the claim, order or remedy sought by the parties;
(f) a summary of the facts; and
(g) the grounds for the decision.
2. The order of the Court consequential upon the decision (other than costs) including any order giving immediate effect to an injunction, shall be appended to the decision. The order shall comply with Rule 351.
3. Any dissenting opinion shall be attached to the Court’s decision.
4. The decision of the Court of First Instance shall contain a summary of the requests and facts submitted by the parties and a statement of the facts and arguments on which the Court bases its decision.
5. All decisions shall be recorded in the register.
Relation with Statute: Article 35(4)
This rule relates to Art. 35.4 UPC Statutes.
The decision is a judgment in the meaning of Art. 2 lit. a) Brussels I Recast Regulation 1215/2012 and enforceable according to Art. 82 UPCA.
1. Every order shall contain:
(a) the statement that it is an order of the judge-rapporteur, of the standing judge, of the single judge, of the presiding judge, of a President of the Court or of the Court;
(b) the date of its adoption;
(c) the names of any judge taking part in its adoption;
(d) the names of the parties and of the parties’ representatives; and
(e) the operative part of the order.
2. Where, in accordance with these Rules the Court grants leave to appeal an order the order shall in addition contain:
(a) a statement of the forms of order sought by the parties;
(b) a summary of the facts; and
(c) the grounds for the order.
3. All orders shall be recorded in the register.
The order is a judgment in the meaning of Art. 2 lit. a) Brussels I Recast Regulation 1215/2012 and enforceable according to Art. 82 UPCA.
This rule is related to the right for security to safeguard reimbursement of costs and damages caused by preliminary enforcement of judgements which are later revoked.
1. Order of Security when issuing the decision or order
In UPC_CoA_549/2024 (Koninklijke Philips N.V. vs. Belkin Ltd. Et al., order of 29. October 2024), the Court of Appeal stated that according to R. 352 RoP, a decision or order may be made contingent upon one party providing security to the other party. However, such security must be ordered when the decision or order is issued. This follows from the wording of R. 352.1 RoP, according to which a decision or order may be “made contingent” and from its systematic position in Chapter 10 (“Decisions and Orders”).
2. Reasons for Security
In UPC_CoA_382/2024 (Abbott Diabetess Care Inc. vs. Sibio Technology Ltd. et al., order of 14. February 2025), the Court of Appeal stated in no. 170, that a request for security for enforcement shall be rejected in case that no grounds have been substantiated why serious difficulties would be expected in connection with the recovery of any possible damages. The hypothesis that a defendant might have to file for bankruptcy if the injunction is issued without such a security requires substantiation.
3. Release of Security
In UPC_CoA_844/2024 (Network System Technologies LLC vs. Audi AG, order of 19. February 2025), the Court of Appeal stated that R. 352.2 RoP applies to security for enforcement but should be applied by way of analogy in the case of withdrawal of the infringement action in which the security was ordered.
In UPC 252/2023 (NanoString Technologies Europe Ltd. vs. President and Fellows of Harvard College, order of 17. October 2024), it was stated that under R. 352.2 RoP, the Court has the discretion to release the security but does not have this power of its own motion. An application of a party is required, which implies that the party applying for releasing the security has the burden of substantiation and proof as to why the Court should use its discretionary power to release the security. The Court must weigh the interests of the parties considering the relevant facts and circumstances. The RoP does not specify the circumstances or conditions under which the Court should release security. A security should be released when the reasons for imposing the security have ceased to exist, e.g. when a final and non-appealable judgement has removed the possibility of the event for which security was ordered (i.e. there is no longer a potential liability for legal cost). A further reason to release the security can be if the facts and circumstances that led to imposing the security order have materially changed so that the balance of interests is in favor of releasing a security.
In UPC_CFI_16/2024 (Ortovox Sportartikel GmbH vs. Mammut Sports Group AG et al., order of 5. August 2024), it was stated that security in the form of a surety bond must cover possible enforcement damages in accordance with R. 211.5 sentence 1 of the Implementing Regulation in conjunction with R. 213.2 of the Implementing Regulation and reference to R. 354.2 of the Implementing Regulation. In accordance with R. 45 Registry Rules, this is checked by the UPC Registry as a condition of validity. If the court grants the applicant a right to choose between a deposit and a bank guarantee with regard to the type of security to be provided and if the applicant also provides a bank guarantee following the deposit, the resulting double security can be the reason and cause for a corresponding decision to release the deposit.
The Court may, by way of order, of its own motion or on application by a party made within one month of service of the decision or order to be rectified, after hearing the parties, rectify clerical mistakes, errors in calculation and obvious slips in the decision or order.
1. The correctness of a decision is assessed based on the entire content of the decision and other decisions of the case.
In UPC_CFI_582/2024 (Yealink v. Barco, final order of 8 May 2025) the Local Division Brussels stated that a decision/order of the Court should be read and interpreted as a whole, the motivational part of the decision/order (grounds) being as much a part of the decision/order as its substantive part (decision).
In UPC_CoA_218/2024 (Volkswagen v NST, order of 27 September 2024) the Appeal Court stated that it suffices that information as meant in R.158.4 RoP is provided by a separate order. It does not follow from R.158.4 RoP that this information must necessarily be given in the order itself. Otherwise, the party must request that the information be included in the order itself.
2. Omission can be corrected only if the statement is incorrect or incomplete of the actually intended statement.
In UPC_CFI_177/2023 (myStromer/Revolt Zycling, Order of 30 June 2023) the Local Division Düsseldorf stated that pursuant to R. 353 RoP, the court may, by order and after hearing the parties, correct clerical and calculation errors as well as obvious inaccuracies in the decision or order. The latter includes all incorrect or incomplete statements of the court's actual intention in the order or decision. The statement of the court's intention in the decision or order must differ from the intention formed during the decision-making process.
In UPC_CFI_368/2024 (Valeo Electrification v. Magna, order of 20 November 2024) the Local Division Düsseldorf stated that the wording of R. 353 RoP, which speaks only “of clerical mistakes, errors in calculation and obvious slips”. There is no mention of omission. Nor is it an incomplete statement as mentioned in the Court´s definition of what an obvious slip can cover.
In UPC_CFI_15/2023 (Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. Meril, order of 17 February 2025) the Local Division Munich stated that besides clear factual errors “obvious slips” can be rectified. “Obvious slips” within the meaning of R. 353 RoP are all incorrect or incomplete statements of what the Court actually intended in the order or decision. The correction must be attached to the original and become an integral part of the decision. The original version of the decision on the UPC's webpage must be amended.
3. Intended deletions in the redacted version is no reason for correcting the decision.
In UPC_CFI_336/2024 (Maxeon Solar Pte. Ltd. v. Aiko Energy et al., order of 21 January 2025) the Local Division Düsseldorf stated that there is no room for rectification in the case where the unredacted version contains the information requested for adding and where this information is only in the redacted version deleted or replaced by another information.
4. A request for correcting orders in related procedures of the same case, in particular invalidation action and counterclaim for revocation, can be made twice for each action number.
In UPC_CFI_501/2024 (Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. Meril, order of 3 June 2025) the Local Division Mannheim accepted the filing of two identical requests for the infringement action and the counterclaim for revocation caused by technical reasons and the intention to avoid any ambiguities. When filing a request for rectification under R. 353 RoP via the CMS, the CMS asks a party (1) to link the request to a specific action number and (2) to provide an order number (if applicable). Since the party asked for the rectification of obvious errors relating to both, the infringement action and the counterclaim for revocation, the party filed the request for rectification twice, once linked to the infringement action by indicating the related action number and the related order number and once linked to the counterclaim by indicating the separate action number and the related order number in order to comply with the formal requirements of the CMS. Furthermore, the double request was intended to make it clear that the request relates to both "parts" of the decision.
Relation with Agreement: Article 82
Rule 354 RoP is related to Art. 82 UPCA.
1. Date of Service as starting point for enforcement
It specifies in R. 354.1 RoP that beginning from the date of service a judgement is enforceable.
2. Enforcement without prior notice
In UPC_CFI_2/2023 (NanoString Technologies Inc. et al. vs. 10x Genomics, Inc., order of 5. December 2023) it was stated that judgments are immediately enforceable without further court enforcement order or threat thereof (for enforcement (see also Local Chamber Düsseldorf, UPC_CFI_177/2023 (myStromer AG vs. Revolt Zycling AG, order of 18. October 2023). Orders are effective and enforceable immediately. In view of this, there was no need for the applicants to give prior notice of their “actual intention to enforce.”
3. Compensation for any injury caused by enforcement
R. 354 .2 RoP gives legal grounds for damages caused by enforcement of a judgement. The court is not entitled to grant compensation without a request of a party.
4. Panalty Payment
Penalty payments to the courts are established by R. 354.3 and 354.4 RoP in case a party fails to comply with the terms of an order.
In UPC_CFI_181/2023 (KraussMaffei Extrusion GmbH vs. TROESTER GmbH & Co. KG, order of 27. December 2023), it was stated that the amount of a penalty payment is limited to the requested amount. According to Art. 76.1 UPCA, the court may not award more than what has been requested.
In UPC_CFI_177/2023 (myStromer AG vs. Revolt Zycling AG, order of 18. October 2023), it was stated that pursuant to Art. 82.4 sentence 2 UPCA, the penalty payment must be proportionate to the significance of the order to be enforced. Correspondingly, the amount of the penalty payment to be paid to the court in the event of a violation must be determined in accordance with R. 354.4 RoP with regard to the significance of the order in question. The decisive criterion for determining the amount of the penalty payment is therefore the significance of the order and thus ultimately the creditor's interest in its enforcement, which may consist, for example, in marketing the patented products (BeckOK PatR/Augenstein, UPCA, 29th edition, as of July 15, 2023, Art. 82 margin no. 41). The penalty payment is intended to reliably deter the debtor from future infringements and violations and therefore primarily has a coercive function. As clarified by both the English (“penalty payment”; “be sanctioned”) and French (“sanctionnée”) versions of Art. 82.4 UPCA make clear, however, the penalty payment is also a penalty similar to a criminal sanction for the violation of the court order, which is why the imposition of penalty payments as an unwritten element of the offense also requires fault on the part of the debtor. This dual purpose of the penalty payment requires that the penalty payment be assessed primarily with regard to the debtor and its conduct. Particular consideration must be given to the nature, scope, and duration of the infringement, the degree of fault, the advantage gained by the infringer from the infringing act, and the danger posed by the infringing acts committed and possible future infringing acts to the injured party. The more frequently and intensively the debtor has violated the injunction imposed on him, the more clearly he has expressed his unwillingness to comply with the injunction. This must be taken into account when calculating the penalty payment. If the debtor has already violated the cease-and-desist order several times in the past, the pressure required to compel him to comply with the order in the future increases. If, on the other hand, the debtor has already demonstrated in the past its willingness to comply with the injunction, this may reduce the pressure required and thus the penalty payment necessary to compel the debtor to comply with the injunction in the future. When assessing the severity of the violation, the debtor's overall behavior must therefore be taken into account. In particular, the nature, scope, and duration of the violation, the degree of fault, and the danger of the committed and possible future infringements for the creditor must be considered.
UPC_CFI_2/2023 (NanoString Technologies Inc. et al. vs. 10x Genomics, Inc., order of 5. December 2023) confirmed this basic principle for determining the value of penalty.
In UPC_CoA_845/2024 (Order of the Court of Appeal Belkin v. Philips of 30 May 2025) it is stated, that according to R. 354.3 RoP, the Court’s decisions and orders may provide for periodic penalty payments payable to the Court in the event that a party fails to comply with the terms of the order or an earlier order. The value of such payments shall be set by the Court having regard to the importance of the order in question, wherein the Court has the discretion to provided a penalty payment of up to a certain amount -in the aforementioned case up to € 50,000- for each day of non-compliance. The fact that only a maximum amount – rather than a specific amount – was provided does not give rise to concerns. The amount of the penalty payment to be imposed does not solely depend on the importance of the order that is reinforced with a penalty (cf. Art. 82(4) UPCA, R. 354 RoP). Rather, after a breach has occurred, the Court must, in exercising its discretion, determine the amount of the penalty payment in a manner that is adapted to the circumstances and proportionate to the breach of the order. Relevant factors in this regard include, among others, aspects such as the severity of the established breach, its duration, and the defendant's ability to pay. The appropriate amount of the penalty payment can therefore only be reliably determined once the nature and extent of the breach of the order have been established.
With reference to UPC_CoA_683/2024 par.240 (Decision of the Court of Appeal on the merits re. Belkin v. Philips, issued on 03.10.2025) and with reference to UPC_CoA_845/2024 par. 40-41 (Order of the Court of Appeal Belkin v. Philips of 30 May 2025) the Court of Appeal made in its Order UPC_CoA_699/2025 issued on 14.10.2025 (Kodak v. Fujifilm) the following summarizing statements:
In FUJIFILM Corporation v. Kodak GmbH. et. al., UPC_CFI_365/2023 , order of 30 January 2026 The Mannheim Local Division confirms that a penalty order under Rule 354.4 RoP may be issued by the judge-rapporteur.
Relying on Rule 1.2 RoP, the Court reasons that procedural acts attributed to “the Court” are, in principle, exercisable by the presiding judge or judge-rapporteur unless expressly reserved to the full panel. Rule 354.4 RoP contains no such reservation.
Procedurally, this matters. A party objecting to a penalty order must first seek panel review under Rule 333 RoP before appealing. The Division granted leave to appeal, acknowledging that enforcement practice under the UPC is still developing.
Part 5 - General Provisions
1. Upon request a decision by default may be given against a party where:
(a) the Rules of Procedure so provide if a party fails to take a step within the time limit foreseen in these Rules or set by the Court; or
(b) without prejudice to Rules 116 and 117, the party which was duly summoned fails to appear at an oral hearing.
2. A decision by default against the defendant of the claim or counterclaim may only be given where the facts put forward by the claimant justify the remedy sought and the procedural conduct of the defendant does not preclude to give such decision.
3. A decision by default against the defendant of the claim or counterclaim may only be given where the time limits for the defence to the claim or counterclaim have expired and thus, it is established that the service of the claim or counterclaim was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to enter a defence.
4. A decision by default shall be enforceable. The Court may, however:
(a) grant a stay of enforcement until it has given its decision on any Application under Rule 356; or
(b) make enforcement subject to the provision of security; this security shall be released if no Application is made or if the Application fails.
According to the decision by default UPC_CFI_318/2025 issued by the Local Division of Düsseldorf on 05.08.2025 between igus and Whale the following applies for decisions by default:
A default judgment is permissible if (1.) the plaintiff requests the issuance of such a judgment (Art. 37 (1) UPC Statutes, R. 355.1 Rules of Procedure), (2.) the defendant has failed to perform an act incumbent upon him within the time limit specified in the Rules of Procedure and the Rules of Procedure provide for the issuance of a default judgment in this respect (R. 355. 1 (a) Rules of Procedure) or fails to submit a written response to a document served initiating proceedings (Art. 37(1) UPC Statute) and (3.) the time limit for response to the action or counterclaim has expired, thereby ensuring that the service of the action or counterclaim was effected in such a way that the defendant had sufficient time to prepare its defence (R. 355.3 Rules of Procedure) (see UPC_CFI_193/2024 (Munich Regional Court), default decision of 11 October 2024 – i-mop v. ARCORA).
In the Decision UPC_CFI_499/2024 issued by the LD The Hague on 21.102025 (Amycel v. Defendant located in Poland) the Court stated:
Pursuant to R.355.2 RoP, a decision by default against the defendant may only be given where the facts put forward by the claimant justify the remedy sought (see also above cited LD Dusseldorf 5 August 2025, UPC_CFI318/2025 (igus/Whale technology). A similar test seems to be applied by LD Munich in its decision by default of 9 January 2025, UPC_CFI _508/2023. The test mentioned in the headnote of CD Milan 22 July 2025, UPC_CFI_597/2024 seems stricter, but the test applied in that decision seems to be similar; the facts of the latter case are also quite different because several submissions had been exchanged).
The Court understands this to mean that in a default situation, it must assess whether the facts are sufficiently substantiated by evidence and whether the requested measures and orders are not prima facie unlawful or unfounded, i.e. the patent in question is not obviously invalid and that the allegedly infringing product is not obviously outside of the scope of the patent ( by considering that the patent is more likely that not to be valid and infringed).
Relation with Statute: Article 37
Part 5 - General Provisions
If the Court finds that an action has become devoid of purpose and that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on it, it may at any time, on the application of a party or of its own motion, after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard, dispose of the action by way of order.
In UPC_CFI_249/2023 (Meril GmbH v. Edwards Lifesciences Corporation, order of 19 December 2023, the Local Division Munich found that Rule 360 RoP (Termination of the main proceedings) shall apply mutatis mutandis to applications for provisional measures.
In UPC_CFI_372/2023 (Stäubli Tec-Systems v. Respondent, order of 16 May 2024) the Central Division Paris stated that the obligation to decide on the merits of the costs is regulated in R. 118.5 RoP for the main proceedings. There is no corresponding provision for the settlement of the main issue within the meaning of R. 360 RoP. Therefore, R. 118.5 RoP applies accordingly in this respect. Since there is no unintended gap in the provision governing actions for annulment, analogous application of R. 61.1 RoP, which generally requires a warning letter as a prerequisite for negative declaratory relief, is not applicable. R. 61.1 RoP refers to an action for a declaration of non-infringement and establishes substantive admissibility requirements.
Where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognisance of an action or of certain of the claims therein or where the action or defence is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Court may, after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard, give a decision by way of order.
The Court may at any time, on the application of a party or of its own motion, after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard, decide that there exists an absolute bar to proceeding with an action, for example because of the application of the principle of res judicata.
Part 5 - General Provisions
Relation with Agreement: Article 79
Part 6 - Fees and Legal Aid
1. Court fees provided for in these Rules shall be paid in accordance with the provisions contained in this Part and the table of fees adopted by the Administrative Committee pursuant to Article 36 (3) of the Agreement (hereinafter: table of fees).
2. A fixed fee shall be paid in accordance with Section I (fixed fees) of the table of fees for the following actions at the Court of First Instance:
(a) Infringement action [Rule 15],
(b) Counterclaim for infringement [Rule 53],
(c) Action for declaration of non-infringement [Rule 70],
(d) Action for compensation for licence of right [Rule 80.3],
(e) Application to determine damages [Rule 132].
3. In addition to the fixed fee a value-based fee shall be paid in accordance with Section II (value-based fees) of the table of fees for those actions at the Court of First Instance set out in paragraph 2, which exceed a value of 500,000 EUR.
4. For the following procedures and actions at the Court of First Instance a fee shall be paid in accordance with Section III (other procedures and actions) of the table of fees adopted by the Administrative Committee:
(a) Revocation action [Rule 46],
(b) Counterclaim for revocation [Rule 26],
(c) Application for provisional measures [Rule 206.5],
(d) Action against a decision of the European Patent Office [Rule 88.3, 97.2],
(e) Application to preserve evidence [Rule 192.5],
(f) Application for an order for inspection [Rule199.2],
(g) Application for an order to freeze assets [Rule 200.2],
(h) Filing a protective letter [Rule 207.3],
(i) Application to prolong the period of a protective letter to be kept on the register [Rule 207.9],
(j) Application for rehearing [Rule 250],
(k) Application for re-establishment of rights [Rule 320.2],
(l) Application to review a case management order [Rule 333.3],
(m) Application to set aside decision by default [Rule 356.2].
5. For the following procedures at the Court of Appeal a fixed fee and, where applicable, a value based fee shall be paid in accordance with Section IV. of the table of fees:
(a) Appeal pursuant to Rule 220.1 (a) and (b) [Rule 228],
(b) Interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 220.1(c), appeal with leave of the Court of First Instance pursuant to Rule 220.2 or allowance by the Court of Appeal pursuant to Rule 220.4 or appeal of a cost decision with leave of the Court of Appeal pursuant to Rule 221.4 [Rule 228],
(c) Application for leave to appeal against cost decision pursuant to Rule 221 [Rule 228],
(d) Request for discretionary review pursuant to Rule 220.3, [Rule 228],
(e) Application for re-establishment of rights [Rule 320.2],
(f) Application to review a case management order pursuant to Rule 220.2 [Rule 333.3],
(g) Application to set aside decision by default pursuant to Rule 357 [Rule 356.2],
(h) Application for rehearing pursuant to Rule 245.2 [Rule 250].
6. The assessment of the value of the relevant action in paragraphs 3 and 5 shall reflect the objective interest pursued by the filing party at the time of filing the action. In deciding on the value, the Court may in particular take into account the guidelines laid down in a decision of the Administrative Committee for this purpose.
7. If an action has more than one claimant and/or more than one defendant or if an action concerns a plurality of patents only one fixed fee and, if applicable, one value-based fee shall apply.
8. Small enterprises and micro-enterprises are required to pay only 60 % of the fees provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 above (hereinafter: regular fees) subject to the following:
(a) In the Statement of claim or Counterclaim or in the application for a procedure or an appeal the party shall lodge with the Registry a notification in an electronic form in the language of the proceedings. In this notification the party shall provide an affirmation that he fulfils either the criteria of a “small enterprise” or a “micro-enterprise” as defined in Title I of the Annex to the Recommendation of the European Commission n° 2003/361 of 6 May 2003.
(b) If the requirements referred to above have not been met Rule 16.3 to .5 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
(c) The Court may, of its own motion, order the party to supply further documentation including any document relating to that party’s financial resources. The application shall be dealt with by the Court as soon as practicable.
(d) The Court may, at any time, of its own motion, and after having heard the party order payment of (i) the remainder of the regular fee, in the event that payment of 60 % of the regular fees is manifestly disproportionate and unreasonable having regard to the financial capacity of the party; (ii) the remainder of the regular fee plus an additional 50 % of that regular fee, if the affirmation provided by the party is found to be wholly or partially incorrect. An order for the payment of an additional fee pursuant to (i) and (ii) above shall state the reasons for such order.
(e) If the additional fee is not paid within the time limit set by the Court, a decision by default against the party shall be given by the Court pursuant to Rule 355.
9. Fixed and value-based fees may be reimbursed as follows:
(a) If the action is heard by a single judge [Rule 345.6.] the party liable for the Court fee will be reimbursed by 25 % of the fee.
(b) In case of the withdrawal of an action [Rule 265] the party liable for the Court fees will be reimbursed by: (i) 60 % if the action is withdrawn before the closure of the written procedure (ii) 40 % if the action is withdrawn before the closure of the interim procedure (iii) 20 % if the action is withdrawn before the closure of the oral procedure
(c) If the parties have concluded their action by way of settlement the party liable for the Court fees will be reimbursed by: (i) 60 % if the action is settled before the closure of the written procedure (ii) 40 % if the action is settled before the closure of the interim procedure (iii) 20 % if the action is settled before the closure of the oral procedure
(d) Only one of the reimbursements referred to in paragraph 9 (a), (b) and (c) will apply per action and party. Where more than one reimbursement is applicable, the larger will be applied for each party.
(e) In exceptional cases, having regard, in particular, to the stage of the proceedings and the procedural behaviour of the party, the Court may deny or decrease the reimbursement payable according to paragraph 9 (b) and (c) of the aforementioned provisions.
10. If the amount of Court fees threatens the economic existence of a party who is not a natural person, and has presented reasonably available and plausible evidence to support that the amount of Court fees threatens its economic existence, the Court may upon request by that party, wholly or partially reimburse the fixed and value-based fee. In reaching a decision the Court shall reflect on all circumstances of the case including the procedural behaviour of the party. Before making such a decision the Court may give the other party an opportunity to be heard.
11. The party seeking reimbursement under paragraphs 9 and 10 shall lodge a reasoned Application for reimbursement to the Court. The Court shall deal with the application without delay and if satisfied that the reimbursement is appropriate shall direct the Registrar to make the payment as soon as practicable.
According to the Decision UPC_CFI_202/2025 of the LD Milan dated 05.09.2025 the Court finds that rule 370.9(c)(i) RoP is not applicable to applications for provisional measures, either directly or by analogy (see UPC_CFI_500/2025, order 28.08.2025, LD Mannheim). Correspondingly, the Applicant’s request that the Court reimburses 60 % of the Court fees in view of a settlement has been rejected. The Court stated that the wording of the provision refers only to actions. Furthermore, the stages of the proceedings referred to in rule 370.9(c) RoP are not applicable in proceedings concerning applications for provisional measures. In particular, there is no interim procedure, and oral hearings do not take place in every case. Furthermore, the court fees for applications filed pursuant to rule 206 RoP is already significantly reduced compared to that for actions. Against this background, no further reductions are provided for or required.
Relation with Agreement: Article 70
In UPC_CoA_286/2025 (Order of 23 June 2025, Sumi Agro Europe v. Syngenta) the Court of Appeal confirmed that a timely order to pay court fees suffices even if payment is received after the payment deadline. Internal CMS metadata was not considered relevant for determining the effective lodging date.
Part 6 - Fees and Legal Aid
1. Subject to Article 71(3) of the Agreement, legal aid may cover, in whole or in part, the following costs:
(a) court fees;
(b) costs of legal assistance and representation regarding: (i) pre-litigation advice with a view to reaching a settlement prior to commencing legal proceedings; (ii) commencing and maintaining proceedings before the Court; (iii) all costs relating to proceedings including the application for legal aid; (iv) enforcement of decisions;
(c) other necessary costs related to the proceedings to be borne by a party, including costs of witnesses, experts, interpreters and translators and necessary travel, accommodation and subsistence costs of the applicant and his representative.
2. Subject toArticle 71(3) of the Agreement, legal aid may also cover the costs awarded to the successful party, in the event that the applicant loses the action.
1. The applicant shall be entitled to apply for legal aid where:
(a) owing to his economic situation, he is wholly or partly unable to meet the costs referred to in Rule 376; and
(b) the action in respect of which the application for legal aid is made has a reasonable prospect of success, considering the applicant’s procedural position; and
(c) the claimant applying for legal aid is entitled to bring actions under Article 47 of the Agreement.
2. The Administrative Committee may define thresholds above which legal aid applicants are deemed wholly or partly able to bear the costs of proceedings set out in Rule 376. These thresholds may not prevent applicants whose economic situation is above the thresholds from being granted legal aid if they prove that they are in fact unable to pay the costs of the proceedings referred to in Rule 376 as a result of the high level of the cost of living in the Contracting Member State of domicile or habitual residence.
3. When deciding on the grant of legal aid the Court shall, without prejudice to paragraph 1(a), consider all relevant circumstances including the importance of the action to the applicant and also the nature of the action when the application concerns a claim arising directly out of the applicant’s trade or selfemployed profession.
1. An application for legal aid may be lodged before or after proceedings have been started before the Court.
2. The Application for legal aid shall contain in a language of a Contracting Member State:
(a) the name of the applicant;
(b) postal and electronic addresses for service on the applicant and the names of the persons authorised to accept service;
(c) the name of the other party as well as postal and electronic addresses for service on the other party where available and the names of the persons authorised to accept service, if known;
(d) the action number of the action in respect of which the application is made or, where the application is lodged before the action has been brought, a brief description of the action;
(e) an indication of the value of the action and the costs to be covered by legal aid;
(f) where legal aid is requested for costs of legal assistance and representation, the name of the proposed representative;
(g) an indication of the applicant’s financial resources, such as income, assets and capital, and of the applicant’s family situation including an assessment of the resources of persons who are financially dependent on the applicant;
(h) where appropriate, a reasoned request for suspension of a time limit which would otherwise need to be observed until the date of notification of the order deciding on legal aid.
3. The application for legal aid must be supported by:
(a) evidence of the applicant’s need for assistance, such as certificates attesting his income, assets and capital and family situation; and
(b) where the application is lodged before the action has been brought, an indication of the evidence in support of the action.
4. In the event of an appeal, a new application shall be lodged.
5. Rule 8 shall not apply.
1. To be admissible, the application must contain a statement of the facts and legal situation, with specific mention of the evidence to be presented. The application must also contain a statement regarding the economic and financial situation of the applicant. The following documents shall be attached to the application:
(a) latest property and income declarations of the applicant;
(b) a document showing the personal monthly income for the previous year, or a declaration of unemployment delivered by the competent authorities, or a certificate proving that the applicant is receiving aid or financial support under a social welfare scheme;
(c) a certificate of composition of household;
(d) any other official document that can provide proof of the financial situation of the applicant.
2. Where appropriate, a certificate relating to the income of other members of the household of the applicant should also be attached to the application. The official documents shall not be older than 3 months. At the request of the Court, the applicant shall produce further documentation and, if so requested, an affidavit of the truthfulness of his statements, otherwise the application will not be admissible.
1. The Registry shall examine the formal admissibility of the application for legal aid and the conditions regarding the financial situation of the applicant pursuant to Rules 377.1(a), .2 and 377A.
2. If the requirements referred to in Rules 377.1(a), .2, 377A, 378 and 378A have not been met, the applicant shall, as soon as practicable, be invited to correct the deficiencies within 14 days.
3. If the requirements referred to in Rules 377.1(a), .2, 377A, 378 and 378A have been met or the applicant fails to correct a deficiency, the decision on such application shall be taken, by way of order, by the judge-rapporteur or, where the application is lodged before the action has been brought, by the standing judge.
4. Before making a decision on an application for legal aid, the Court shall invite the other party to submit written observations unless it is already apparent from the information submitted that the conditions referred to in Rule 377.1(b) have not been met. Documents regarding the economic and financial situation of the applicant shall be made accessible to the other party only where the applicant has consented or the applicant’s refusal of consent is unreasonable or in the view of the Court the other party has a right to information on the economic or financial situation of the applicant.
5. An order refusing legal aid shall state the reasons on which it is based.
6. An order granting legal aid may provide for:
(a) an exemption, wholly or partly, from Court fees;
(b) an interim amount to be paid to enable the applicant and/or the representative of the applicant to meet any request of the judge-rapporteur or standing judge prior to making a final order;
(c) an amount to be paid to the representative of the applicant or a limit which the representative’s disbursements and fees may not exceed;
(d) a contribution to be made by the applicant to the costs referred to in Rule 376.1(c).
7. Legal aid may be granted only for the period from receipt of the application with the Court.
8. Where the legal aid covers, in whole or in part, the costs of legal assistance and representation the order granting legal aid shall designate the representative of the applicant.
9. On a request by the designated representative, the Court may order that an amount shall be paid by way of advance.
10. Where requested by the applicant in accordance with Rule 378.2(h), the Court shall decide on the suspension of any time limit.
The applicant shall inform the Court promptly of any alteration in his economic situation.
1. If the economic situation of the applicant which has led to the grant of legal aid according to Rule 377.1(a) alters during the proceedings, the Court may at any time, of his own motion or on a reasoned request by the other party, withdraw wholly or partly legal aid but only after having heard the applicant.
2. The Court may withdraw wholly or partly legal aid if the applicant:
(a) by inaccurately representing the circumstances of the case, has misrepresented its prospects of success, which are determinative for the approval of assistance with Court costs; or
(b) has grossly negligently made false statements as to his personal or economic circumstances; or
(c) has not immediately informed the Court of a considerable improvement to his financial circumstances;
(d) has been in arrears for longer than three months with the payment of a monthly instalment or with the payment of any other amount.
3. An order withdrawing legal aid shall state the reasons on which it is based.
